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 This dissertation examines representations of wounded white masculinity in 
contemporary American fiction from the late 1960s to the mid-2000s through a critical 
perspective developed within Native-authored creative and critical work. It departs from 
currents within studies of contemporary U.S. fiction in approaching representations of the 
experience of whiteness within settlement in nonnative writing. The project’s critical 
focus is grounded in the work of Sherman Alexie (Spokane/Coeur d’Alene) and Anna 
Lee Walters (Otoe/Pawnee). Alexie and Walters theorize white masculinity as the 
experience of prosthetic belonging within settlement. The project develops their theories 
of whiteness into a unique approach to novels typically read as exemplars of postmodern 
narrative. Reading works from Don DeLillo, David Foster Wallace, Kurt Vonnegut, and 
Jonathan Safran Foer, Wounded Whiteness examines the ways these writers imagine 
sincerity as an emotional prosthetic for white masculinity. This examination yields a new 
perspective on contemporary fiction’s engagement with questions of personal, spatial, 
and national belonging in highlighting the embodied, sensory dimensions of racial and 
gender identity for a category—white masculinity—typically associated with 
disembodied rationality. The dissertation thus demonstrates the extent to which 
contemporary U.S. fiction imagines performances of white masculinity’s distanced 
disembodiment as actively dependent on the sensory inhabitance of others’ identities; and 
how, out of those relationships, white masculinity instantiates an expansive experience of 
belonging within contested spaces. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Since at least the 1960s, white men have been wounded men within U.S. cultural 
representation. As Sally Robinson, David Savran, and others have argued, this pattern 
marks a strategic response to the destabilization of white masculinity’s normatively 
hegemonic home at the center of U.S. cultural privilege.1 Woundedness may seem like a 
strange strategic vehicle. However, Robinson suggests that in order for white masculinity 
to “most fully [represent] itself as victimized” it has to inhabit a “wounded body” (6). 
Though Robinson develops this claim through a focus on white men’s response to the 
“forced embodiment of whiteness and masculinity” (4), what would it mean to read the 
wounded body white men inhabit as someone else’s? How might the pattern of white 
men’s victimized representation in so much of U.S. literature, film, and television from 
the past half-century flag a pattern of surrogation and prostheticization, affective 
transmissions that produce the experience of whiteness as an experience of 
woundedness?2 For what would woundedness become a surrogate if we were to take this 
perspective? And how might it push us to reconsider representations of white men’s 
victimization as less strategic than sincere? 
 In this project I examine representations of wounded white masculinity in 
contemporary U.S. fiction as expressive of a phenomenological orientation I call 
wounded whiteness. I develop this perspective from the critical-creative work of two 
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Native American novelists, Anna Lee Walters (Otoe/Pawnee) and Sherman Alexie 
(Spokane/Coeur d’Alene). In Ghost Singer and Indian Killer, Walters and Alexie 
respectively develop a critical phenomenology theorizing white masculinity as the 
experience of prosthetic belonging within settlement and suggest that whiteness inhabits 
its imaginary of Indianness in order to inhabit itself—a form of prosthetic attachment to a 
fiction borne from settler-colonial relations that becomes self-authorizing and self-
generating. Alexie’s and Walters’s white men experience whiteness as a wound that 
colors their perceptual capacities and, in Walters’s evocative phrasing, “plugs up” their 
senses. From within whiteness as a plugged-up sensorium, Alexie and Walters suggest 
white men sincerely experience and express their fantasies of victimhood and 
woundedness as the basis for their fantasies of prosthetic belonging within settlement. 
Wounded whiteness is thus not a strategic manipulation of embodiment but a sincere 
expression of what it means and how it feels to live within settlement as the experience of 
living within whiteness. 
Following work within Indigenous studies that examines settlement as a structure 
not an event,3 I read a selected set of nonnative texts—Don DeLillo’s White Noise, David 
Foster Wallace’s The Broom of the System, Kurt Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse-Five, and 
Jonathan Safran Foer’s Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close—as archives of the 
phenomenology of wounded whiteness Alexie and Walters imagine and develop within 
Ghost Singer and Indian Killer.4 Merging critical analyses of white male victimhood with 
Walters’s and Alexie’s phenomenologies of whiteness, and developing that perspective 
through diverse array of critical and theoretical work within Indigenous studies, gender 
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and sexuality studies, and feminist critiques of genre and cultural production, I read these 
nonnative texts’ representations of wounded or victimized white masculinity as 
expressive of the sincere experience of whiteness as a wound that directs white men 
toward others as their emotional surrogates and affective prosthetics. By emotional 
surrogates I mean that other persons become the vehicles for wounded white men’s 
feelings of woundedness within these texts, both enabling their expression and 
conditioning their possibilities. By affective prosthetics, I mean that wounded white men 
feel themselves durably attached to forms of belonging—to space and place as much as to 
personhood and plain human being—through the affective space these texts imagine 
others’ bodies to provide. Whether through women’s sexual availability, ambiguously 
racialized threats, other men’s suggestively queered bodies, or domestic-familial spaces 
over which ever-watchful maternal figures preside, DeLillo, Wallace, Vonnegut, and 
Foer suggest whiteness is experienced as woundedness through the durable attachments 
to space and place others make possible.  
Drawing upon Alexie’s and Walters’s texts as theoretical touchstones, I situate 
these nonnative texts’ representations of wounded whiteness against the 
phenomenological backdrop of settler-colonial experience, or what I have called settler-
feeling. Positioning them as archives for what Walters and Alexie imagine as the 
experience of prosthetic belonging is as unique as it is unorthodox within studies of 
contemporary U.S. nonnative fiction. What does DeLillo have to do with Native 
Americans? How does Foer’s imaginative revision of 9/11 trauma intersect with settler-
coloniality? These questions, while warranted, speak to the core presumption this project 
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challenges: that Native creative and intellectual work is applicable only when Native 
peoples feature as representational content. Within a U.S. frame, perceptual experience is 
shaped by the experience of settler-coloniality, even and especially when its contours 
appear inconsequential. This is what it means to say that settlement is a structure; 
settlement is an enduring process that unfolds in the present through the manifest content 
of perceptual experience. To the extent that nonnative U.S. fiction takes up, organizes, 
narrates, and represents lived experience—to whatever end—what features as experience 
in nonnative novels take shape around the experience of settler-occupation. As I show in 
the first chapter, Alexie’s and Walters’s work open up ways to chart these experiences 
through a focus on the phenomenological contours of white masculinity as a particularly 
privileged position within settlement.5  
Building on analyses of white male victimhood, I argue that victimized white 
masculinity’s typically representational affects—isolation, disorientation, insularity, and 
withdrawal—can be better understood as surrogates for the experience of settler-feeling. 
To that end, I have organized the project around three modes of wounded whiteness: 
sincerity, solipsism, and traumatic experience. Though the first chapter focuses explicitly 
on white sincerity, I track sincerity as an affective inclination throughout each chapter of 
the project. White sincerity for Alexie represents a particular interpersonal inclination 
that arises from the experience of others’ subject positions’ prosthetic availability, and for 
Walters expresses a mode of belief that colors one’s perceptual capacities and conditions 
what one can be sincere about. Following their work with white sincerity, in the second 
chapter I track the relationship between sincerity and white solipsism particularly as it 
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works out a vision of core humanity over and against the otherwise problematic 
dimensions of white men’s solipsistic insularity. In the third chapter, I focus on how 
Walters’s sense of sincerity as expressive of experiential limits conditions what becomes 
possible when sincerity becomes a genre within which to frame wounded white men’s 
traumas as dramas of national-familial belonging.  
Each chapter thus offers a different take on sincerity, which I argue to be a core 
mode of wounded whiteness’s expression within nonnative literary representation. I take 
sincerity in its usual since, as an expression of genuine feeling that runs counter to 
otherwise perceptible incongruities between performance and intention. I privilege 
sincerity over other representational strategies at work in these nonnative narratives for 
two primary reasons. First, the texts stage men’s sincerity as an appeal to “deep” 
emotional truths grounded in the body’s affective inclinations. This appeal makes it 
possible, on the one hand, to represent whiteness or masculinity as the experience of 
woundedness while, on the other, to clear away space within which performances of 
“deep” emotions come into the foreground against the background conditions that 
produce them. Second, as a representational frame sincerity situates wounded whiteness’s 
prosthetic attachments as ethically uncomplicated and emotionally necessary elements of 
cultural repair. In this second sense I do not mean to suggest that sincerity is equivalent to 
ideological dissimulation, as if the texts know not what they do. Rather, as I show in the 
third chapter, sincere fictions map the contours of a particularly privileged mode of 
existence within which others appear as already available affective prostheses and 
emotional surrogates. These relationships stem from the possessive attachments to spaces 
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and others that characterize the perceptual experience of whiteness, and I argue that 
through them we can see wounded whiteness as itself a prosthetic for white masculinity’s 
possessive attachment to cultural centrality as a mode of belonging within settlement.  
 To these ends, my work has three primary goals. First, in departing from usual 
approaches to contemporary U.S. fiction, I hope to demonstrate the potential of re-
reading and re-thinking contemporary U.S. writing alongside Native creative and 
intellectual work. Situating wounded whiteness as an experience of prosthetic belonging 
is among this project’s unique contributions to studies of contemporary nonnative fiction. 
In highlighting belonging as an affective attachment articulated through whiteness, I aim 
to draw critical approaches to nonnative contemporary fiction into the analytical orbit of 
Indigenous studies in order to demonstrate the generative potential of stepping beyond 
canonical approaches to canonical literature. Second, in positioning nonnative U.S. 
fiction as an archive for Native-authored phenomenologies of whiteness, I hope to 
encourage scholars within Indigenous studies to reconsider contemporary nonnative 
writing as a fruitful site of engagement with the modalities of settler-feeling as they take 
form through representations of perceptual experience. And finally, in focusing on 
sincerity as the privileged literary representation of wounded whiteness’s 
phenomenological orientation, I argue that critics of contemporary fiction need to 
reimagine the cultural work of sincerity as a generic tactic, particularly as sincerity 
implicates whiteness as its condition of possibility. I elaborate the context for these aims 
and the specific challenges this project poses in the following sections. 
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Wounded Whiteness and White Masculinity: Re-Thinking Victimization and 
“Invisibility” 
How do Alexie’s and Walters’s theories impact approaches to whiteness and 
masculinity? In particular, how does reimagining whiteness as the experience of 
prosthetic belonging reframe white male victimhood as the lens through which white 
masculinity has come into focus in the past several decades?6 Much critical work on 
white male victimhood takes representations of victimization throughout what Sally 
Robinson calls the “post-liberationist era” as strategic manipulations of white 
masculinity’s supposed newly and sometimes forcibly embodied visibility in American 
culture.7 And since at least the 1980s in popular media, white masculinity has been “in 
crisis.” 8 For Robinson, representations of wounded white men work to decenter white 
masculinity’s dominant position through laying claim to a “symbolic 
disenfranchisement” (12). David Savran makes a similar argument in focusing on the 
masochistic images through which white men articulate and embody victimhood and 
comes to a similar conclusion about the deflective potential opened up through 
representations of self-inflicted wounds. As Savran puts it, “masochism functions 
precisely as a kind of decoy” against which representations of masochistic masculinities 
stage “an almost magical restitution of phallic power” (37). Other more recent work on 
white masculinity largely follows in line.9 The way woundedness (whether literal, 
physical wounds or the metaphorical wounds that “masochism,” “fragmentation,” or 
“hysteria” signal) has become a dominant representational strategy through which white 
masculinity comes into cultural and critical focus connects these analyses to this project. 
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But the question these perspectives leave unaddressed is what it means to assume that 
whiteness could have once been invisible and that white masculinity could have once 
been disembodied.  
Discourses create subject positions that bodies inhabit, enact, and perform. 
Affective experience offers a view to the experience of living a subject position as a 
material part of one’s embodied existence. White masculinity is always already an 
embodied subject position; what shifts in representational content show is thus not the 
experience of becoming, finally, embodied but rather changes in the experience of what it 
means and how it feels to inhabit white masculinity as both a subject position imbued 
with power and privilege and as a structure of perceptual experience. When we talk about 
whiteness’s invisibility or masculinity’s disembodiment, we are talking about affect; and 
when we talk about victimization or woundedness we are talking about the affective 
contours of embodied experience. Victimization or woundedness are affective 
experiences that shape how embodiment feels and direct what becomes possible as 
embodied experience. So rather than taking representations of white male victimization 
as calculated responses we can read them as sincere expressions of embodied experience, 
a felt woundedness that becomes another in a long line of affected performances through 
which white masculinity is embodied. Focusing on the representational strategies through 
which white men repair and maintain their privileged position work against efforts to 
highlight the active subordination of other subject positions embedded within processes 
of “co-optation,” as Hamilton Carroll puts it (7). In order to co-opt, one must also inhabit 
a relatively stable position that one can then mask in the guise of another operation. If we 
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analyze how performances of crisis or victimhood point to the experiential contours of 
white masculinity, we can move from questions of stability toward analyzing ways of 
feeling and doing that produce, to paraphrase Judith Butler, the fiction of the doer behind 
the deed.10 In this sense, woundedness is a productive performance through which 
masculinity articulates its presumptively stable centrality while also staking a claim to 
enduring coherence. Thus rather than unmasking the core of white masculinity, we can 
see performances of woundedness or victimhood as generative of modes of engagement 
and affective inclinations that are themselves constitutive of white masculinity.  
The lingering notion of white masculinity’s disembodiment, and through it the 
sense that white male victimhood must amount to an insincere dissimulation masking 
some essential core, within some strands of white masculinity studies owes to a set of 
critical assumptions that circulate through usual approaches to whiteness. Early work on 
whiteness examined the myriad privileges whiteness affords visibly white persons, the 
systemic ways in which whiteness manifests these privileges to the exclusion of others, 
and how whiteness fashions itself.11 This work was and remains immensely valuable 
insofar as it corrects a critical and cultural oversight that permits whiteness to remain, as 
George Lipsitz put it, “everywhere in U.S. culture but very hard to see” (1). Although 
useful as a starting point for analyzing the ways whiteness colors white persons’ 
perceptual capacities, to the extent that whiteness’s notional invisibility serves as an 
analytical anchor for continued analyses of whiteness’s embodied experience it raises a 
more knotty problem. Theorizing whiteness’s ubiquity threatens to bring about its 
collapse into normality, what whiteness studies organized itself around contending.12 
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Arguing that whiteness is everywhere but also nowhere in particular, as Richard Dyer put 
it in White, might render its presence throughout a broad swath of contemporary 
canonical fiction too banal to warrant discussion or, worse, too malleable to substantively 
engage. Thus there might be an acknowledgement of the whiteness of much U.S. 
literature on the one hand (“yes, these writers are white, but so what?”) and on the other a 
casual dismissal of whiteness’s influence on the shape such narratives take (“the text isn’t 
about whiteness, really, it’s about XYZ”). Intertwined with this paradox is the pernicious 
assumption that the content of white-authored fiction can perfectly well take shape 
around anything but whiteness.  
This project challenges the literary-critical solipsism involved in not engaging 
with the experiential contours of whiteness the nonnative texts I examine and others like 
them produce. Walters’s and Alexie’s theories of whiteness help to bring its givenness as 
a background for experience into focus, and draws out the relationship between the 
perceptual experience of whiteness and what is more directly in the foreground. In 
reading these foreground-background structures as representations of what white persons 
feel themselves able to do and of the conditions within which they feel able do it, we can 
read whiteness as productive of capacities and orientations that might nevertheless feel 
like anything but whiteness. 
Some more recently have begun to examine the relationship between whiteness, 
perception, and affect from a phenomenological perspective.13 This work’s productive 
implementation of phenomenology as a tool through which to address embodiment as a 
site of the active materializing of racial constructions helps to reframe the potential 
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abstraction involved in discussions of whiteness’s systemic effects around how whiteness 
manifests through situated, embodied inclinations. However, in positioning whiteness as 
a part of one’s perceptual schema, this work raises additional questions about the 
relationship between embodiment and environment.14 Shannon Sullivan, for example, 
examines whiteness as a mode of ontological expansiveness and addresses the problem of 
white solipsism as stemming from the limitations that white-centered environments 
engender. Sullivan argues that changing one’s environment can produce new habits and 
modes of engagement that might open up these perceptual limitations (9-10). This line of 
thinking, however, too narrowly defines “environment” as one’s immediate surroundings 
rather than taking into account the relationship between one’s spatial, geopolitical, and 
historical situatedness. The embodied experience of whiteness, like the embodied 
experience of other discursive formations, is lived in relation to the history of its 
articulation. The sense that changing one’s immediate environment will work to undo this 
history is tenuous particularly because it misses the relation—within a U.S. frame—
between the history of spatial occupation and white persons’ habitual relationships to 
space as exceedingly capacitating of their expansiveness. 
Theorizing whiteness as the experience of prosthetic belonging accounts for the 
history and endurance of settlement as the experience of a capacitating expansiveness, a 
largely unaddressed area of much U. S.-focused whiteness studies literature. Aileen 
Moreton-Robinson argues that this perceptual gap is the product of a historical 
homological relationship between proprietary ownership and citizen-subject belonging.15 
In “Writing Off Treaties,” Moreton-Robinson argues that white persons are disciplined 
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“to invest in the nation as a white possession that imbues them with a sense of belonging 
and ownership” (86). The possessive investment in the nation as a divisible territory over 
which one can hold property rights “imbues” the citizen-subject with an affective sense 
of propriety over their citizenship as the follow-on to territorial possession.16 In other 
words, one belongs to the extent that one owns one’s belonging. There is no affective 
distinction between one’s immediate and macrological environment in terms of the 
degree to which one feels oneself to belong to both. Whiteness in this vein names the 
modality through which one’s possessive attachments to the nation are articulated and 
through which those attachments endure as one’s felt belonging.  
As the privileged mode of proprietary belonging to national space, citizenship 
becomes an affective structure toward which white bodies are already oriented and into 
which they are already grafted. Situating belonging before whiteness flips the logic 
through which whiteness is theorized as taking shape around what it is not. As the means 
through which one owns one’s citizenship as a marker of one’s belonging, propriety over 
territory positively constructs whiteness out of a particular relationship to land and 
resources that in turn delineates modes of access to those resources posited as white 
possessions.17 Through this flipped framework we can address how whiteness becomes 
an experience of attachment to territorial possession, which is especially salient for 
thinking through late-twentieth and early twenty-first century nonnative fiction where the 
notion of settlement feels like a long-foregone conclusion, if it is felt at all.  
 
 13 
Native Phenomenologists: Re-Reading Nonnative Writing as a Phenomenological 
Archive 
Focusing my work with contemporary nonnative fiction through Alexie’s and 
Walters’s phenomenological critique positions their novels as, on the one hand, 
developing representations of whiteness that are traceable within nonnative self-
representation, and, on the other, as doing theoretical work that bears on critical studies 
of white masculinity as much as on literary studies of contemporary nonnative fiction. 
Within a U.S. frame, to the extent that racial identification has historically operated and 
continues to operate as one means through which Indigenous peoples are dispossessed of 
land, resources, and political and economic sovereignty, texts that dramatize these 
conditions also implicate whiteness in their continued production and endurance. Indian 
Killer’s and Ghost Singer’s close focus on how whiteness colors and contours the 
perceptual experience of settler-occupation is especially generative. The novels’ 
representations of whiteness underscore its manifestation as a phenomenological 
surround wherein white persons can feel like anything but settlers. Though the texts’ 
staging of whiteness in this way is strategic insofar as both novels present whiteness as a 
screen through which white persons feel unimplicated in the endurance of settler-colonial 
violence, I argue that their representations of whiteness as a phenomenological surround 
and affective inclination pertains equally as much to narratives wherein settlement seems 
a nonissue and whiteness appears as a given.  
Some within Indigenous studies have sought to focus on the background 
conditions within which nineteenth-century American literature represents everyday 
 
 14 
settler-experience, and it is my hope that this project reflects its indebtedness to that 
work’s productive insights.18 Few studies, however, address contemporary nonnative 
American fiction from Native creative writers’ critical-theoretical perspectives. James 
Cox’s Muting White Noise is one standout example. Cox reads canonical Native-authored 
fiction as challenging self-justificatory settler narratives. Employing those texts’ critiques 
as a way of reading nonnative fiction, a strategy he calls “red readings,” Cox argues that 
Native creative work can help to “unmake non-Native stories and the worlds imagined 
there” (205). Cox’s work speaks the productive potential of approaching nonnative 
fiction through Native creative writing, and helpfully situates Native-authored fiction as 
performing literary criticism. However, the nonnative texts Cox considers call attention 
to settler representations of Indigenous peoples. In this project, I focus on narratives and 
narrative worlds that do not feature representations of Native people in order to show 
how Native-authored texts bring nonnative self-representation into focus, and in 
particular how the critical perspectives developed within Native creative writing unmake 
the framework wherein Indigenous absence feels like a given.  
Worlds within which whiteness seems normative speak to the broader conditions 
that push race into the background of everyday perception. Phenomenological analysis 
posits a fundamental relationship between the act of perceiving and the conditions within 
which one perceives. Taking this relation as a starting point illustrates how habits, 
attitudes, and inclinations both affect and are affected by the world one inhabits. As 
Walters suggests throughout Ghost Singer, “forty years of thinking” a particular way 
“plugs up” the capacity to feel the fullness of this relationship. As I demonstrate in 
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chapter one, these “plugs” are not incapacitating but rather generative of alternate modes 
of engagement with the world. Walters imagines the experience of whiteness as the 
givenness of belonging manifest through a felt attachment to a future national space 
cleared of Indigenous peoples and their history. For this imaginative landscape to feel 
like a given, one has engage with its sensory contours from an alternate plane of 
perception that edits out the reality of Indigenous existence. We can draw upon this sense 
of alternate capacities to examine novels that take this edited perceptual horizon as a 
given backdrop for the experience of wounded whiteness.  
 Alexie’s and Walters’s focus on perception, screening, and editing out point to 
their novels’ theoretical position within phenomenological philosophy. Alexie’s sense of 
whiteness as the experience of prosthetic belonging develops Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s 
thinking about perception’s spatial anchorages in the Phenomenology of Perception. For 
Merleau-Ponty, the ability to feel oriented in a given space depends on already having 
established an affective and proprioceptive anchor point (264-65). Once established this 
affective coordinate recedes into the background. In other words, familiar spaces do not 
require active orientation because the space feels as thought it already provides the 
coordinates.19 As these affective anchorages accrue, they become a “perceptual tradition” 
that one embodies without having to think about it (248). Alexie’s sense of “perceptual 
tradition” further encompasses the experiential accrual of whiteness as the habituation to 
spatial occupation within settlement. Walters’s “plugged-up” sensorium takes the sense 
of habituation further, imagining that whiteness blocks the otherwise available capacity to 
sense the fullness of one’s relationship to space and place.  
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Whiteness for Walters becomes an affective structure within which only filtered 
phenomena become perceptible. Whiteness in this vein is an “orientation,” in Sara 
Ahmed’s terms, that is experienced as a background for perception. What becomes 
sensible within whiteness’s orientation thus points to what has not already been edited 
out. In Queer Phenomenology, Ahmed considers the givenness of orientation through the 
lens of bodily motion, and suggests that the experience of being oriented within spaces 
depends on what is within reach. Whiteness puts “certain things within reach” that 
through their proximity and potential utility become “orientation devices”; “The white 
body in this way expands; objects, tools, instruments, and even ‘others’ allow that body 
to inhabit space by extending its reach” (126, 132). Walters’s sense of perceptual plugs 
elaborates Ahmed’s instrumental critique of whiteness’s expansiveness. Situating the 
transit of others’ bodies into instruments as a part of what plugs whiteness, Walters 
locates the experience of inhabiting space within prostheticization as whiteness’s default 
perceptual setting. In the context of Walters’s narrative, whiteness’s default 
prostheticization edits out the noninstrumentality and autonomy of Indigenous persons in 
the process of converting their existence into the logic of whiteness’s orientation toward 
settler-inhabitance.  
That whiteness as the condition of possibility for these relationships remains 
imperceptible for the white men Alexie and Walters imagine suggests that the “plugs” 
blocking up the fullness of experience also work to generate whiteness as a background 
condition. In Ahmed’s terms, whiteness “trails behind” within spaces that are “oriented 
around whiteness” (Queer 133). Whiteness is thus not an object toward which one 
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becomes oriented, but rather a condition that lends a feeling of orientation within spaces 
that have taken shape around it. To the extent that whiteness marks a “particular 
privileged position within the allocation of Native lands and resources among 
nonnatives,” as Mark Rifkin puts it (23), the experience of that privilege speaks to the 
experience of settlement as a mode of orientation within which spaces, objects, and 
others feel like capacitating givens. Alexie and Walters portray this relationship as taking 
form through habitually embodied inclinations, suggesting that the sensation of being 
oriented within settler-structures, in Merleau-Ponty’s language, “benefits from work 
already completed,” “my body and my senses being precisely this habitual knowledge of 
the world” (247). In this sense, settler-feeling is an embodied experience and an 
embodied inclination toward its continual manifestation. “We do not think the object,” 
Merleau-Ponty writes of the relationship between the focal object of one’s perceptions 
and the background conditions within which one perceives, “we are directed toward the 
object and we merge with this body that knows more than we do about…the means 
available for accomplishing the synthesis” (248). Following Alexie and Walters, taking 
whiteness to constitute the relationship between embodiment, the historical accrual of 
habitual inclinations, and a sense of directedness toward what becomes sensible within 
whiteness’s perceptual horizon, we can come to see the experience of whiteness as 
already oriented toward the experiential continuance of settler-occupation as a feeling of 
prosthetic capacitation.  
The “givenness” of whiteness in the nonnative novels I examine points to the 
experience of already being oriented within the space of settler-occupation as it takes 
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shape around whiteness. Though settlement may appear a non-issue, and Native peoples 
may be absent from the texts representational frame, positing settlement as a structure 
that conditions the parameters of felt experience calls attention to the ways it features as 
an enduring background of nonnative self-representation. What becomes foregrounded 
within these narratives thus calls attention to other ways white men imagine themselves 
to belong and other kinds of prosthetic attachments through which they articulate their 
belonging in worlds that seem to have already taken their shape.20 Instead of threatening 
to occlude whiteness from view, reading whiteness as a “given” structure presents an 
opportunity to engage with how whiteness structures the perceptual traditions that 
DeLillo, Wallace, Vonnegut, and Foer imagine as men’s sincere experiences of 
woundedness.  
 Positioning whiteness as an affective prosthetic for settler-belonging thus opens 
up a way to account for white masculinity’s malleability, particularly when it is imagined 
as a wounded subjectivity. DeLillo’s White Noise for example imagines Jack Gladney’s 
deathward dramas to implicate a form of white solipsism. Despite most everyone else 
being able to see Gladney as a middle-aged white man, he remains distinctly unable to 
perceive the extent to which his whiteness plays a role in his spiralingly solipsistic 
anxieties. Imagining Gladney’s ability to embody a culturally authoritative position 
crumbling all around him, DeLillo suggests that whiteness’s attachment to social power 
is predicated on a dead foundation.21 The co-dependent relationships DeLillo sketches 
throughout the narrative—whether between Gladney and his wife Babette or between 
Gladney and his nemesis “Mr. Gray”—further highlight how the social power vested in 
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white masculinity structurally depends on others’ willingness to grant it. Aligning 
Gladney’s whiteness with his inability to perceive the extent of his co-dependency, 
DeLillo echoes Walters’s theory of whiteness as constitutive of a perceptual blockage but 
differs crucially, inasmuch as DeLillo imagines Gladney unable to notice how others 
make his subjective centrality possible. The direction these relationships take ultimately 
always situates Gladney at the center, reifying rather than critiquing white masculinity’s 
centrality within American culture’s gender and racial hierarchy.  
To the extent that whiteness becomes a wound, Gladney’s ability to find another 
affective anchorage through which to reorient his centrality speaks to ways that his 
orientations toward belonging are never actually at issue but that rather the habitual 
patterns through which those orientations take form no longer function in the ways they 
once did. DeLillo’s characterization, though it tilts toward a critique of white solipsism, 
proceeds from a durable sense of Gladney’s inevitably secure position. His dramas of 
embodied disorientation thus become the background for a narrative of his reorientation 
toward the structures that have never really fallen apart around him. Taking DeLillo’ 
novel as an example, we can see how wounded whiteness becomes a phenomenological 
orientation that directs wounded men toward objects, others, and spaces that already feel 
like capacitating givens. Against the backdrop of settler-feeling, the structure of 
capacitation that, in this example, finds form through the prostheticization of women’s 
bodies becomes possible within what the narrative situates as belonging’s durably and 
unquestionably stable framework. The sense that something durable and stable remains 
underneath it all points to the connection between wounded whiteness as an orientation 
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and the ways wounds provide for sincere representations of white men’s “victimization” 
as bridges toward their affective reorientation. 
 
Sincerity and Contemporary Nonnative Fiction 
Throughout the period I examine, sincerity has become a mode of literary-
aesthetic engagement that foregrounds affect and feeling as keys to genuine experience. 
From Slaughterhouse-Five (1969) to Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close (2005), one 
can readily observe this stylistic shift. Vonnegut and the dark humorists like him explored 
what ethical horizons remain amid the absurdities of American culture during a decade of 
immense political and cultural shifts in race relations, foreign policy, and global conflicts. 
Fast-forward nearly forty years to Foer’s narrative, likewise situated against the backdrop 
of 9/11, two wars on global fronts, and changes in American domestic and foreign policy 
the effects of which endure well into the present, and what we find is not an allegorical 
confrontation with cultural absurdity but rather a reification of an affective status quo that 
turns bad feelings into an engine of hopeful restoration. DeLillo’s canonically 
postmodern White Noise (1985) situates its protagonist as beset by a series of absurd 
anxieties that reflect his relative stasis against the rapidly changing cultural and political 
horizon of mid-1980s America. Wallace’s The Broom of the System (1987) sets up an 
equally absurd situation that rather abruptly and improbably resolves through reorienting 
its central characters toward the normalizing horizon of hetero-love and -couplehood. 
What accounts for these novels’ different perspectives, I argue, is Wallace’s and Foer’s 
overt reliance on sincerity as a textual strategy meant to shift American literature, and 
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with it American cultural attitudes, away from Vonnegut’s or DeLillo’s brand of ironic 
diagnostics toward the felt immediacy of emotional truths.  
However, many of these novel’s readers attend to their micro-level details rather 
than pulling back the focus to account for the conditions the novels present as givens. 
Vonnegut’s readers often focus on elaborating his invented philosophical systems, or take 
up the complex cosmic ironies his narratives often stage.22 DeLillo’s readers generally 
either situate his fiction as oracular of shifts in the American cultural milieu or attend to 
the theoretical play in which his novels and White Noise in particular revel.23 Wallace’s 
critics generally approach his fiction with a mix of reverence and heartfelt critique of the 
shortfall between his novels and the commitment to humanism he often expressed in his 
non-fiction.24 And some of Foer’s readers situate him as among the heirs to Wallace’s 
sincere vision for American literature and culture, arguing that his work represents a new 
direction of American literary aesthetics following the cultural exhaustion of 
postmodernism.25 While Wallace’s influence on contemporary writers like Foer, Jonathan 
Franzen, Geoffrey Eugenides, Dave Eggers, Nicole Krauss, Zadie Smith, and others is 
difficult to ignore, I am ultimately less interested in delineating the literary-historical 
dimensions of a shift from irony to sincerity than I am in charting the work that sincere 
fiction understands itself to be doing and the conditions it imagines itself to work within.  
As the critical history of these novels suggests, typical approaches overlook how 
their small-scale dynamics or commitments to relatively uncomplicated humanism 
emerge from complex and often ethically and politically vexing situations that position 
wounded white men as the sincere arbiters of everyone else’s affective orientations. The 
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paradoxical positioning of sincerity as both a mode of affective solicitation and a 
disciplinary affective structure makes these narratives unique in a field otherwise full of 
representations of wounded white men. From Hemingway to Updike and everywhere 
between, wounded white men feature prominently in twentieth-century American 
nonnative fiction. However, where most of these representations posit woundedness as a 
limitation that hampers one’s engagement with the world, whether Jake Barnes’s 
impotence in The Sun Also Rises or Harry Angstrom’s wanderlust in Rabbit, Run, 
DeLillo, Wallace, Foer, and Vonnegut imagine woundedness—whether physical, 
psychological, or metaphorical—to be productive.  
Representing woundedness as a sincere experience of whiteness, the texts imagine 
woundedness as a workaround for the otherwise ethically complicated ways their men’s 
prosthetic attachments position whiteness as a form of affective privilege. Staging men’s 
sincerity about their emotional disorientations and mixed feelings thus speaks how 
whiteness constructs a background against which men can otherwise feel disoriented 
while remaining nevertheless firmly grounded. Woundedness becomes the affective 
vector through which the texts represent men as needing others to supplement their 
emotional or physical capacities; but woundedness also becomes a prosthetic through 
which whiteness articulates itself as a given attachment to a durable feeling of belonging 
and placement from which white men can sincerely perform their woundedness. 
Many of my readers may wonder why, in setting out to do so much with sincerity, 
I have chosen not to highlight the characteristic irony or sardonic humor of these novels 
and novelists. For example, in the second chapter I read Wallace’s The Broom of the 
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System as uncritically embracing heteronormative whiteness as the presumptive 
orientation through which it resolves its characters’ solipsistic anxieties. I take Wallace’s 
characters at face value, reading Rick Vigorous’s suggestively queer embodiment as a 
foil for Andrew Lang’s pronounced straightness, and highlight the ways these characters 
become central mechanisms for the novel’s understanding of, in Wallace’s phrase, “what 
it means to be a fucking human being.”26 Some of my readers may argue that this take on 
The Broom of the System is not only humorless but also potentially obstructive of the 
text’s otherwise critical irony. Wouldn’t taking these characters at a slant shift the reading 
and thus undermine the argument? Furthermore, isn’t Wallace up to something more than 
simply staging a humanist drama against the backdrop of a postmodern world gone 
askew?  
These questions are serious and well founded, but they express a position toward 
postmodern narrative of Wallace’s ilk that, out of a commitment to examining 
whiteness’s manifestations within the structure of settlement, I do not share. And with 
due respect to the fact that Wallace’s novel could certainly be read in myriad ways, to 
answer these objections I would point back to the text and situate it in context. In order 
for irony to work, one has to mean something other than what one says. Further, that 
something else has to be understood through its ironic vehicle. In order for solipsism to 
be an ironically critical vehicle for cultural insularity, in other words, cultural insularity 
has to already be associated with solipsism. The same for whiteness, for straightness, and 
for suggestively queer bodies. Thus to the extent that Wallace might have been ironizing 
a set of cultural conditions, he does so through a sincere embrace of the extant conditions 
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that mobilize certain bodies, figurations of identity, or understandings of sexuality as 
vehicles for ironic critique without examining the structure within which those 
associations get made. Wallace himself made this argument in his famous essay “E 
Unibus Pluram: Television and U.S. Fiction,” claiming that irony is akin to a “queer 
ontology of appearance” wherein one attempts always to deflect what one says from who 
one is.27 For Wallace, this amounts to a full-on sense of existential dread that becomes as 
socially immobilizing as it does emotionally incapacitating. The antidote? Sincerity. I 
read Broom within this context, and arguably by pointing to the background conditions 
that mobilize what some may read as ironic critiques, I demonstrate how even when irony 
appears the privileged strategy some sincerity is always going on. 
As Walters suggests in Ghost Singer through her sense of whiteness as a 
“plugged-up” sensorium, performances of sincerity reflect as much as produce the 
conditions that limit what one can be sincere about. Wallace and Foer are overtly sincere 
about their characterizations and representational strategies, and within the context of 
American literary history their narratives represent a shift away from a postmodern 
aesthetics of irony toward an embrace of something more stable and enduring. The 
impulse toward sincere representation, inasmuch as it carries with it an impulse toward a 
sincere embrace of something stable, points to a broader assumption that there are things 
about cultural experience in the United States that do not change. As I engage with the 
aesthetics and performances of sincerity in the last two chapters, I suggest that among the 
core experiences that these writers represent as unchanging settler-feeling is perhaps the 
most durable. Irony is thus not a useful interpretive angle precisely because it assumes 
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that the novels’ representations are offered in the service of another unstated premise. 
Rather than read their representations in the negative, I argue that we can see these texts 
dramatizations of wounded whiteness as the experience of prosthetic belonging precisely 
through foregrounding the relationships they imagine to be in the background. 
The affective transmission on which sincerity relies stretches further than the 
distance between characters. When sincerity becomes a generic strategy aimed toward 
affective refashioning, sincere fictions’ focus on individual white men’s travails becomes 
an aspiration toward cultural reorientation. As Lauren Berlant argues of sentimentality, 
overtly emotional texts produce disciplinary affective structures that influence readers’ 
felt relation to the national, political, and ethical frames through which inequitable 
distributions of social power are articulated and maintained.28 Following Moreton-
Robinson’s argument that white persons are disciplined into a possessive investment in 
the nation as a white possession, to what extent might texts whose avowed strategy is to 
influence readers’ affective inclinations through staging white men’s wounds partake in 
extending this disciplinary project?  
As I demonstrate in chapter three, sincere fictions situate an uncomplicated form 
of national belonging as their aspirational horizon and generate an affective structure 
wherein pain, not politics, brings us together.29 Foregrounding how sincerity operates as a 
genre, I show how the phenomenology of white masculinity that Alexie and Walters 
describe influences the modes of engagement that sincere fictions characterize as cultural 
aspiration.30 The texts suggest that woundedness amounts to a condition of detachment 
from fully feeling one’s imbrication in the affective fabric of personhood or nationhood 
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they imaginatively weave around white men’s woundedness. The mixed feelings the texts 
stage as wounding whiteness or conversely as white wounds thus work to cast wounded 
white men as in need of something else through which to articulate their attachments. The 
durability of those attachments flags the sense that white men have the capacity to 
remake them in whatever ways and through whatever persons appear available. The work 
of woundedness thus functions through as much as articulates whiteness as its condition 
of possibility insofar as whiteness invests white bodies with the affective privilege of 
feeling sincere about feeling through others.  
Feeling through others is more than feeling vicariously, a point that I wish to 
stress because it is a point that Alexie and Walters emphasize throughout their narratives. 
It is less that wounded white men feel for others through sympathetic imaginings of 
other’s pain, but more that wounded white men sustain their feelings of woundedness 
through others’ presumed capacity to endure on their behalf. Emphasizing prosthetic 
attachments as opposed to vicarious feeling highlights how everyday actions, relations, 
and affective inclinations sustain one’s feelings of prosthetic belonging. In attending to 
the bodies, conditions, and affects that make these feelings possible as the given content 
of everyday perception, we can trace how nonnative self-representation articulates settler-
feeling and in turn how settler-feeling structures wounded whiteness’s representation as a 
phenomenological orientation. Thus we can see how gender and sexuality, or trauma and 
disorientation, become privileged pivot points of wounded whiteness in narratives where 
whiteness as such appears as a given; how the givenness of whiteness indexes the 
conditions that foreground gender or sexuality as vectors of prosthetic attachments to 
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personhood or national feeling; and examine how the feelings toward which wounded 
white men aspire as their normative horizon takes the conjunction of settler-feeling and 
national belonging as mutually constitutive givens. 
 
Organizing Wounded Whiteness 
Wounded Whiteness re-contextualizes contemporary nonnative fiction within the 
scope of Native-authored theories of whiteness as a phenomenological surround. 
Focusing on representations of wounded white masculinity and white sincerity within 
Anna Lee Walters’s Ghost Singer and Sherman Alexie’s Indian Killer, I build a 
theoretical framework and critical methodology from which to re-examine 
representations of wounded white masculinity as documenting the perceptual experience 
of whiteness within settlement. From Walters’s and Alexie’s representations of 
whiteness’s perceptual plugs, I position Don DeLillo’s White Noise and David Foster 
Wallace’s The Broom of the System as archives of the perceptual experience of white 
solipsism, and juxtapose DeLillo’s more ambivalent critique against Wallace’s more 
decidedly sincere depiction. Moving from DeLillo’s and Wallace’s representations of 
white solipsism, I turn to Kurt Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse-Five and Jonathan Safran 
Foer’s Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close, reading their novel’s imaginations of 
traumatic experience as engendering a feeling of national-familial belonging. As with 
DeLillo and Wallace, I contrast Vonnegut’s more direct critique of whiteness as a form of 
insular engagement with historical trauma to Foer’s representatively traumatized family, 
and through that contrast show how sincerity as a genre operates to position 
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woundedness’s inevitably traumatic return as the wellspring for a sincere vision of a 
better tomorrow. Each of the chapters is thus thematically organized around different 
modes of wounded whiteness—sincerity, solipsism, and traumatic experience—as a way 
to focus the different inflections of sincerity the novels imagine. Grouping the nonnative 
texts so that one generates a critique of the other’s framework suggests that wounded 
whiteness is not necessarily a universally “plugged-up” condition, but that as Walters 
suggests what gets blocked depends on what gets foregrounded.  
Chapter one, “Inhabiting Indianness: Sherman Alexie’s Indian Killer, Anna Lee 
Walters’s Ghost Singer, and the Phenomenology of White Sincerity,” argues that white 
sincerity is the experience of prosthetic belonging that takes form around inhabiting 
“Indianness.” I read Walters’s and Alexie’s presentations of wounded whiteness as a 
structure of feeling, and focus on the ways they imagine it to take shape through white 
men’s performances of benevolence and beliefs in Indigenous erasure. In Indian Killer 
Alexie juxtaposes white men’s sincere benevolence with direct, racially motivated 
violence to highlight the contiguity between them. Sincerity is a violent affect that 
permits material violence to glide past white men’s perceptions. Alexie’s utterly 
unreflective anthropology professor Clarence Mather and his mirror opposite radio talk 
show host Truck Shultz become the embodiment of this dialectic, and through them 
Alexie suggests that in inhabiting an idea of “Indianness”—whether as a sign of one’s 
sincere solidarity or as the culprit of one’s wounds—white men can feel like anything but 
settlers. Walters offers a way to account for what Alexie presents as a perceptual 
impossibility through her notion of whiteness as a “plugged-up” sensorium. I argue that 
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through this notion, Walters offers the stronger claim that whiteness inhabits Indianness 
in order to inhabit itself. I read Walters as suggesting that whiteness manifests an 
alternate perceptual plane within which sincere beliefs in Indigenous erasure manifests in 
the active editing out of Indigenous presence. Walters and Alexie thus together 
demonstrate the violent solipsism of white sincerity’s continual manifestation of settler-
occupation as the genuine experience of belonging within, and indeed through, Native 
space. 
Walters suggests that the affective buildup of “forty years of thinking” oneself 
grounded in the removal of Native peoples plugs up the ability to feel otherwise while 
highlighting the fact that this way of thinking engenders a durable attachment to national 
space. Representing the “selective historical amnesia” that Aileen Moreton-Robinson 
argues mitigates “the fear of opening oneself up…to being a disoriented, displaced, and 
diasporic racialized subject” (93), Walters draws attention to the stakes involved in 
keeping whiteness plugged. Ending the narrative with the sense that white men, even 
when wounded by what they feel to be an inconceivable Indigenous presence, remain 
nevertheless incapable of believing it to be materially real, Walters offers a way to 
reimagine wounded whiteness in contexts where Indigenous presence has been 
thoroughly edited out of what becomes sensible within whiteness’s sensorium.  
In chapter two, “Body Dramas: Sex, Sincerity, and White Solipsism in Don 
DeLillo’s White Noise and David Foster Wallace’s The Broom of the System,” I track the 
violent solipsism of white sincerity through DeLillo’s and Wallace’s representations of 
solipsism as a wound to whiteness and sexuality as a means of overcoming it. I 
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demonstrate how White Noise presents protagonist Jack Gladney’s death anxiety as a 
wound to his heterosexual prowess, and imagines him able to overcome it through the 
twinned prostheses of his wife Babette’s sexual availability and the wounded body of his 
racially ambiguous nemesis Willie Mink, whom he attempts to murder at the narrative’s 
close. Mink’s pain becomes Gladney’s prosthetic, and through it Gladney is able to recast 
what Mink points out as the whiteness of his wounds as a sign of his deeply human 
“muddles and quirks.” The Broom of the System imagines solipsism to be a similarly 
wounding affect, but this time as most problematically manifest in Lenore Beadsman’s 
misaligned relationship to her body’s fundamental “function” to reproduce. Figured 
through a female body, the novel suggests that the insularity and withdrawal solipsism 
yields can only be overcome through properly penetrative heterosexual sex. In staging its 
solipsistic drama as a heterosexual saga, Broom marks a sincere investment in gender 
essentialism that takes form against whiteness as its unacknowledged backdrop. Rick 
Vigorous’s suggestively queered body, as I show, becomes a prosthetic for the novel’s 
engagement with white hetero-reproductivity; through him, Broom positions wounded 
whiteness as the experience of a queer sort of solipsism in need of perceptual and sexual 
realignment. 
To the extent that both of these narratives stage the body as the locus of white 
men’s wounds as much as the vehicle for their repair, they each imagine sincerity as the 
affective orientation most suited for bringing about the alignment of embodied 
inclinations and sincere desires. Situating the body as a gateway to a fuller and more 
deeply human sense of personhood, the novels imagine sex, violence, and sincerity as the 
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affective channels through which white men build their prosthetic attachments to plain, 
universalized personhood. As Savran and Robinson have observed, through inhabiting a 
wounded or victimized body white men gain access to a felt sense of plain humanity that 
restores their universality by paradoxically particularizing their whiteness. However, 
where Robinson sees this performative victimization as the result of extrinsic pressures 
stemming from the expanded political and cultural enfranchisement of women and 
persons of color, White Noise and The Broom of the System imagine the pressures that 
wound whiteness as intrinsic to the limitations that accrue around whiteness itself. The 
narratives’ representations of white solipsism thus configure whiteness as an inherently 
insulating formation that limits white men’s and women’s abilities to extend themselves 
(figuratively or, in Wallace’s case literally through reproductive heterosexuality). In this 
sense, performances and representations of white victimhood appear less “reactive” as 
Hamilton Carroll has suggested, and instead more proactive in the sense of aiming to 
produce another way to inhabit personhood.31 The other channels that become available 
in these narratives—heteroconjugality, the body’s affective inclinations, redemptive 
violence—thus position white men’s sincerity about their limits as productive of a 
prosthetic attachment to a universal sense of belonging. 
In chapter three, “Regions of Silence: Trauma, Sentimentality, And Emotional 
Surrogacy In Kurt Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse-Five And Jonathan Safran Foer’s 
Extremely Loud And Incredibly Close,” I show how the prosthetic attachments that 
DeLillo and Wallace suggest can repair whiteness’s intrinsic limitations and restore 
men’s fuller and more deeply human sense of personhood become attachments to 
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national-familial feeling. Set against the backdrop of the firebombing of Dresden 
Germany, the novels frame contemporaneous national traumas within the “region of 
silence” Dresden represents. Borrowing the concept of “regions of silence” from 
Merleau-Ponty, I argue that Slaughterhouse-Five imagines Dresden as a silent area of 
national history metonymic of the cultural silence about the continuum of U.S. violence 
Vonnegut sees stretching from Euro-colonial contact through to the contemporary war in 
Vietnam. I argue that insulated and solipsistic protagonist Billy Pilgrim represents 
Vonnegut’s critique of whiteness as the mechanism through which contiguous acts of 
violence, historical or contemporary, feel like the smooth glide of everyday life. 
Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close reimagines the Dresden firebombing as the 
backdrop for its staging of intergenerational traumas. Sharply contrasting with 
Vonnegut’s sense of white insularity as the wellspring of historical violence’s continual 
contiguity, Extremely Loud self-consciously frames its familial drama through the critical 
and clinical discourse of trauma. As a result, Foer imagines traumatic experience to 
become a “region of silence” within the men who populate his narrative that enables their 
sincere prostheticization of women’s bodies to become the novel’s normative horizon. 
Relying on sentimental tropes of childhood and maternality, Foer’s trauma drama 
constructs a homology between domesticity and domestic national space that situates 
women’s care and receptivity as phenomenal contours within which wounded men 
experience their woundedness as a wellspring for the continuous care that always puts 
them at the center of everyone else’s attention.  
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The universalizing maneuver through which DeLillo and Wallace foreground 
their notions that humanity can be repaired through wounded men’s sincere performances 
fold into the backdrop of historical trauma in Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close. In 
other words Foer does not have to take pains to demonstrate how sincerity can repair 
cultural wounds because the novel, hewing close to the critical and clinical discourse 
theorizing trauma, imagines traumatic experience to be always already universalizing.32 
Though whiteness is never at issue nor ever acknowledged in Foer’s novel, it does not 
fail to account for whiteness but rather does not need to insofar as whiteness seems 
already given as the backdrop against which particularized pain can become 
representative of universalized aspirations toward heterofamiliality as the locus of a 
better tomorrow when the pains of history will not hurt quite as much.  
Foer’s vision proceeds from an uncritical embrace of the universality of pain that 
points to the presumptive universality of the suffering bodies he imagines and the work 
those bodies in pain do to present the pained nation as having taken their shape.33 Insofar 
as Foer’s novel marks a representative turn toward sincerity within nonnative U.S. 
fiction, its uncritical portrayal of heterofamiliality’s enduring stability against the 
inevitable return of historical traumas calls for nuanced attention to what this new 
aesthetics encourages readers to take for granted. Though the novel’s gender dynamics 
are as assuredly problematic as Wallace’s or DeLillo’s, ultimately what needs more 
scrutiny than even these patterns of reliance is the larger system of prostheticization in 
the background. Walters’s and Alexie’s novels provide the theoretical framework for a 
sustained engagement with wounded whiteness as the experience of prosthetic belonging, 
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especially when settler-occupation seems a foregone conclusion. This project sets out to 
demonstrate what becomes possible when nonnative fiction becomes an archive of the 
perceptual experience of settler-feeling. 
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Notes
 
1 On victimized white masculinity as a strategic response to waning cultural authority, see Carroll; 
DiPiero; Lotz; Malin; Robinson; Savran; and Walsh. 
 
2 For a consideration of the ways affect is transmitted between bodies, see Brennan. For the 
transmission of affects as shaping social and political situations, see Ahmed, Cultural Politics and Protevi, 
Political Affect. Brennan uses the term “transmission of affect” to “capture a process that is social in origin 
but biological and physical in effect” (3). In other words, affects are socially communicable and as such 
one’s affective inclinations can influence and shape another’s physical body. My use of the term “affective 
prosthetics” denotes this process. 
 
3 As Glen Coulthard puts it in Red Skin, White Masks, conceiving of settlement as an “event” 
positions it as a “temporally situated experience which occurred at some relatively fixed period in history 
but which unfortunately continues to have negative consequences for our communities in the present” 
(125). Citing Patrick Wolf’s “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” Coulthard explains 
that as a “structure,” “there is nothing ‘historical’ about the character of settler colonization…Settler-
colonial formations are territorially acquisitive in perpetuity” (125). Through this critique of eventalization 
as a tactic within the structural strategy of settler-coloniality, I seek to trace the experience of living 
whiteness as a privilege subject position that materializes within settlement as a structure.  
 
4 Throughout this project, I use “Native” and “Indigenous” interchangeably to refer to Native 
peoples and polities within the United States. When referring to non-Indigenous persons, I use the term 
nonnative as opposed to “Non-Native” or “non-Native” in order to deemphasize the historical primacy 
afforded to nonnative persons within the United States and to more prominently differentiate between 
nonnative cultural production and Indigenous creative and scholarly work. 
5 On whiteness as a particularly privileged position within settlement, see Rifkin (23). 
 
6 For an overview of the ways white masculinity has been represented through victimized and 
wounded subject positions from the 1960s-1990s, see Robinson (1-21). On white male victimhood, see 
Savran and Silverman. For contemporary representations of white male victimhood in literature, film, and 
television, see Carroll; and Lotz. 
 
7 See Robinson (1-21) for an elaboration of her sense of the “post-liberationist era” and how white 
masculinity fashions itself in response. 
 
8 Announcements of and responses to the “crisis” of white masculinity have been varied. See for 
example Faludi; Gardiner; Jeffords; Kimmel, Manhood and Angry and “Masculinity”; Kaufman; and 
Malin. Kimmel is in this regard representative of a particularly problematic strain within masculinity 
studies. Kimmel’s work often expresses a desire to conserve “manhood” as something essential that can be 
remade through shifts in the construction and articulation of “masculinity.” This line of thinking reifies a 
fictional division between gender as a socio-discursive formation and its lived embodiment through the 
form of something like “manhood.” Masculinity may be in “crisis,” in other words, but we can quell the 
crisis if we take control of what “masculinity” means.  
 
9 On masochism and masculinity, also see Silverman. Fintan Walsh in Male Trouble focuses the 
deflectionary tactics Robinson and Savran address through the lens of performativity, reading the “crisis” 
of masculinity as affected through a “network of performative practices that contain the queer disruption 
that crisis might otherwise signify” (182). Thomas DiPiero, in White Men Aren’t suggests that the kinds of 
containment strategies Walsh illustrates signify the extent to which “whiteness and masculinity are built 
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around an anxiety of insufficiency” (9), an anxiety that positions the “identity ‘white male’ [as] about 
nothing if not a form of hysteria” (2). Hamilton Carroll’s recent examination of white masculinity, 
Affirmative Reaction, follows the logic of these arguments, positioning white masculinity as a “reactive” 
identity formation that “redefines the normative by citing itself a marginal identity” (6). Carroll argues that 
white masculinity further attempts to manage “the stakes of its own fragmentation by co-opting the forms 
of representational meaning secured by women, gays, and people of color over the preceding decades” (7). 
 
10 See Butler, Gender Trouble (25). For an analysis of how white masculinity performs its crisis, 
see Walsh. 
 
11 See for example Babb; Delgado and Stefanic, ed. Critical; Dyer; Hill, ed. Whiteness; Lipsitz; 
and Morrison. See Hill, After (173-84) for a critical survey of much early scholarship on whiteness. 
 
12 See Hill, After; and Frankenberg for critiques of whiteness’s “invisibility” and the conceptual 
challenges posed by circulating it as a critical orthodoxy.  
 
13 See for example Lee, ed. Living; esp. Al-Saji; Ortega; and Lee. 
 
14 On this relationship, see for example Alcoff, Visible; and Ahmed, Queer and “A 
Phenomenology.” On the ways this relationship articulates its connections to Indigenous landedness, see 
Nicoll. 
 
15 See Moreton-Robinson, “Writing off Treaties.” For further considerations of whiteness in 
relation to theorizing Indigenous sovereignty, see “Writing Off Indigenous,” and “Whiteness.” 
 
16 Although Moreton-Robinson contends that this logic renders whiteness studies less than useful 
for engaging with Indigenous sovereignty, her argument points to the immense usefulness of engaging with 
whiteness through a perspective informed by work within Indigenous studies. Pressing scholars concerned 
with whiteness to re-examine the relationship between citizenship, property, and the “black/white binary” 
that influences the enduring co-extensivity of these formations, Moreton-Robinson argues that examining 
Indigenous sovereignty through this lens yields a misunderstood relationship of Indigenous polities to the 
settler-states that contain them. On this issue in particular, see also Rifkin. Despite the conceptual 
shortcomings of typical approaches to whiteness for Indigenous sovereignty Moreton-Robinson points out, 
her critique of whiteness’s relationship to property holding and territoriality is especially instructive for 
rethinking whiteness in terms that include but move past the social construction of race as a primarily 
discursive dynamic. On whiteness as property, and especially the legal codification of whiteness as tied to 
real property, see Cheryl Harris. For the tie between whiteness and Enlightenment philosophies of self-
possessive individualism that underpin the proprietary relationship Moreton-Robinson describes, see 
Montag. 
 
17 In Settler Common Sense, Mark Rifkin argues “whiteness may be understood as expressing a 
particular privileged position within the allocation of Native lands and resources among nonnatives.” To 
the extent that “whiteness names the mechanisms by which settler land tenure and jurisdiction are 
legitimized,” Rifkin continues, “it may not be the same whiteness as that of the black/white binary, even if 
both are lived in the same body, such that people of color may enact and aspire to whiteness-as-settlement 
while still contesting whiteness-as-allocation-of-entitlements-within-citizenship” (23). Situating whiteness 
as expressive of a relationship to land and resources that in turn produces an inequitable distribution of 
entitlements and privileges “within citizenship” reframes whiteness’s relationship to privilege as stemming 
primarily from its relationship to occupation.  
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18 Special thanks to Mark Rifkin, whose work in and around Settler Common Sense helped me to 
generate and clarify my thinking throughout this project. My thanks also to Jason Cooke, whose insights, 
conversation, and critique sharpened my focus and helped me to move this project forward.  
For an overview of this scholarship, see Rifkin, Settler (5-10). See Carpenter for a reading of 
sentimentality and anger in late-19th and early-20th century Native-authored fiction. For a reading of 
settler-feeling as haunted by the spectral presence of Native peoples, see Bergland. On the interaction 
between representations of Native peoples and settler self-fashioning, see Huhndorf; and P. Deloria.  
 
19 On the conjunction between habit and space, see Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, “Sensing” 
(214-52) and “Space” (253-311). On the habit body and habitual orientations, see Massumi (177-207). For 
the relationship between the body and feelings of “fitness” in spaces, and Ahmed, Queer (51-63). 
 
20 Such worlds, as Sara Ahmed argues in Queer Phenomenology, present themselves as 
comfortable fits for white bodies because those worlds seem to have already taken the shape of the bodies 
that inhabit them. See Queer (120-142). 
 
21 For this reading of DeLillo’s White Noise, see Engles, “Who” and “Connecting.” 
 
22 See for example Klinkowitz, Reforming and The Vonnegut Effect; Broer; and Boon. 
 
23 See for example Osteen. 
 
24 See for example Boswell, Understanding; Harris, “David Foster Wallace”; Hoberek, “The 
Novel After”; and Holland, “The Art’s Heart’s Purpose.” 
 
25 For Wallace’s influence on a literary-aesthetic shift toward sincerity, see den Dulk; Hoborek, 
“Introduction”; McLaughlin; and Z. Smith. For Foer’s aesthetic relationship to Wallace, see Beck; and 
Gates. 
 
26 See McCaffery (26). 
 
27 See Wallace, Supposedly (63). For the full essay, see Supposedly (21-82). 
 
28 See Berlant, The Female Complaint and Queen. 
 
29 On belonging and citizenship as an affective, aspirational horizon represented in texts and 
functioning socially through texts’ cultural circulation, see Berlant, The Female Complaint and Queen. 
 
30 In this sense, I follow Raymond Williams’ notion of structures of feeling. Ideological structures 
are not fixed formations, Williams argues, but rather are lived “actively, in real relationships…which are 
more than systematic exchanges between fixed units” (130). “Structures of Feeling” in this way works to 
define “social experience which is still in process” as “affective elements of consciousness and 
relationships: not feeling against thought, but thought as felt and feeling as thought: practical consciousness 
of a present kind, in a living and interrelating continuity” (132). I position prosthetic attachments to 
affective structures as this kind of “practical consciousness of a present kind” insofar as one’s feelings and 
thoughts present the “interrelating continuity” of broader ideological structures as they are lived and made 
through affective inclinations. 
 
31 See Carroll (8-10). 
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32 On the universality of traumatic experience, see for example Caruth, Unclaimed; Caruth, ed. 
Trauma; and Bal, Crewe, and Spitzer, ed. Acts. For a critique of trauma studies and its theoretical 
underpinnings in the history of psychology, see Leys, Trauma. 
 
33 On the relationship between pain, subjectivity, and citizenship, see Hartman. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
INHABITING INDIANNESS: SHERMAN ALEXIE’S INDIAN KILLER, 
ANNA LEE WALTERS’S GHOST SINGER, AND 
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF WHITE SINCERITY 
 
 
Have we somehow travelled back to the nineteenth century? 
 
— Sherman Alexie, Indian Killer 
 
 
On 9 July 1998, Spokane/Coeur d’Alene writer Sherman Alexie appeared 
alongside President Bill Clinton on PBS NewsHour as a part of a series of panel 
discussions entitled “President Clinton’s Dialogue on Race.”1 Turning to Alexie early in 
the broadcast, Clinton offers the following:  
 
When I was running for President in 1992, I didn’t know much about the 
American Indian condition except that we had a significant but very small 
population of Indians in my home state and that my grandmother was one-quarter 
Cherokee. That’s all I knew. I spent a lot of time going around…to the 
reservations…to learn about this sort of nation-to-nation legal relationship that is 
supposed to exist between the U.S. Government and the Native American 
tribes…What I concluded…[was] that they have not been given enough 
empowerment or responsibility or tools to make the most of their own lives…So 
they literally got the worst of both worlds. They weren’t getting enough help and 
they certainly didn’t have enough responsibility and power, in my view, to build a 
future. So what do you think the most important thing is for Americans to know 
about American Indians?2 
 
 
Asked to maneuver within this narrow framework, one that confines Native American 
political sovereignty to the precarious status of a “sort of…supposed to” liminality and 
positions Indigenous peoples themselves as living in the “worst” of possible worlds, 
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Alexie responds: “I think the primary thing that people need to know about Indians 
is…that we really do exist as political entities and sovereign political nations. That’s the 
most important thing for people to understand, that we are separate politically and 
economically. And should be.” Alexie’s “really do exist” points to the gap between 
Clinton’s notional “Indian” and the former President’s apparent inability to recognize the 
reality of Indigenous political sovereignty. Recounting the ways people talk to him about 
race, Alexie sharpens the point: “Usually…what [people] will do is come up to me and 
tell me they’re Cherokee. But that’s usually what it amounts to. Nobody talks about 
Indians.” Taken together, Alexie’s responses point out two related phenomena: on the 
one hand how claims to Indigenous identity, particularly Cherokeeness in this example, 
work to open up affective space for sincere claims to solidarity; and on the other, how the 
sincere feelings those claims generate work for those who offer them to silence 
Indigenous peoples’ political—and affective—sovereignty, filling space instead with talk 
about themselves.3 
 At least for most of the panel’s hour, indeed no one is talking about Indians. The 
irony of this relative silence, especially given Clinton’s claims, is that Alexie needed to 
make the point in the first place. The dynamics and tenor of Alexie’s and Clinton’s 
conversation, and its quick fizzling-out, reads like a scene-for-scene rewrite of the 
interactions between well-meaning but utterly unreflective white Anthropology professor 
Clarence Mather and politically motivated Spokane student Marie Polatkin in Alexie’s 
1996 novel Indian Killer. Throughout the course of their interactions, Mather repeatedly 
attempts to build bridges and gain Marie’s goodwill, only to not recognize how his efforts 
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silence her abilities to respond from a position not already bounded by Mather’s 
discourse. While the stakes are different, the effect is the same. In both sets of 
interactions between white men and the Indigenous people they attempt to stand in 
solidarity with, what gets most in the way of seeing their sincere ambitions realized is the 
degree to which their whiteness colors their affects and, as a result, screens out the 
violence of their good intentions. 
 How is it that such sincere moments, good intentions, and well-meaning gestures 
at solidarity—in Indian Killer as well as on PBS—get in the way of genuine engagement 
with the core problematic of continued settlement practices that manifest as an active 
silencing of Indigenous peoples and a dismissal of Indigenous sovereignty? How do 
claims to “Indianness” position Indigenous identity, for the white men in these examples, 
as a supplement for their affective experience of whiteness? What does it mean to see 
indigenous identity as an inhabitable subject position into which whiteness can expand 
and within which white men like Clinton or Mather can fail to recognize their ongoing 
complicity in settlement’s enduring effects? Through their characterizations of white 
masculinity, Alexie’s Indian Killer and Otoe/Pawnee writer Anna Lee Walters’s novel 
Ghost Singer take up these questions and offer in response a phenomenological theory of 
gendered whiteness as a structure of feeling: a felt and active influence on the present that 
acts as a guiding impulse pressurizing and limiting experience and action.4  
I have borrowed Raymond Williams’ phrasing here to emphasize the texts’ 
resistance to framing white masculinity as an ideological position conceptualized in terms 
of a fixed formation traceable through sets of determinate responses. Rather, they 
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imagine white masculinity as actively produced through the kinds of everyday social 
interactions for which Clinton’s exchange with Alexie is exemplary. It is not that Alexie 
can see something about Clinton that Clinton himself does not know, nor is a similar 
pattern present in Alexie’s and Walters’s imaginative representations of white 
masculinity. It is more that Clinton’s feeling as though he is sincerely engaging with the 
“plight” of Alexie’s “people” takes shape around what Walters imagines in Ghost Singer 
as a set of perceptual “plugs.” In the Clinton example, whiteness’s “plugs” manifest as a 
feeling of genuine helpfulness spurred along by a pattern of thinking reflective of 
histories of benevolence that get remade around feelings of sincere engagement. In the 
narratives, as I show in this chapter, white masculinity becomes expressive of a particular 
relationship to space, place, and personhood the violence of which is lived as a feeling of 
sincere belonging. 
 Arguing that these texts theorize a gendered form of whiteness as a 
phenomenological structure of feeling is a stark departure from the majority of critical 
work on the novels.5 Why choose to focus on whiteness in the first place, given that both 
novels engage with challenges to Indigenous sovereignty that range from collections of 
Indigenous dead in national archives to homelessness, identity, and tribal belonging? 
Focusing on whiteness carries the risk of shortchanging these issues and carries another 
of re-centering the normative position of power that both narratives work to destabilize. 
However, readers face an equally knotty set of problems in not focusing on the ways 
these writers theorize white masculinity, among them marginalizing the narratives’ 
critiques and as a result running the risk of propping up the unnamed centrality of 
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whiteness at which the novels take aim.6 Positioning their work as indices for 
“Indianness” proceeds from an assumed mimesis that the texts themselves, particularly 
Indian Killer, directly challenge. Taking them as representative of “Indian stuff,” for lack 
of a more direct phrase, presumes that Native intellectual and creative work emerges 
from a predetermined representational context out of which springs the usual suspects of 
“Native American” fiction. Alexie’s characterization of self-styled “Indian writer” Jack 
Wilson dramatizes the whiteness of this logic; and in ignoring it readers risk retrenching 
rather than critiquing the ways feelings about what counts as proper objects of critical 
analysis within “Native American” novels might emerge from the whiteness within 
which these kinds of assumptions about representativity are inevitably enmeshed.  
Recent scholarship within Indigenous studies examining the relationship between 
whiteness and settler coloniality may help to account for why Alexie’s and Walters’s 
theories of whiteness have been overlooked. Aileen Moreton-Robinson suggests the 
relative absence of Indigenous concerns within U.S.-based whiteness studies scholarship 
stems from how thinking about race in the United States tends to evoke a “black/white 
binary” to the exclusion of the fact of settlement (“Writing off Treaties” 93). Given that 
the primary analytic of race in the U.S. stems from historical legacies of enslavement, the 
primary axis of redress has historically been political enfranchisement into the cultural 
plurality of the nation-state. This logic is structured around relationships of positive 
recognition that takes the desire for inclusion as a given.7 The forcible occupation of 
Native lands problematizes this presumption by throwing into relief the relationship 
between possession and recognition-based models of inclusivity. In order to grant 
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inclusion one has to presume one’s prior possession of the space into which others are to 
be included. To the extent that this frame may characterize histories of African American 
disenfranchisement and the juridical extension of citizenship, it does not map equally 
onto U.S.-Indigenous relations because the axis of those relations is the space within 
which enfranchisement becomes a possibility. The “black/white binary” may have thus 
rendered analyses of whiteness less apparently applicable for critiques of Indigenous 
creative work, but this does not also mean that this work is any less applicable to analyses 
of whiteness. To the extent that whiteness can be understood as “expressing a particular 
privileged position within the allocation of Native lands and resources among non-
natives” (23), as Mark Rifkin puts it in Settler Common Sense, we can read Native 
creative work’s engagement with settlement as engagements with whiteness’s privileged 
position within its manifestations.  
As Alexie’s and Walters’s novels suggest, one of the ways whiteness articulates 
its privileged position within settlement is through sincere gestures toward inclusivity 
that presume a recognition-based framework amounts to a fix for bad feelings. In this 
vein, the modes of white masculinity Alexie and Walters theorize offer a view to the 
dynamics of whiteness in relation to issues of sovereignty and settlement as well as to the 
ways those issues become effaced through sincere attempts to garner good will as a mode 
of affective redress—not necessarily for the Indigenous persons white men encounter but 
instead as a workaround for the felt reality of settlement. 
 Part of Alexie’s and Walters’s theory of white masculinity positions Indigenous 
identity, or at least an idea of “Indianness” de-linked from land and space, as something 
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that white men feel able to access and mobilize in order to make up for gaps in their 
perceptual capacities. In this sense, “Indianness” as a sign of cultural difference serves as 
an affective prosthetic through which white men can augment their normatively powerful 
positions. In this chapter, I read Alexie’s and Walters’s phenomenology of whiteness as, 
in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s terms, a perceptual tradition emerging from the historical 
accrual of lived habituation to objects, spaces, and others as available elements of their 
everyday patterns of sense-making—what Sara Ahmed refers to as “orientations.”8 
Alexie and Walters characterize white masculinity as an orientation in this sense, but 
ground whiteness’s orientations within a U.S. frame in the fact of settler colonial 
occupancy. Furthermore, by characterizing the presumptive availability of “Indianness” 
as an affective prosthetic through which white sincerity and benevolence become 
possible, the texts point out that lived habituation to everyday forms of settler 
occupancy—as a perceptual tradition that accrues in one’s physical as well as affective 
orientations toward the world—works to screen out the very history those bodies carry 
with them into the present from what becomes perceptible as the present.  
As the narratives demonstrate, however, this process is not always articulated 
through a discourse of good intentions. Some of the men who populate Alexie’s and 
Walters’s narratives want as little to do with “Indians” and “Indianness” as possible, and 
like Alexie’s Truck Schultz wonder aloud if the world in which they find themselves 
hasn’t somehow been dragged back to the nineteenth-century (209). These negative 
affects and their more directly violent results, however, are no less reliant on the notional 
“Indian” as an affective prosthetic than those men whose good-will screens their overt 
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capacity for violence. In both cases, as I show in what follows, the idea of the Indian 
becomes, to borrow from Jodi Byrd, a “transit” point for feelings of commonality, 
belonging, and emplacement that augment the otherwise disorienting feelings of 
displacement Schultz’s time-out-of-joint narrative belies.9 In other words, one is not 
dragged back to the nineteenth-century, but rather one’s body—and its thickly complex 
attachments to history—drags the nineteenth-century into the present. Whether those 
modes of affect and relationality one would recognize as “belonging” to a prior time 
emerge as direct violence or as sincere benevolence, what these novels ultimately offer is 
a view toward whiteness as a double-screen. On the one hand, whiteness works to screen 
out connections to settlement as its condition of possibility. On the other, whiteness 
works to screen out the degree to which white men’s sincere intentions to protect, guard, 
vaunt, or otherwise “positively” engage with the problematics of continued settlement 
themselves participate in the direct violence of settlement practices that silence, remove, 
and indeed kill Indigenous peoples.  
 
“A Positive Portrait of…Your People”:  
Indian Killer, Prosthetic Indians, and White Sincerity 
 How do white men’s claims to “Indian” identity enable sincere gestures of 
solidarity with Indigenous peoples? How does feeling “Indian” screen out feeling like a 
settler? And further, to what extent does the presumptive availability of “Indianness” as a 
mode of feeling, if not a mode of identification, form a part of the structure of feeling that 
“whiteness” might serve to name? In this section I chart Indian Killer’s presentation of 
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anthropology professor Clarence Mather, who seems able to feel “Indian” and as a result 
to feel in a position to offer “positive portrait[s] of Indian peoples” (84). Despite his 
seeming ease at feeling Indian, he seems equally unable to sense how his “portraits” 
participate in the enduring violence of settlement. Although he does not participate 
directly in the race war between whites and Natives the novel eventually stages and to 
which I will return in a later section, his felt detachment from that direct violence is made 
possible through “Indianness” as an affective prosthetic. Through inhabiting Indianness, 
Mather in turn feels as though his care, concern, and positive portraits of Native peoples, 
are signs of his sincere solidarity, a structure of feeling that screens out the degree to 
which his whiteness produces a mode of attachment to the settler-nation that enables him 
to feel like an “Indian” while not feeling like a settler.  
Indian Killer imagines these dynamics to flow from white men’s sincere efforts to 
generate commonality and good will as a way to ground their otherwise contested 
relationship to physical and affective space. The tenuousness of this relationship becomes 
palpable for Mather as the titular Killer begins to stalk and murder white men on the 
streets of Seattle. Within this context he feels it necessary to offer “positive portrait[s] of 
Indian peoples” as a way to reframe public perception (84). He feels able to do so, Alexie 
suggests, because he already feels like an Indian, claiming to have been adopted into a 
Lakota family while on a research trip (61). Upsetting his notion of Indianness and with it 
the relative imperceptibility of his whiteness, Mather’s responses to the Killer’s presence 
highlight the degree to which whiteness takes shape through negotiations over the 
meaning and stability of the notional “Indianness” he feels himself to possess. Through 
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the ambiguity of the Killer’s identity—as in Marie’s words an Indian killer or a killer 
Indian (247)—Alexie dramatizes the instability of the referent grounding Mather’s 
attachments as well as the ease with which it can be taken up as a prosthetic for 
whiteness. Through his efforts to mitigate the visibility of whiteness as a set of 
assumptions and inclinations, and stand in solidarity with Indigenous peoples who 
progressively become the targets of a distinctively racialized form of violence, Mather 
responds to the uncertainty the Killer generates throughout Seattle by engendering 
benevolent attachments to Indigenous peoples in an effort to re-frame and stabilize the 
meaning of “Indian” by grafting it into their performances of sincerity. 
Clinton’s dialogue with Alexie can help to frame the discussion of Mather’s 
maneuvers into and out of Indianness by drawing attention to the ways the notion serves 
as a transit point through which white sincerity articulates an attachment to forms of felt 
belonging that can then be offered up as a gesture of inclusion in national feeling. 
Implicitly relying on tropes of extinction and vanishment, Clinton’s comments reflect the 
discourse of “lasting” Jean O’Brien, writing of settler-Indigenous encounters in New 
England, defines as a “rhetorical strategy that asserts as a fact the claim that Indians can 
never be modern” (107). O’Brien’s compact definition puts into perspective the degree to 
which Clinton’s framing paints Indigenous sovereignty as almost, but not quite, fully 
realized and casts Indigenous survival as dependent upon the benevolence of the nation-
state and its more fully-fledged members. As a tactic of political-affective 
disenfranchisement, Clinton’s “lasting” rhetoric yokes Indigenous peoples to a narrative 
of progression into modernity that can only find its condition of possibility within the 
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boundaries of the nation-state and within the embrace of national feeling he proffers. This 
discursive maneuver is further complicated, however, in the context of a dialogue 
putatively centered on diagnosing and repairing American race relations. Developing 
what she calls the “temporalities of race” as a product of settler-colonial epistemologies 
and control over the meaning of “modernity,” O’Brien argues that lasting locates 
“Indians in an ahistorical temporality” that binds “Indian history to a degeneracy 
narrative” built around theories of “blood purity” and cultural retention that positioned 
“mixture” as “degeneracy for Indians and progress for non-Indians” (107). To put it a 
little differently, to become white/modern was to no longer be Indian, whereas to draw 
upon Indianness—configured as lineal, genealogical descent—was for whites a way of 
becoming progressively more attached to the modern nation.10 In this sense, Clinton’s 
claims to Cherokee descent do more than open affective space through which he can 
negotiate differences; his claim marks him as more firmly attached to the nation.  
Clinton’s claims to Cherokee descent, as a marker of his attachment to a narrative 
of progress into modernity and belonging to the nation, likewise works to imply 
“common ground” (Sturm 188). Analyzing “racial shifters,” persons otherwise identified 
as white who claim Cherokee identity, throughout Becoming Indian, Circe Sturm argues, 
“contemporary racial shifters evoke the logic of hypodescent…to reassert their claims to 
indigeneity. According to this logic, all it takes is one drop of Cherokee blood, one 
Cherokee ancestor in the family tree to make them Cherokee” (175). The inverse of this 
logic, however, allows white racial shifters to deny “their whiteness, for it reproduces the 
idea that whiteness is the one racial category that is pure and unadulterated” (175). The 
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double-valence of whiteness Sturm alludes to permits on the one hand claims to 
Indigenous descent regardless of “blood quantum” while on the other retains the 
possibility of continuing to “pass” as white at will. Sturm sees Clinton’s attempts at 
solidarity-through-identification as exactly this mode of denial: a form of “neoliberal 
dissimulation…a thinly veiled racism of a new variety…whose very emphasis on culture, 
class, individualism, and choice…[denies] not only the persistence of racism but also the 
meaningfulness of race” (188-89). Though certainly implying choice and capitalizing on 
opportunity, while retaining the core meaning of individuality to which Ross Chambers 
argues persons identified as white can claim unfettered access (145), the extent to which 
Clinton’s rhetoric involves an attempt at “dissimulation” remains an open question. It 
seems more useful in this regard to look back at the ways that claims to Indigenous 
identity appear available to white persons regardless of the degree of their descent while 
simultaneously making the denial of whiteness possible. To the extent that “race shifters 
must repeatedly perform their racial difference” from whiteness “using social and cultural 
markers” of Indianness in order to gain “recognition” among Cherokee persons (Sturm 
177-78), it may well follow that “passing” as either white or Cherokee in these examples, 
to paraphrase Judith Butler, relies on a similar pattern of stylized repetition.11 Here, part 
of the stylized performance of whiteness becomes a performative and iterative claim to 
Indigenous identity that sets the stage for sincere solidarity.  
 Alexie imagines the performances of racial difference Sturm describes to produce 
the experience of material difference manifest in the privileged position from which 
Mather feels able to arbitrate the meaning of “Indianness.” He experiences this privilege 
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as a sincere desire to help Native people while seeming to remain unaware of the ways 
his efforts as positive portraiture end up dictating the shape of who can fit within his 
frames. Having faced Marie’s constant challenges throughout the semester, Mather is 
exasperated with her most recent argument against his interpretations of Native-operated 
casinos as threats to “cultural purity” (84), reframing her contention that casinos present a 
viable economic engine for reservation communities as an attempt to create an 
“antagonistic situation” (84).12 “Indians are just plain hungry,” Marie explains, “Not for 
money. For food…You don’t know anything about that” (84). Through Marie’s pointing 
to Mather’s position of relative security, Alexie suggests the “antagonistic situation” 
Mather sees her trying to create already exists as a literal resource disparity that takes 
form through unevenly embodied affective privilege. Speaking from this privileged 
position, Mather’s sincerity marks the extent to which his whiteness colors his affects:  
 
‘Don’t you understand what I’m trying to teach? I’m trying to present a positive 
portrait of Indian peoples, of your people. Of you. I simply cannot do that if you 
insist on this kind of confrontational relationship. I mean, with all this negative 
publicity surrounding the murder of that white man, don’t you understand I am 
trying to do a good thing here? People actually think an Indian killed and scalped 
that young man. Despite all the evidence to the contrary, people still think that 
Indians are savages. Don’t you understand that I’m on your side?’ (84-85) 
 
 
Mather’s brand of “help,” however, appears less focused on changing the material 
circumstances affecting Native peoples than on capturing some “essence” he can 
configure and reconfigure at will.13 Mather’s performance of sympathy and his attempts 
to do a “good thing” are rooted in the essence he imagines to remain fixed as a portrait he 
can present for his students’ consumption. His feeling that he and Marie occupy the 
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“same side” of the “battle” lines being drawn in the classroom and in the wider 
community following the Killer’s first murder connotes spatial demarcation, occupancy, 
and inhabitance; and if positioning himself alongside Marie on the “other” side of typical 
white reactions to the murders enables Mather’s feeling of occupying “Indian” space, his 
proximity to Marie appears to authorize his occupation. From within it, he thus feels able 
to frame the meaning of Indianness “positively” against Marie’s negative opposition. 
Slyly rehearsing the discourse of savagery and civilization throughout his 
performance of sincerity, Mather’s occupation of an “Indian” perspective dictates the 
terms of its inhabitance for Marie. Either she continues to be obstinate and intractable, 
and thus remains outside modernity, or she can feature in Mather’s whitewashed portrait 
as a “positive” exemplar of a “progressive” Indian. Caught in Mather’s ontological catch-
22, Marie’s options for response are limited. Staring up “at the tenured professor,” and 
asking what gives him “the right…to tell me what battles I’m fighting?” she’s 
incredulous when Mather explains that he “understands” what she’s going through as “an 
Indian woman in college” (85), and she is angry when he later closes his office door and 
throws the bolt. “Mather would have never treated a white student that badly, nor would 
he have shut the door in the face of a man,” Marie thinks, wanting “every white man to 
disappear. She wanted to burn them all down to ash and feast on their smoke” (85). 
Marie’s reading of Mather’s actions as motivated by sexism and racism butts up against 
his frustrations with her inability to see things from his perspective, and her pointed 
question about authorization and the right to speak of and for her frames his whiteness as 
its answer.  
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Mather’s privileged position with respect to his feeling like an Indian enables his 
attempts to reframe Marie’s contentions as mere “antagonism” that clouds what is for 
him the essential fact of their occupying the “same side.” Mather’s notional Indianness, 
articulated through the privileged position his whiteness allows him to inhabit, thus 
converts Marie into what Ahmed calls a extension point through which Mather’s affects 
can circumscribe the space of her responses.14 Alexie’s portrait metaphor thus suggests 
that Marie becomes the focal subject of Mather’s sympathetic recognition insofar the 
whiteness of its background falls out of focus. Against this background, Marie becomes 
an “Indian woman in college” who is simply antagonistic toward what she does not yet 
understand. In this vein, Mather’s interpellation of Marie into the subject of his positive 
portraiture traffics in what Jodi Byrd argues is the propagation of “empire not through 
frontiers but through the production of a paradigmatic Indianness” (xxxv). Staged in this 
way, Marie’s desire to make Mather disappear and feast on his smoke is inevitably 
framed as a “negative” sign of willful “savagery.” Mather’s effacement of her more 
overtly political arguments, and his reframing them into “antagonistic situations” of her 
own contrivance, position her as in need of his benevolent pedagogy as much as beyond 
the scope of the positive portraits he seeks to generate.  
Coming from a moment of exasperation, Mather’s “same side” logic seems a 
desperate appeal to Marie’s capacity for alliance. However, as the dynamics of the scene 
demonstrate, Alexie suggests that such sincere appeals operate through a disciplinary 
discourse of confinement that mirrors the spatial constraints of settler occupancy.15 The 
feeling of already inhabiting Marie’s “side” and the way that feeling screens out Mather’s 
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complicity in the endurance of settlement signals Mather’s historical habituation to 
inhabiting Indianness and its function as an affective prosthetic through which he’s able 
not to feel like a settler. Framed as a “Wannabe” and a “real Indian lover” from the 
reader’s first encounter (58), Mather’s idea of Indianness seems already colored by these 
affective inclinations and by a tradition of misrepresentation and appropriation embodied 
in his reading list for Native American Literature. Stocked with books by nonnative 
authors or biographies of questionable authorship, when Marie challenges his choice of 
The Education of Little Tree, infamously written by Forrest Asa Carter, former “Grand 
Wizard of Ku Klux Klan” (58) and speechwriter for notoriously racist Alabama Governor 
George Wallace,16 Mather again reframes the critique by leaning this time on the 
sentimentality and “beauty” of Carter’s novel: “perhaps we can learn that there are 
beautiful things inside of everybody” (59). As a proud adoptee of a Lakota family, 
Mather nevertheless insists on positioning himself as able to “view the Native American 
world from the interior and exterior,” and aims for the class to understand Native 
American literature through a bent Whitman paraphrase: “Every good story that belongs 
to Indians belongs to non-Indians, too” (61). Mather leaves off the famous line about 
containing multitudes, an absence that signals Alexie’s framing of whiteness as a mode of 
conceptual and spatial givenness that takes its ability to consume and contain any form of 
difference as something that need not even be stated.  
The democratic vision of Whitman’s Leaves of Grass here becomes a vehicle for 
Alexie’s critique of how Mather’s sincere appreciation of the goodness within everyone 
maps onto the racialized dynamics of liberal affective inclusion that wind up nonetheless 
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being unevenly applied to anyone who might actually be Indigenous. Among the things 
contained within the body of work Mather passes off as Native American literature 
include the signs of “Indianness” that have become a part of the perceptual tradition he 
bodies forward as a performance of sincere inclusivity. However, what he seems 
completely unable to feel as embodied knowledge is the degree to which those 
performances enact an equally real and embodied form of violence against those he 
otherwise seeks to present and paint positively.  
Mather again falls back on signs of cultural authenticity that work to render the 
everydayness of lived Indigeneity illegible in defending his inclusion of self-proclaimed 
Shilshomish writer Jack Wilson’s novels. Mather argues that Wilson’s work, detective 
novels in the manner of Tony Hillerman’s Jim Chee series, “present [an]…authentic and 
traditional view of the Indian world” that flows from Wilson’s self-proclaimed 
membership among the Shilshomish (66). Mather’s measure of authenticity, however, 
takes The Education of Little Tree as its barometer, vaunting whitewashed notions of 
“tradition” and cinematic portrayals of visions and deep spiritualism as signs of genuine 
Native authorship. In response, Marie argues that not only can Wilson’s claims to 
ancestry not be verified through research and records of tribal membership, but that 
further Mather ought to find it ironic that “all these so-called Indian writers claim 
membership in tribes with poor records…Cherokee, Shilshomish? I mean, there’s not a 
whole lot of people claiming to be Spokane. And do you know why? Because we’re not 
glamorous and we keep damn good records” (67).17 Marie highlights a distinction 
between “Identity” and lived experience that Mather is unable to recognize in part 
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because he gets his frame of recognition from texts like Wilson’s. Continuing to argue 
about Wilson’s purported Shilshomish belonging, Marie notes that he has never 
contributed to the American Indian College Fund, that no one knows him at the United 
Council of All Tribes, and that few among the Indigenous community in Seattle know 
him other than those who frequent a bar Wilson regularly haunts downtown. “Wilson 
sure doesn’t have much to do with Indians,” Marie argues, “I mean, there are so many 
real Indians out there writing real Indian books…Why teach Wilson? It’s like his books 
are killing Indian books” (68).18 Marie’s critique points back to the ways that Mather’s 
feelings of belonging are, like Wilson’s, predicated on an accrued sense that signs of 
“Indianness” equate to Indigenous being; that those signs are available as prosthetics for 
otherwise ordinary whiteness; that proffering the signs rather than acknowledging their 
violence is equivalent to political solidarity; and finally that the logic behind the modality 
of inclusion Mather enacts is a tactic of settlement that kills.  
Turning the lens onto Mather later in the narrative, Marie confronts him with the 
direct possibility that his enactments of liberal settler-feeling, screened out through his 
performances of white sincerity, might make him the Indian Killer stalking the streets. 
Marie bluntly asks Mather why he thinks he knows so much about Indians, asking him if 
he has ever “lived on a reservation” (246). Answering that he spent three months with the 
Navajo, and smuggled food to American Indian Movement (AIM) activists during the 
occupation of Wounded Knee, Mather again leans on liberal affiliation and sentiments of 
solidarity as prostheses for the ways his whiteness marks his disconnection from 
everyday life as an Indigenous person. Reminding Mather of his ability to access 
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resources in ways that AIM activists, surrounded by U.S. Government forces during the 
occupation, could not, Marie’s argument points to the quotidian privileges and material 
access whiteness affords persons like Mather.19 As if to amplify the insularity of Mather’s 
whiteness, and his inability to sense it, Marie takes another jab: “I mean, calling him the 
Indian Killer doesn’t make any sense, does it? If it was an Indian doing to the killing, 
then wouldn’t he be called the Killer Indian? I mean, Custer was an Indian killer, not a 
killer Indian. How, about you, Doc, are you an Indian killer?” (247). Mather’s response is 
telling, “I’m certainly no murderer” (247). Reframing the dynamics of their earlier 
encounter, here Marie’s framing controls the tenor of Mather’s response through casting 
him into a “modern extension of that long tradition” (61) of pointedly white Indian 
killers. That Mather is “no murderer” highlights the degrees of abstraction from that 
“long tradition” to which he’s become habituated, despite the fact that for Marie, at least, 
his body betrays his good intentions by bringing the “tradition” of direct violence toward 
Indigenous peoples squarely into the present.  
 
“The Very Last Shilshomish Indian”: Jack Wilson’s Indian Killer, John Smith, and 
the Violent Fantasies of Prosthetic Attachment 
The critical difference between Mather’s claims to Indianness and Jack Wilson’s 
felt relationship to his supposed Shilshomish identity and the fictional worlds in which he 
lives it out is the depth of Wilson’s felt attachments. Up to this point, Mather’s claims to 
Indian identity have largely been iterative in the manner of Clinton’s on PBS. Despite 
that those claims may feel benign to Mather, through his conflicts with Marie, Alexie 
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demonstrates how claims to Indianness as a prosthetic for sincere engagement with 
Indigenous peoples and concerns produce material consequences. Through Wilson, on 
the other hand, Alexie’s critical phenomenology of whiteness turns to a consideration of 
how inhabiting Indianness manifests as a mode of felt belonging to a fictional world of 
one’s own making. 
Alexie situates Wilson as the author of a palimpsest of fictional worlds. After 
retiring from the Seattle Police and growing weary of the emptiness of his new routine, 
Wilson turns to writing as a way to “do something” through reconnecting with the 
intrigue and monstrosity of the white men he had previously investigated (161-62). As a 
result, he invented the protagonist of his series of novels, Aristotle Little Hawk, “the very 
last Shilshomish Indian,” a “practicing medicine man and private detective in Seattle” 
(162). Playing on tropes of extinction and vanishment while mocking mystery novelists 
like Tony Hillerman and his series of novels featuring Navajo Tribal Police detective Jim 
Chee (299), Alexie casts Wilson as a sincere opportunist aiming to capitalize on the “new 
age stuff” and “shaman thing” his literary agent tells him “publishers are looking for” by 
combining it with a juicy murder mystery (162-63). After receiving leaked information 
from the Seattle police that they had now dubbed the Killer “The Indian Killer” (165), 
Wilson embarks on a new project that will become Little Hawk’s last case, also titled 
Indian Killer. But his more personal aims for the book extend beyond mere market share. 
Despite knowing “it was all sort of ridiculous” but loving “the money and attention” 
playing “shaman” brought him (162), “Wilson felt he’d been chosen for a special task” in 
writing Indian Killer: “more than a novel…[he] would write the book that would finally 
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reveal to the world what it truly meant to be Indian” (338). When writer’s block and 
vague dreams stall his efforts, his literary agent reminds him of a few things he seems to 
have lost track of, that he’s the “Indian writer” and that as the creator of fictional worlds 
he gets to “make shit up” (339). 
Wilson’s fictional inventions mirror the fictionality of his perceptual world. 
Introduced as growing up “white and orphaned” and having dreamed “of being Indian” in 
hopes of finding “some tribal connection with his eleven foster families,” Wilson’s 
earliest and lasting ideas of being Indian came from reading “every book he could find 
about the First Americans,” and from his reading and felt disconnection he “recreated 
himself in the image he found inside those books” (157). As an adult, he merged his idea 
and image of “Indian” identity into a “complicated cornucopia of tribal 
influences…burned sage and tobacco, a medicine pouch worn beneath his clothes, a 
turquoise ring on his right hand” (178). Mixing styles on a drum he had “ordered from a 
catalog” and slipping into “the tradition dance outfit he’d bought at a downtown 
pawnshop,” Wilson dreamed “of being the best traditional dancer in the world…[seeing] 
himself inside a bright spotlight in a huge arena while thousands of Indians cheered for 
him. Real Indians” (178). As Wilson’s menagerie of Indian iconography drawn from 
tribes throughout North America suggests, he “did not realize” the importance of “tribal 
distinctions,” whether for himself or for those “Real Indians” he seems to understand 
were some degree of difference apart from his fictional ideas of them (179). Frequenting 
an “Indian bar” downtown, Wilson also didn’t realize that “white people who pretend to 
be Indian are gently teased, ignored, plainly ridiculed, or beaten, depending on their 
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degree of whiteness” (179). Mick, the bartender, reflecting on Wilson’s claims to Indian 
identity, “did not buy that shit. Mick’s great-grandmother was a little bit Indian, but that 
did not make him Indian. Besides, who the hell would want to be Indian when you could 
just as easily be white?” (181).  
Through these last two details, Alexie generate a tension between whiteness as a 
stylized repetition of acts manifesting in degrees of visibility and effect and the notion of 
whiteness as an embodied marker of social privileges inaccessible to those whose bodies 
are visibly unable to pass. Whereas in Wilson’s home, or in his imagination, his 
whiteness can follow behind his intentions and actions because it rarely meets a stress 
point, in Ahmed’s sense, in the “Indian bar” Wilson’s whiteness manifests in degrees of 
visibility and affective influence that depend on the willingness of those around him to 
entertain his fantasies of belonging. Having become habituated to a past of his own 
invention, Wilson takes up his Indian identity as mode of navigating his perceptual 
milieu. He augments his otherwise apparent whiteness through inhabiting signs of 
belonging to “traditions” so disparate as to be indistinct of any specific tribal affiliation 
other than the most generic notion of “Indianness” in broader U.S. cultural circulation. In 
the bar, when he is not pressing folks for details about the murders or pumping them for 
information for his new novel, he uses them as prostheses to enable and extend the 
palpability of his affiliation with them and to screen out whiteness from his self-
perception.  
What needs to be stressed here is that Wilson is not simply “playing” at being 
Indian, nor “going Native” in a new-age sense.20 Alexie’s characterization resists these 
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readings precisely because Wilson himself seems unable to always clearly discern the 
line between play and reality. Following Sturm’s reading of “racial shifters,” it might be 
that Wilson is reacting to a perceived cultural emptiness in whiteness and so seeks modes 
of attachment to a notional “tradition” that offers him a rooted feeling of belonging. 
However, his ability to “shift” positions at will owes to his inhabiting an otherwise 
recognizably white body. As Sturm puts it, “Having a choice about how to racially 
identify implies a social power that only white-skinned or physically ambiguous 
individuals can access” (52). Further, “Whiteness…hides in the language of racial choice 
and marks the difference between those who have racial options and those who do 
not…As a result, a strange racial alchemy is at work… a meaningful if somewhat 
delirious interplay between race, culture, and indigeneity” (60). Sturm reflects the theory 
of whiteness by degrees Alexie voices through Mick, a notion Marie offers as a critique 
of white writers like Wilson who “thought they became Indian just by saying they were 
Indian” (Alexie 232). Marie suggests that for white men like Wilson the ease of making 
claims become reality stems from their capacity to act as individuals, observing that 
“Only white people got to be individuals” and that as a result “they could be anybody 
they wanted to be” (232). Expanding Mick’s observation, Marie’s sense of the “racial 
alchemy” at work in race shifters’ claims to Indian identity points to a phenomenology of 
whiteness as an infinitely expansive set of perceptual capacities made possible through 
making static the differences white persons like Wilson seek to graft into their identities 
as prostheses. If whiteness “hides” in these discourses and their embodied performances, 
as Sturm’s evocative phrasing suggests, then it may be that those who feel able to conceal 
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it find the possibility of its dislocation precisely in the ease through which they inhabit 
spaces already oriented around their whiteness.  
Wilson’s imaginative fantasies of being Indian flag Alexie’s staging of the spaces 
he inhabits as already oriented around whiteness. That Mather, a putative expert on 
Northwest Native peoples, reads Wilsons’s performances as authentic despite clear 
evidence to the contrary suggests that the logic connecting cultural iconicity to 
authenticity manifests through men like Wilson’s ability to take up Native space, whether 
on the literary scene or in day-to-day life. Alexie connects Wilson’s felt expansiveness to 
material violence against Native people through contrasting his self-styled caricature of 
authentic Indianness against John Smith’s forcible adoption out of his tribal community 
and into a white, Seattle family. Daniel Grassian has observed the close parallels between 
Smith and Wilson, reading them as mirror opposites of one another.21 Yet, if they appear 
as such it is arguably because Alexie uses Wilson’s fantasies as the measure of “Indian” 
authenticity loosed from tribally specific connections and imagines the arbitration of 
Indianness through persons like Mather or novels like Wilson’s to have direct, material 
consequences for someone like John, who can not “be anybody [he wants] to be” because 
he can not pass as white (232). 
The scene of John’s forced adoption, recounted in a chapter entitled “Mythology” 
that opens the narrative, sharply contrasts to Wilson’s memories of becoming 
Shilshomish through reading everything he could about “the First Americans.” Alexie 
imagines John’s adoption as a “war,” complete with a helicopter gunship that “[strafes] 
the reservation with explosive shells” as it carries John away from his screaming mother 
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into the arms of the waiting white family who had adopted him (6). Though some have 
read Alexie’s imagined warzone as the stuff of the opening chapter’s myth, the focus of 
Alexie’s mythos is arguably more directed toward the absence of tribal specificity within 
John’s memories.22 He was born on “this reservation or that reservation. Any reservation” 
(3-4), ambiguities suggestive of a perspective from which “reservations” are synecdochic 
of tribal lands and “Indians” stand in for “Navajo or Lakota…Apache or 
Seminole…Yakama or Spokane” (4). His adoptive parents, Olivia and Daniel Smith, 
know nothing about John’s tribal affiliation nor about his mother save that she is fourteen 
and according to the adoption agent “doing the right thing” by giving him up. “This child 
will be spared a lot of pain by growing up in a white family,” the agent explains.23 
Desiring to be a “good mother” Olivia takes it upon herself to fill in the gaps surrounding 
John’s origin by reading books “about the Sioux, and Navajo, and Winnebago. Crazy 
Horse, Geronimo, and Sitting Bull rode horses through her imagination. She bought all 
the children’s books about Indians and read them aloud to John” (12). In this sense, 
John’s sense of himself is derived from the stuff of myth circulated through the “Indian 
books” his mother purchases in an effort to give him some semblance of “authentic” 
identity. Alexie in effect suggests that the violent suppression constituting the 
imaginative circumstances of John’s birth bears out in the violence of his extrusion from 
tribal affiliation and resultant interpellation into the generic and mythicized “Indians” 
riding horses through his mother’s imagination.  
In this sense, John lives within the interpellative schema that Alexie presents as 
Mather’s metaphoric portraiture or Wilson’s fantastical representations. Without a sense 
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of connectedness to tribal community or to a homeland, John is forced to invent an 
explanatory framework to account for his outwardly “Indian” appearance. When he first 
meets Marie at a protest she had organized at the University, the second question she asks 
him is “What tribe are you?” Knowing that “he was Indian in the most generic sense,” 
John does not know how to answer the question but tells Marie that he is “Navajo” 
because “that was what he wanted to be” (32). Marie, however, had seen him as “another 
urban Indian” who was as “so many Indians were…outcasts from their tribe” (38). 
Against Wilson’s scenes in Big Heart’s, Marie’s quick acceptance of John into the 
community of urban Indigenous persons suggests another side of identity’s uneven 
application within a frame circumscribed by illusive measures of authenticity. She takes 
John to be an “Indian” because he looks like one—described as “tall and muscular…like 
some cinematic warrior” (32)—and interprets his confusion and difficulty at answering 
her question as a sign of his “outcast” status rather than of his dissimulation. Alexie 
suggests that part of Marie’s sympathy toward John and suspicion toward Mather and 
Wilson owes to her own background of feeling like an outcast. As a precocious child, 
Marie had always aspired to go to a university and leave the reservation. Because Marie 
“did not dance or sing traditionally, and because she could not speak Spokane,” she “was 
often thought of as being less than Indian” (33). Her parents had not taught her Spokane 
because they thought it would be of “no use to her in the world outside the reservation,” 
and not unlike John’s parents had bought her “books by the pound” from which she 
might educate herself beyond the frames of traditional culture.  
 
 65 
Whereas both of these characters’ backgrounds could be interpreted as Alexie’s 
critique of the notion of “authenticity” and in particular its impact on Indigenous identity, 
reading them in this way compounds rather than alleviates the imposition of a 
recognition-based framework wherein identity is dependent upon performance rather than 
on connectedness to community. John’s feelings of detachment, like Marie’s, stem from 
the logical circumscription of what counts as recognizably “Indian” performance within 
the framework of settler-imposition. Within such a framework, one’s performance of 
“traditional” authenticity becomes the measure of one’s belonging rather than, as Alexie 
suggests, one’s active involvement in collective action toward advancing Indigenous 
sovereignty. From the latter perspective, Marie’s acceptance of John may stem from 
John’s outwardly visible identity as an “Indian” but is motivated by an effort to mobilize 
his interpellation within settler-frames toward counterframed collective action on behalf 
of the urban Indians with whom she feels in solidarity.24  
I am not suggesting that Alexie’s vision of being “Indian” rests on participation in 
political action, nor that anyone who might do so can just as easily claim Indigenous 
identity. Marie is in fact Spokane, and John was in fact born to an Indigenous mother 
within a tribal territory. These baseline conditions of belonging characterize their 
differences from Mather’s or Wilson’s appropriative stance precisely because they flag 
belonging to a specifically emplaced community the boundaries of which—physically 
and culturally—have been circumscribed by settler-occupation. Mather and Wilson, 
conversely, claim a sense of “Indianness” that rests on iterative and performative 
affiliations to what they take to mean Indigenous belonging, while remaining unaware of 
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the extent to which such belonging depends on one’s connection to place-based 
communities and equally place-based traditions. The sincerity of their claims, and in 
particular the depth of feeling with which Wilson holds to his fantasies of Indian 
belonging, signal the whiteness of the space within which their claims can carry enough 
affective force to graft them into a sense of ontological unity with Indigenous peoples. 
The force of their claims equally as much does violence to members of Indigenous 
communities whose ties to land are effaced by Mather’s or Wilson’s performances of 
cultural authenticity and erased within the framework those performances generate as the 
measure of Indian belonging.  
From within this frame, Wilson’s imaginative reproduction of the novel’s titular 
mystery becomes a screen for the violence his representations of Indianness enact. As the 
Killer’s murders touch off violence across Seattle, Wilson heads out to give a reading of 
the few pages of his Indian Killer he has prepared. Marie, protesting the reading, explains 
to a reporter that “Wilson is a fraud,” and that his novels are “dangerous” and “actually 
commit violence against Indians” (264). The news reporters gathered around the protest 
add to the pressure, asking Wilson to respond to the charge that his “books might be a 
prime motivating factor for the Indian Killer” (264). Yet despite the suggestion and the 
evidence supporting it—a violent attack a few nights before on a Makah man named 
Corenlius and Puyallup woman named Zera that left Cornelius with “four cracked ribs, a 
punctured lung, carious contusions and abrasions” and a “concussion” (215)—Wilson 
waves away the implication by again falling back on his self-proclaimed Shilshomish 
ancestry. When Marie and John, who had followed him home after the reading, confront 
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him as he steps out of his taxi, Wilson is awestruck not with fear but with the profundity 
of his “shamanistic” powers: “as if he’d brought Little Hawk to life through some kind of 
magic. Wilson had always felt magical, but he’d had no idea how much power he really 
possessed” (268). Though from Wilson’s perspective the power he feels may seem a part 
of his possessive relationship to Shilshomish identity, in context Alexie suggests that his 
feelings of power owe to his powerful position as an arbiter of “Indianness,” a position 
from which he can conjure up John’s actual presence as the living manifestation of his 
character’s surrogation of his longtime fantasies.  
Through his vision of John, Wilson finds a vehicle for his imaginative entry into 
the Killer’s perspective. Pushing through his initially stalling efforts to write the novel, 
Wilson begins to have vivid dreams of the killings, imagining the face of murdered 
university student David Rogers as “a bullet passed through his brain” and seeing “the 
blood fountain” stream from the first of the Killer’s victims Justin Summers (227). Yet 
once John becomes his affective prosthetic, his dreams become far more personal. He 
begins “following John’s eyes” in his fantasies of the murders, and then begins to dream 
about “Smith pushing the knife into the white man in the University District”, “[slitting] 
the throat of the business man” Edward Letterman found dead in his car outside an adult 
bookshop, and “smiling as he lifted” kidnapped boy Mark Jones “from his bed” (390). As 
if losing grip on himself as the creator of these imaginative scenes and moving from 
“follow[ing]” to inhabiting the fantasy John’s prosthetic body opens up, Wilson begins to 
see “himself with that knife…pushing the knife into one white body, then another, and 
another, until there were multitudes” (390-91). Alexie does more than taunt readers to 
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take Wilson as the actual Indian Killer in these final passages; he offers a clear view to 
how Wilson’s whiteness, and its multitudinous expansiveness, allows him imaginative 
entry into a hallucinatory perspective of Indianness that permits him to screen his 
complicity in the direct violence he conjures up in the form of John Smith and authors 
throughout his own Indian Killer.25 
It is important to note that within the fantasy space Wilson’s prostheticization of 
John’s body allows he imagines himself as the perpetrator of violence against a 
“multitude” of white bodies. Alexie suggests that through John’s representativity 
circumscribed within a frame of recognition that takes his outward appearance as 
indicative of his “Indian” iconicity Wilson gains fuller affective access to his fantasies of 
Indigenous belonging. That those fantasies take form as violence toward white bodies 
throws into relief the ironic juxtaposition of savagery and positive portraiture Alexie 
works out through Mather’s more distanced affiliations. “Indianness” becomes equated 
with violence against whites for the sake of their whiteness, in other words, only within 
the fantasy space of settler-affect articulated through the prostheticization of Indigenous 
bodies.  
Alexie positions Wilson’s whiteness as screening out the relationship between 
occupation and violence characteristic of settlement through transposing that history into 
racially motivated violence and warfare. Within this perspective, whiteness becomes the 
problematic sign of one’s inscription into frames of Indigenous violence and removing it 
via sincere identification with Indigenous peoples becomes a fix that itself effaces the 
core problematic of occupation. Wilson’s whiteness in this regard becomes akin to a 
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wound to his subjectivity that, in Merleau-Ponty’s terms, allows his hallucinatory 
fantasies to be experienced as an “affective entity” with the “value of reality” because 
they are made up of the “debris of a shattered world” (355-58). Wilson thus lives within 
whiteness as a doubled-screen, on the one hand configured as the affective mechanism 
through which he feels able to belong as an Indian and not as a settler and on the other as 
the screen through which his fantasies become felt realities that slide over his ability to 
perceive himself as implicated in the spatial occupation the articulates his whiteness as a 
privileged position.26  The fantasies of Indian belonging Wilson lives through and 
actively constructs as a part of his everyday affect are not, however, equivalent to 
“delusions” and the pathologies they imply.27 Rather, as Alexie insinuates through 
Wilson’s childhood background and adult “dreams” and fictions, Wilson’s notional and 
affective attachments to Indianness emerge from a fiction of his own making, one that 
works through the wound he imagines his whiteness to constitute.  
Wilson’s sincere efforts to feel for Indians, to do “good” and to represent to the 
world what it means to be among his tribe of imagined “Real Indians,” thus transits into 
his feeling as an Indian of his imagination. Not unlike Mather’s portraits, then, the 
fictions Wilson creates represent the static that floats across the surface of his world; the 
key difference between them, however, is that Wilson, unlike Mather, gets to invent the 
discourse through which “Indians” become “real” and Indigenous persons like Marie 
drop out of the frame entirely. Wilson’s good intentions and “positive portraits” follow 
from his hallucinatory attachments, and those attachments themselves screen out the 
violence of his portrayals as much as the violence of his performance of Indianness. 
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Alexie in effect argues that whiteness and the individuality it permits becomes a screen 
through which Wilson and other men like him filter their felt attachments to “Indian” 
identity and as a result leave the “debris” of violence behind them.28 
 
“Have We Somehow Travelled Back to the Nineteenth Century?”:  
Wounded Whiteness and Settler-Violence in Indian Killer 
Up to this point, my analysis of Alexie’s phenomenology of whiteness has been 
focused on the ways Indian Killer imagines whiteness to screen out the violence enacted 
by what feels like good intentions. To the extent that these dynamics play out on an 
interpersonal terrain, their connectedness to the materiality of violence and dispossession 
may still appear somewhat occluded through my focus on whiteness’s perceptual 
manifestations. Mather’s positive portraits and Wilson’s fantasy frames, however, 
generate the conditions within which their complicity in direct violence remains an 
unacknowledged part of their affective milieu. Through the sincerity of their intentions, 
they experience the effects of their gestures toward inclusion as markers of their 
solidarity with Indigenous persons’ “plight,” without recognizing that the frames within 
which their visions of “Indianness” take shape convert the material dispossession of 
settler-occupation into affective content about which they can feel sympathetic while 
doing nothing in particular. Through both of them Alexie suggests that their deflective 
posture articulates the felt givenness of their belonging to the contested space they 
occupy, and through Wilson especially, the novel frames the self-evidentness of 
belonging as the wellspring of a wounded subjectivity in need of a prosthetic supplement. 
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To demonstrate this dimension of Alexie’s phenomenology of whiteness, I have 
intentionally held off a discussion of Indian Killer’s representations of direct violence. In 
this section, I turn to those representations to demonstrate the ways that Mather’s and 
Wilson’s affects take form through the same set experiential conditions that produce 
material violence as a marker of whiteness’s prosthetic attachment to settler-belonging.  
Imagining the Killer’s murder to touch off a race war, Alexie demonstrates the 
relationship between the presumptive whiteness of space and the affective dynamics 
through which whiteness becomes the lived experience of settler-belonging. The motif of 
mythicization returns throughout the novel’s dramatizations of racially motivated 
violence, linking Wilson’s imaginative fantasies of the Killer to the material violence that 
the circulation of those fantasies engenders. The ambiguity of the Killer’s identity spurs a 
series of imaginative mythologies within which the apparently inexplicable might 
become the affectively intelligible. In this sense, Alexie suggests that the stories through 
which whiteness narrates its attachments to space as a privileged position from which to 
arbitrate the inexplicable are ultimately more powerful than the facts that give rise to 
them.29  
In this vein, Alexie casts radio talk-show host Truck Schultz alongside Wilson as 
one of the novel’s prime mythmakers. The difference between them, however, is that 
where Wilson longs to feels Indian, Shultz explains to the undoubtedly white “citizens” 
his invective conjures up: “We should have terminated Indian tribes from the very 
beginning” (209). Schultz continues:  
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And, now, through no fault of their own, two men are dead, and a little boy is 
missing, because they were white. If two black men had been killed because of 
their race, this city would be in uproar. If a black child had been kidnapped by a 
white man, the city would be up in arms…This whole country cares more about 
the lives of young black teenage hoodlums than it does about law-abiding, God-
fearing white men…And now comes the news that an Indian savage is killing 
white men. Have we somehow travelled back to the nineteenth century? (208) 
 
 
Shultz conjures up more than an angry white citizenry here. He evokes the citizen as by 
default white and thus produces the white body as embodying the nation. Casting white 
men as by default innocent victims of reverse racism, he further paints responses to racial 
violence as disproportionately focused on black victims of hate crimes. Through it all, in 
positing the white body as the anchor point of historical continuity he effects the travel 
back to nineteenth-century affects he seeks to locate in the “savage” now killing white 
men. Relying on tropes of innocence and abidance to add force to his incitement, he 
appeals to patriotism and citizenship as a means of mobilizing affect and galvanizing 
white men into a citizenry still fighting the Indian Wars for their rightful occupancy of 
territory. Reporting misinformation regarding David Rogers’s death, Schultz adds fuel to 
the fire. This time Schultz appeals to the American dream held in promise for David and 
dashed by the Indian Killer (344), before moving on to suggest that the Killer has “come 
to kill us because we have tried to help him. He has come to kill us because his children 
have moved beyond him….He has come to violate our women…We must defend 
ourselves, our families, our homes. We must arm ourselves and repel further attacks on 
our great country” (346). The level of hyperbole is matched by the elevation of Seattle to 
“our country,” a move that within the scope of Schultz’s racist invective appears an 
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added bit of rhetorical flourish, but within the scope of Indian Killer’s staging of 
whiteness as the experience of prosthetic belonging to national space appears as exactly 
the necessary justification for violence perpetuated in the name of home and country.  
 Authoring fictions that kill, Schultz becomes Wilson’s mirror opposite. Utterly 
disinterested in inhabiting Indianness as a mode of belonging, Schultz proffers 
Indianness—through a discourse of savagery and a threat of sexual violence—as a 
prosthetic enabling the justified enactment of previously unavailable modes of affective 
redress. Shultz’s incitement to racially motivated violence would not be possible were the 
“Indian Killer” not available as the anchor grounding his rhetoric in materiality. In this 
regard, wounded whiteness becomes the subject of an impassioned and sincerely 
articulated appeal through the mythic invocation of Indigenous retribution cast as 
directed toward whites rather than toward settlement as the terrain upon which whiteness 
stakes its claim to centrality. The wounds Schultz conjures are thus, like Wilson’s, 
hallucinatory; whiteness can no more sustain the notion of racial victimhood than it can 
mark marginalization from the normative center. However, the effect of Schultz’s sincere 
appeal to a wounded and hobbled whiteness carries the same force as Wilson’s attempts 
to make up for the hollowness he feels as his orphaned vision of white identity.30 
Schultz’s incitement to violence takes on the value of reality for the white men who hear 
his messages, stirring David’s brother Aaron and his friends Sean Ward and Barry 
Church to don ski masks and commit targeted acts of violence against homeless Native 
people throughout the city, nearly murdering a Makah man named Cornelius (211-215). 
During the attack, one of them screams “Get the fuck out of our country, man!” (215), 
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suggesting the degree to which Schultz’s mythic invective has stirred feelings of national 
attachment made all the stronger by viciously beating homeless Native people. Where the 
myths Wilson spins around the murders in his Indian Killer traffic in romantic tropes of 
vanishment, Schultz’s myths actively participate in the process of making vanishment a 
reality because they generate sincerely held feelings of national belonging that require the 
violent removal of Native presence. 
 To the extent that Shultz’s rhetoric invests in a discourse that reifies white male 
embodiment as metonymic of national belonging and citizenship, it stakes a possessive 
claim to the nation and invests that claim in white embodiment. However, the discourse 
of possessive investments does not quite capture how Schultz’s argument actively 
engenders affective belonging through incitements to violence.31 His appeals carry 
affective force because they draw upon felt “traditions” and orientations that, while not 
always recognizable as belonging to the present, remain effective elements of everyday 
perception and affective citizenship among the white men in his audience. Shultz’s 
appeals speak to, as much as create, wounded, victimized white masculinity as a structure 
of feeling that posits wounds and notional victimhood as residual elements of past 
cultural formations. These residual elements remain active and effective to the extent that 
they can be taken up at will.32 In this vein, Alexie’s “portraits” of white masculinity 
position it as relying on two interarticulated prostheses: on the one hand notional 
victimhood and felt but-not-quite-actual wounds; and on the other the availably 
threatening presence of Indigenous peoples who can be made to represent variably 
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framed modes of victimhood at will, if they come into the frame of white male perception 
at all. 
 Positioning straight, white masculinity as reliant on prosthetic attachments for its 
claims to normative citizenship, victimhood, woundedness, or racial identification, 
suggests that a fundamental powerlessness inheres in the presumptive center of power in 
the American array of identity positions. Where power appears, it accrues through 
habitually inhabiting others’ subject positions as a part of one’s perceptual tradition. 
These traditions are taken up as much as passed down, and throughout Indian Killer 
Alexie frames the ways that white masculine embodiment and orientation is actively 
made through taking up power over others. The effects of these perceptual traditions, 
once they filter into active awareness, prompt reflection and, often, sincere gestures 
soliciting absolution.  
As an example of this push-pull relationship between power, violence, and 
atonement, Alexie offers Aaron and David Rogers as cases in point. As children, Aaron 
and David learned from their father Buck how to “defend” their land from Indigenous 
people digging camas root by shooting “over their heads” (62-66), or, as Aaron later 
explains to his father, directly at them (284). When David expresses reluctance to fire on 
the “Indians” who had “been root digging for thousands of years,” his father Buck, who 
“hated fear,” assumed that David was “probably queer” (63-65). Out of a “specific sense 
of guilt and a vague curiosity” (61), David sought friendship and possibly romance with 
Marie Polatkin, a “Real Indian” in his eyes with whom he could share his childhood 
experiences (68, 87). After David’s death, Aaron wonders aloud whether or not his 
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attempted murder of the Indians digging camas all those years ago might have caused the 
calamity erupting throughout the city (283-84). Following Aaron’s, Sean’s, and Barry’s 
spree of violence against the homeless, Sean has a change of heart and heads to the 
Seattle police. Searching for absolution, and explaining that the trio “started doing this 
for a good reason” or at least a reason “people would understand,” he dodges a direct 
confrontation with the fact that he “almost killed” his victims and instead explains: 
 
…this white-Indian thing has gotten out of control. And the thing with the blacks 
and Mexicans. Everybody blaming everybody. I mean, it’s like white people get 
blamed for everything these days. I mean, I know we did some bad stuff. I know 
it. I know what me and Aaron and Barry did was wrong. But it was anger. 
Frustration, you know? David disappeared, and…somebody had to pay for it. 
Somebody was to blame for it. (387) 
 
 
Sean’s sense of the wrongness of the “bad stuff” he, Aaron, and Barry have done, and his 
seemingly sincere, or at least intransigent, belief that anger and frustration motivated by 
filial loyalty constitute a reasonable explanation, hinges on his attempt to evoke solidarity 
through appealing to the wounded whiteness he now feels as a racial marker of his social 
identity. Like Aaron’s vague sense of guilt earlier, or David’s more palpable guilt, all 
three know they are complicit in something, but the scale of their complicity outstrips 
their capacities to feel it. They need someone else, in other words, to feel it for them. And 
those others are in all three cases Indigenous peoples whose historical victimhood, in the 
minds of these white men, make them available receptacles for “bad stuff” and bad 
feelings alike.  
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Arising from a sense of powerlessness at the center of their social power, 
compounded by a fomented sense of anger and frustration at their lack of ability to 
confidently wield it, these men experience wounded whiteness as a kind of power. The 
moments of powerlessness these men experience, and that Alexie stages through them, 
are small-scale and transitory. As Marie observes, because “only white people got to be 
individuals,” they “could be anybody they wanted to be” (232). Part of the elasticity of 
white individuality, and owing to the “multitudes” whiteness contains, is the ability to 
inhabit illusory wounds at will and from within that inhabitance to perform woundedness 
while retaining power.  
Alexie’s layered allusions to the Ghost Dance throughout Indian Killer frame the 
degree to which wounded whiteness becomes a powerful illusion.33 Throughout the 
novel, Marie and her cousin Reggie both at turns confront white men with the factual 
possibility that “Indians are dancing now, and I don’t think they’re going to stop” (418). 
“Maybe this is how the Ghost Dance works,” Marie explains to Mather, “Maybe ten 
Indians are dancing. Maybe a hundred. It’s just a theory” (313, my emphasis). 
Capitalizing on Mather’s love of theories, and through it his felt insularity from the 
reality of the violence he not only produces but to which he is also subject, Marie’s irony 
finds a sharp point: “You don’t believe in the Ghost Dance, do you? Oh, you like its 
symbolism. You admire its metaphorical beauty, enit?...You love Indians so much you 
think you’re excluded from our hatred. Don’t you see? If the Ghost Dance had worked, 
you wouldn’t be here. You’d be dust” (313). Mather’s reliance on “theory,” “metaphor,” 
“beauty,” sincerity and sympathy, craft around him a metaphoric attachment to the 
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Indians he theorizes into existence and with whom he communes through whiteness as 
the vehicle of his metaphors. His whiteness screens out the reality of Marie’s argument as 
well as the reality of settlement the Ghost Dance sought to make into “dust.” Inhabiting 
the metaphoric beauty of Indianness and augmenting his whiteness through sincere 
gestures will not obviate the fact of his forcibly being in space that does not belong to 
him. But through appealing to the wound opened by Marie’s rejection, a wound that 
manifests for him as whiteness, Mather can continue to inhabit the illusion that the Ghost 
Dance is only metaphor. So while Mather may acknowledge the historical injustices done 
to Native peoples; while Aaron, Barry, Sean, and David might explain away the “bad 
stuff” they’ve done through acknowledging its wrongs; while Wilson might know he is 
not really Shilshomish but press on nevertheless within the illusion, none of these white 
men seems able to feel that their acknowledgements of small-scale complicity link them 
to the enduring continuance of settler-violence that whiteness screens out of perception. 
Their senses are, as Walters suggests in Ghost Singer, “too damned plugged up!” (21), 
and so they turn to others to do their feeling.  
 
“Not in Our Skins, but in Our Minds”:  
Whiteness as a Plugged-Up Sensorium in Ghost Singer 
Anna Lee Walters’s Ghost Singer takes up the notion of whiteness as a screen 
through which the violence of settlement is filtered out of normative white perception, 
but reframes the kinds of affective intransigence Alexie imagines to characterize white 
masculinity throughout Indian Killer as stemming from a plugged-up sensorium. 
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Walters’s theory of whiteness as articulating a set of sensory plugs that stop up 
engagement with the fullness of one’s experience opens up alternative capacities within 
whiteness that counter Alexie’s quite damningly determinative characterizations. 
Whereas Alexie puts a sharp point on his critique of white sincerity as an inevitably 
violent though apparently benign enactment of sympathetic identification, Walters’s 
notion of sensory plugs helps to account for how such affective inclinations take form in 
a way that renders the ongoing violence of settler-occupation imperceptible and thus 
allows for white men like Alexie’s Mather and Wilson or Walters’s cast of white 
researchers to feel unimplicated in contributing to the conditions the ensure settler-
violence’s continued enactment. 
Originally published in 1988, the novel participates in national arguments over the 
repatriation of Indigenous remains held in museums and private collections throughout 
the nation.34 Walters’s narrative intervenes in this debate through imagining the life that 
remains in the items housed in museum archives, and stages the political and legal 
arguments over rightful possession that characterized the repatriation movement as taking 
place on the terrain of sensation and belief. Within Ghost Singer, whiteness expresses a 
mode of belief that renders the material presence of life held within the national archives 
as immaterial to the supposed scientific and cultural value of retaining those remains. 
Casting this perspective as the result of sensory plugs, Walters destabilizes whiteness’s 
presumptive centrality through positioning the novel’s Indigenous characters’ 
perspectives as its normative framework. In this sense, Walters’s narrative situates 
whiteness as estranged from normative perception rather than indicative of a presumptive 
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centrality that needs to be deconstructed. From this perspective, arguments over the 
rightful “possession” of Indigenous remains for the purposes of scientific advancement or 
cultural preservation appear as affective intransigence. In other words, failing to sense the 
remains as imbued with a form of life that continues beyond death becomes equivalent to 
failing to sense what the novel portrays as the lived contiguity present-day Native peoples 
and their ancestor’s remains.  
Ghost Singer represents this conflict through white men’s refusal to acknowledge 
the materiality of the narrative’s titular figure. The researchers’ sincere investments in the 
objects and bodies in their possession are imagined as preserving the historical violence 
of settler-occupation as much as manifesting a form of its continuance. Importantly, 
however, the violence Walters imagines whiteness to engender impacts Indigenous 
persons as much as those who inhabit whiteness’s plugged-up sensorium. As Russell 
Tallman, described as being “a little bit of half a dozen tribes,”35 observes of Donald 
Evans, a white researcher at the National Archives who refuses to acknowledge the 
reality of the titular Ghost Singer, “what he is is forty years of thinking that way” (200). 
Tallman’s assessment frames Evans’s refusal as stemming from, in Merleau-Ponty’s 
language, the historical accrual of a perceptual tradition that Walters imagines to 
encompass the modes of belief and disbelief that tilt his feelings toward the subjects of 
his putative preservation. In imagining his whiteness as “forty years of thinking that 
way,” however, Walters leaves open the possibility of his eventual acknowledgement in a 
way that suggests whiteness could be unplugged through taking a different perspective. 
Attempting to get Evans to understand the gaps between his belief and his perceptions, 
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Cherokee medicine man Wilbur Snake explains that “beliefs wouldn’t ‘mount to much if 
what we believe didn’t have to do so much with power, our power […] ‘cause you and 
me is different. Not in our skins, but in our minds” (198).  
Couched as a difference in belief, or a difference “in our minds,” the narrative’s 
central tension might seem to point to a core epistemological difference between white 
and Native ways of knowing.36 However, Walters’s characterization of whiteness as a 
sensory plug resists reducing its critique to the level of epistemology alone. What Evans 
refuses to acknowledge is not something he cannot know, but rather something he seems 
unable to fully feel. As George Daylight, a Creek/Cherokee tribal official travelling with 
Russell Tallman to Washington D.C., explains Evans’s and the other researchers’ 
inability to acknowledge the life within the archives, their inability to feel it owes to their 
senses being “too damned plugged up!” (21). Unable to “know” because unable to feel, 
Ghost Singer offers whiteness as a plug that stops up their capacity to sense life in forms 
they otherwise find inconceivable. Reframed as a modality of sensory perception, 
whiteness appears like Merleau-Ponty’s “wound” through which illusions mix with 
representational schemas to augment the actuality of sensory perception, closing off 
possibilities for fully feeling the reality sensation might afford.  
Ghost Singer develops its phenomenology of whiteness as a “plugged-up” 
sensorium through a critique of white masculinity’s association with disembodied 
rationality. Despite their sense that something strange is going on in the archives, Evans 
and fellow researcher Geoffrey Newsome lean on rational explanation as a way to 
augment and mitigate feelings that seem to have no place in their perceptual schemas. 
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Working together in the archives to “[sort] out the fragments of history…and [make] the 
pieces fit into something they both understood” (40), Newsome’s and Evans’s immediate 
archeological project mirrors the degree to which both work to assimilate the fragments 
and “debris” of history into a coherent, explanatory narrative in order to locate and place 
the objects in their possession. Despite feeling as though something was not quite fitting, 
both Newsome and Evans initially follow historian David Drake’s line of reasoning to 
explain the strange phenomena in the archives. Early in the narrative, Drake’s sister Jean 
Wurly meets him in a panic, having endured the sense that something living exists in the 
archives for “three years;” “…[there] are Indians there,” she tells him, fearing he will 
think she is crazy, “I’ve seen them….Davie, they’re ghosts!” (5). No one else can confirm 
what Wurly feels certain she has seen, a fact that only adds to her distress. Drake, 
however, dismisses her concerns out of hand, implying that she needs only to eat a decent 
meal and get some rest. Drake’s dismissal points out the distinctively gendered character 
of Walters’s representations of whiteness’s plugs. Wurly cannot only sense the presence 
of “Indians” in the archives; she cannot stop seeing them. Despite the affective evidence 
of her exasperation, Drake dismisses her claims as an irrational response to something 
she must have imagined. When Newsome begins to feel something “unexplainable” (41), 
he follows suit and attempts to manage those feelings in a “rational way,” searching for a 
“logical explanation” (45). Evans likewise follows the pattern, dismissing the strange 
phenomena at the edges of his perception as “hocus pocus” and the eventual deaths of his 
former colleagues as owing to the ghost stories they’d allowed themselves to believe 
(125). Later, although having agreed to participate in a ceremony meant to help the Ghost 
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Singer move on from the attic room where his remains are held, Evans nevertheless 
remains skeptical of the process and “scares himself” with the possibility of confronting a 
ghost rather than a living presence (210, 216-17). The “reasonable” positions each of 
these men attempts to take over and against the evidence of something amiss in their 
affective milieu effectively argues that rationality plugs up a set of necessary perceptual 
capacities, not the least of which is a basic form of empathy and, from it, a recognition of 
shared humanity that their possessive claim on the reasonable and the logical continue to 
blur. 
Through Drake’s, Newsome’s, and Evans’s incredulity with respect to the Ghost 
Singer’s materiality, Walters critiques the presumptive givenness of the spatial schemas 
within which their affective experiences seem to have no place. The sheer fact of Native 
presence itself seems not to fit into their orientations. Newsome, for instance, considers 
the collections in his care to be “beautiful [specimens] of extinct Indian culture” (45), and 
as a result cannot seem to fathom why Wurly would feel compelled to show parts of the 
collections to a “group of American Indians” who were “looking into business that had 
nothing to do with them” (44). Drake, despite “writing a history of the people” and 
seeking help from Johnnie Navajo (25), ultimately abandons his efforts out of fear of his 
colleague’s dismissal of Navajo’s stories as “sentimental hogwash that could be 
construed as romanticism” (225). Evans had fully expected Native Americans to “become 
extinct by all the rules of the game” (91), and as such “the last thing” he wanted was 
“involvement with George[ Daylight’s] kind” (122). Rejecting living Native peoples’ 
presence spurs the refusal to acknowledge the sensation that something lives in the 
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archives. The strange feelings plaguing Newsome at work were “directly related to where 
he was, physically” (40), a fact that at first seems to root them in the office but later 
forms a part of his sensorium, manifesting as auditory and visual hallucinations—an 
“intense” buzzing and “white dots of light that flashed before him” (47). Evans, for his 
part, tries to rationalize the presence he feels as owing to the “heathen” culture he 
vociferously argues is “dead” (125), but like Newsome before him his attempts to 
rationalize the presence falter as its power over him grows stronger (130-31).  
Because Newsome and Evans reject out of hand the fact that Native peoples 
continue to live in the present but still sense that some presence in the archives follows 
them around, the novel suggests that Native space circumscribes whiteness’s sensory 
capacities. In this regard, the men’s refusal to acknowledge Native life suggests that they 
plug their senses as a way to mitigate their sense that their possession of Indigenous 
remains metonymically suggests their possession of Indigenous space. The distance 
Newsome and Evans try to maintain between their sensory perceptions and their rational 
perspective highlights Walters’s characterization of their lack of perceptual capacity as 
owning in part to their gendered performances. Their felt attachments to space and place, 
and their palpable disorientation when the presences challenge those attachments, 
suggests that part of their performances of masculinity involves a habituation to spaces 
that, in Ahmed’s phrase, seem to have already taken their shape.37 Their habituation, in 
this sense, finds its condition of possibility in active efforts to screen out the fact of 
Native endurance. These efforts manifest in their attitudes and inclinations toward the 
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objects in the archives over which they claim possession and through which they 
eventually become possessed.  
Ghost Singer’s portrayal of arguments about the possession of Indigenous 
remains, situated within the historical and political context of debates leading up to 
NAGPRA’s enactment, draws clear lines between the supposed anthropological necessity 
of such holdings and the implications of them for Native sovereignty and the wholeness 
of Native peoples. Staging the novel’s series of white researchers as utterly disinterested 
in Native life, and in the progression and evolution of Native cultures across time, 
underscores the novel’s basic claim that the existence of such archives does little but 
compound the discourse of “lasting,” to draw on Jean O’Brien, that propagates notions of 
Native vanishment and participates quite literally in the process of discursively conjuring 
Native death.38 Walters folds the processes of making dead embedded in the existence of 
the archives into everyday settler-feeling articulated and made visible as white 
masculinity. Importantly, however, the “plugs” that block these men’s sensory capacities 
appear not as permanent ontological features of their being as such, but instead as 
temporary blockages “in [their/]our minds” that could be unplugged given the right set of 
circumstances. The first of these plugs that need removal in order to open up the white 
sensorium is the notion of possessiveness, and with it ownership, implied in “holding” 
archives of Native remains.  
Walters develops a critique of possessiveness as a characteristic of whiteness, and 
of white patriarchy in particular, by suggesting its realization within discourses of Native 
extinction. Among the white researchers who come into direct contact with the remains in 
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the attic, Evans is the only one who survives. He lives because, at Daylight’s behest, he 
begins to attempt to unplug reason and rationality from his sensorium, and as a result tries 
to begin recognizing the reality of Native life. This transformation does not come easily, 
in part because Evans “is forty years of thinking that way,” and as Russell Tallman puts 
it, “It’d be unrealistic to expect too much” (200). Evans believes in the notion that 
Indigenous peoples are doomed to extinction, that they “can never be modern” as 
O’Brien puts it (107), because they were “on borrowed time” (Walters 123).39 Because 
“all the groups would be sucked up into one big vacuum” that would eventually obliterate 
difference through assimilation into implied whiteness, “Donald couldn’t…encourage 
ethnic plurality and diversity…it was an unrealistic way of thinking. He couldn’t condone 
such indulgence” (123). The logic, on its face, shows Evans’s racism, but also asserts his 
sense of the archive’s value. When Indigenous peoples become extinct, an inevitability of 
linear progress into modernity, the remains in the archives will be all that is left behind, 
and from those remains, Evans, like Newsome, can assemble the parts into a whole that 
makes sense.  
Evans’s future-anterior logic presents Native extinction a foregone conclusion and 
suggests the progression toward assimilation he imagines is already underway. As a 
guard against a future he experiences as his present, the sincerity of Evans’s commitment 
to the archive speaks to the sincerity of his investments in Indigenous extinction, which 
are articulated through his experience of possessiveness over the remains he hopes to 
preserve. Evans’s denial of continued Indigenous existence thus represents a more 
straightforward characterization of Mather’s brand of white sincerity in Indian Killer. 
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Dismissing with the liberal posture of benevolent inclusion, Walters’s characterization of 
white sincerity points out the extent to which the impetus to preserve Native culture 
through possessing Indigenous remains assumes that Native culture is already dead and 
thus already a part of the national historical archive of settler-feeling. Keeping the lid on 
this history works to seal off its potential continuance, thus becoming a “plug” that 
generates an attachment to national belonging predicated on maintaining the illusion that 
Native peoples only exist as subjects of history.  
Evans’s possessiveness over the archives thus suggests his possessive investment 
in whiteness, in George Lipsitz’s terms, as the only possible eventuality.40 Rejecting 
Daylight’s argument that “such [things] can’t be owned” because “The extent of feeling, 
or cultural belief, of a particular tribal person, or tribal group, creating a religious or 
sacred item goes beyond possession or ownership of it” (124), Evans claims that the 
legacy represented in the archives “is an embarrassment” to Native peoples that “with 
education and enculturation” they would “wisely” choose to put behind them (125). 
Evans’s implied paternalism over Native peoples, here not a gesture of sincerity but a 
sincerely held belief, stems from his “forty years” of accrued perceptual traditions that 
place Native peoples in a supplicant position to the power invested within and exercised 
through his knowledge. Moreton-Robinson reads this kind of patriarchal white 
sovereignty as elaborating a “possessive investment” that produces the nation as a “white 
possession” (“Writing Off Indigenous Sovereignty” 88). Though writing of Australian 
politics, Moreton-Robinson’s argument describes the manifestation of Evans’s “anxiety” 
over “dispossession” (102) as a possessive investment in the archives’ function to make 
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and keep Native peoples “dead,” and thus to secure his attachment to the white nation he 
envisions as an inevitability (Walters 125). Whiteness thus serves to screen out the 
enduring violence of settlement—making “dead” Indigenous peoples whether 
discursively or actually—as its predicate condition, and the “plugged-up” sensorium 
whiteness engenders around Evans blocks up his ability to feel complicit in the process.  
Walters frames the sincerity of Evans’s belief in the inevitable eventuality of 
Native termination as the experience of whiteness’s possessive attachments to national 
space, and situates that experience as expressive of self-possessive individualism. In 
imagining self-possession and white male personhood as contoured around the sensory 
experience of protective benevolence, Walters foregrounds the importance of framing 
whiteness as a set of sensory plugs. Evans feels like a dutiful citizen doing what he can to 
protect what he imagines to remain of Indigenous culture against what he experiences as 
the eventuality of its dying out. Though he may not express his sense of benevolence 
through a notional attachment to Indianness as the terrain of solidarity, as Mather does in 
Indian Killer, his sense of a future-to-come when Native peoples will not live in relation 
to tribal histories articulates a similar desire to frame Indigenous life through a “positive 
portrait” against its eventual negation. That eventual negation, as Evans sees it, will 
manifest as assimilation into modernity, national belonging, and thus eventually 
whiteness. As signs of the past out of which this progression toward modernity moves 
forward, the archives represent the material anchor for the experience of its inevitability. 
If whiteness thus marks a mode of experiencing oneself as belonging to the nation as 
something one can possesses within one’s sense of selfhood, then Walters imagines that 
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experience to depend on the inclusion of Indigenous peoples in a manner that forecloses 
upon Indigeneity. In this sense, Evans is sincere in his commitment to an inclusive 
horizon because he imagines himself to be already in possession of the space into which 
Indigenous people might be included. The plugs that prevent him from acknowledging 
George Daylight’s argument that Indigenous sovereignty surpasses the notion of 
possessiveness thus also produce his commitment to Indigenous erasure as a feeling of 
protective benevolence toward Native peoples’ histories.  
Walters’s sense of plugs thus goes two ways, preventing acknowledgement of the 
full scope of Evans’s historical entanglements within settlement while producing a sense 
of historically rooted attachment to national space that effaces the history of its 
manifestation. Because these relationships play out on the terrain of sensation and take 
form as a mode of belief, Walters suggests that in order for Evans’s senses to become 
“unplugged” he has to experience his complicity directly through his body. Confronting 
the Tall Man, the name given to the titular “Ghost Singer,” Evans feels “himself being 
lifted upward and then dropped” (130). The second time this happens, “Donald felt the 
impact” (131). The “impact” seems to shake loose the plugs blocking his ability to sense 
the Tall Man’s material presence. Yet despite this physical encounter, Evans remains 
fixated on the notion that “Indian ghosts” haunt the attic (174). His unwillingness to 
recognize this experience as materially efficacious points back to his accrued reliance on 
self-possession, which Walters frames here as too sedimented in his self-concept to be 
shaken loose because too much is at stake to let it go. Were he to recognize the Tall 
Man’s materiality, in other words, he would have to recognize that the continuum of 
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Indigenous existence Daylight had earlier tried to explain outstrips his ability to possess 
and contain it.  
Walters’s characterization of whiteness as a plugged-up sensorium, in addition to 
positing its impermeability to sensations of violence and complicity, suggests that 
whiteness contains something white persons might be unwilling to let flow out. As 
Wilbur Snake explains to Russell Tallman, “we got power…This power we got is to live. 
Our bodies is connected to that power just like the unseen part of ourselves is tied to it 
too” (202). Evans’s experiences are “in his mind,” but, as Junior Snake adds, “Our minds 
are the boundaries of our physical selves” (203). Evans knows he has experienced 
something, in other words, but his attempts to rationalize the experience block his ability 
to feel its connection to the power to live that Wilbur contends connects our bodies as 
well as the parts of bodies Evans oversees to the world. “Any part of it [the body] stands 
for the whole,” Wilbur Snake explains, “…a hand, fingers, a breast, the hair. And the 
body itself—the blood, flesh, and bones—stands for the unseen part of man…his 
memory, his mind, and his spirit. A man ain’t fully a man without them” (202). The parts 
of bodies and “relics” held in the archives retain this power, are still part of the “whole,” 
and convey memory, mind, and spirit as, to merge Walters’s phenomenology with 
Merleau-Ponty’s language, the historical accrual of a perceptual tradition. Evans’s refusal 
to acknowledge this power marks a doubled refusal to acknowledge himself as implicated 
in Wilbur’s synecdochic logic. The body stands for the whole, and Evans’s plugged-up 
experiences of his body’s imbrication within settlement both articulates and blocks his 
ability to sense his privileged position within its manifestation. Letting go, unplugging his 
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sensorium, would threaten to release his possessive hold on his way of being attached to 
the nation, and with it the notion of nationhood as anything other than an illusory 
construction that “slide[s] across the world” (Merleau-Ponty 355) of Indigenous lands. 
Rather than “save [himself]” as Russell Tallman urges him to do at the close of the 
narrative, by taking responsibility for his life and trying to “fix it…and if you can’t…then 
open up your mind and prepare to learn something form the next experience” (240), 
Evans thinks only of “how one would kill” the Tall Man (241). Lost within the “forty 
years of thinking that way” that makes up his orientations toward the world, Evans—and 
the white men he metonymically represents—seem to remain hopelessly plugged by the 
narrative’s close.  
Walters offers Evans’s inability to feel himself changed by the powerful 
encounters he has experienced as a way to focalize the novel’s critique of white 
masculinity. The differences “not in our skins, but in our minds” are manifest legacies of 
historical traditions that work to divide perceptual continuity into discrete experience and 
to pull power away from place. Though Walters implies that Wilbur Snake’s 
phenomenology applies to everyone, throughout Ghost Singer whiteness remains a screen 
that masks extent to which settlement is an ongoing project articulated, in part, through 
refusing to acknowledge the materiality of sensory experiences. Evans’s intransigence 
points back to the sincerity of his belief in the discreteness of things, a belief that Walters 
argues plugs up his ability to acknowledge the reality of Native endurance over and 
against attempts to make and keep it dead. His sincerity remains possible despite the 
sensory evidence he experiences because, within his plugged-up sensorium, extinction 
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and vanishment are the only sensible shape the “debris” of Indian cultures can take. 
White sincerity thus becomes, at the close of Ghost Singer, a performance of the 
durability of one’s sensory attachments to an illusory feeling of belonging. Evans remains 
attached to the extent that Indians—or at least his idea of them—remain dead relics of a 
bygone past; a past that forms the prelude to the assimilative modernity in which he feels 
himself firmly emplaced. As Ghost Singer demonstrates, this feeling is illusory, but has 
the value of reality because it remains grounded in the sensory experience of removal and 
possession. Attempts to suture the “gaping wound” that whiteness represents, through 
which the illusions of Native extinction authorize reasonable attachments to the nation-
state, ultimately fail to close up the gap. What remains is a prosthetic attachment to 
national belonging articulated through the sincere feeling that Native peoples’ presence 
will eventually fade. Through yoking white men’s ideas of Indianness, however spectral, 
to self-authorization and assimilative erasure, Ghost Singer frames whiteness as 
inhabiting Indianness in order to inhabit itself. 
 
Structures of Feeling: Wounded Whiteness as Inhabiting Indianness 
As Alexie and Walters theorize, the ability to make others into emotional and 
affective prostheses is among the powers of white embodiment that seems to slip away 
into the self-made wounds of white phenomenology. Alexie’s portrayals of white 
sincerity throughout Indian Killer demonstrate how white men’s appeals to benevolent 
solidarity through inhabiting “Indianness” create the conditions within which sincere 
attachments to national space produce material violence against Indigenous people. 
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Indian Killer suggests that the sincerity of these men’s inclinations, whether toward 
physical violence or violent benevolence, is articulated through a prosthetic relationship 
to notions of Indianness that can circulate as both supplement for and agent of 
whiteness’s wounds. Thus we see Mather able to imagine himself the victim of Marie’s 
intransigent refusal to become a feature of his positive portraiture; Wilson able to 
imagine himself as the very last of his tribe so as to supplement his experience of 
whiteness’s emptiness; and Truck Shultz able to imagine Indians as engaged in a race war 
against whites so as to position whiteness as a wounded subject position in need of 
violent defense. To the extent that none of these men seem able to acknowledge their 
whiteness as the perceptual anchor for their active prostheticization of “Indianness,” 
Indian Killer dramatizes the experiences Walters frames in Ghost Singer as stemming 
from perceptual plugs. The active reliance on Indigenous removal, termination, and 
eventual extinction through which Walters’s cast of white men experience their holding 
of Indigenous remains as an act of sincere protection of Native culture demonstrates how 
their notions of “Indianness” anchor their experiences of whiteness. In this vein, Walters 
takes Alexie’s sense of wounded whiteness in Indian Killer further, reframing whiteness 
as a wound through which fantasies of self-possessive autonomy are superimposed over 
the material conditions that give rise to them.  
 Indian Killer and Ghost Singer thus suggest that whiteness inhabits “Indianness” 
in order to inhabit itself. This claim is not merely metaphoric. As the novels suggest, it is 
instead descriptive of the process through which the experience of whiteness can feel like 
the experience of belonging and circulate as the background condition for the perceptual 
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prostheticization of others’ bodies. White sincerity is thus a gestural mode of wounded 
whiteness’s plugged-up perceptual schema and indicative of one of the ways whiteness’s 
plugs produce prosthetic attachments. The felt alliances Alexie portrays between white 
men’s inhabitance of “Indianness” and the Indigenous people with whom they imagine 
themselves in solidarity express the violence of whiteness’s prosthetic engagements as a 
disciplinary demand to become a recognizable subject within whiteness’s perceptual 
milieu. As Walters suggests, however, recognition is not the only frame through which 
whiteness’s prosthetic attachments becomes possible. From within the privileged position 
to arbitrate the meaning and contours of “Indianness,” white men like Walters’s 
researchers fashion their belonging against the unrecognizability of Indigenous life, and, 
through inhabiting its insensibility, reproduce themselves as continually in possession of 
the tools through which to shape its materialization. 
 To the extent that these modes of inhabitance remain perceptually unavailable 
within whiteness’s plugged-up sensorium, Alexie and Walters suggest that wounded 
whiteness is a structure of feeling, in Raymond Williams’s terms “practical consciousness 
of a present kind” (132), that through the experience of sincere solidarity or protective 
benevolence articulates its privileged position within settler-colonial violence and 
occupation as historical and institutional forces that themselves may remain too abstract 
to become sensible. In contexts where settlement appears to be a non-issue, where 
Indigenous persons are absent from the perceptual milieu of settler self-representation, 
Alexie’s and Walters’s phenomenologies of whiteness are no less applicable. The 
structure of feeling they imagine wounded whiteness to articulate expresses a relationship 
 
 95 
to settlement that structures the perceptual experience of whiteness as an experience of 
prosthetic belonging.  
Through examining the experiential contours of “atomized” individuality, in Ross 
Chambers’ terms (145), we can see how white men’s performances of woundedness 
become a marker of their alienation from social power as much as a means of attaining it 
through attempts to galvanizing a body of feeling around the discreteness of their 
specific, individual wounds. In the following two chapters, I trace Alexie’s and Walters’s 
theory of wounded whiteness as it takes shape within nonnative self-representation. As 
one among several modalities of the phenomenology of white masculinity, wounded 
whiteness emerges as perhaps the most powerful among them, inasmuch as performing 
woundedness makes possible the kinds of illusory acknowledgements of complicity that 
render the scales of violence complicity implicates illegible as well as imperceptible. 
Through the others who do their feeling for them, wounded white men orient themselves 
within the alliances their sincerity disciplines into existence, and within those illusory 
orientations, they build worlds across which their fantasies of belonging smoothly slide.  
 
 96 
Notes 
 
1 For the epigraph, see Alexie (209). The PBS panel consisted of Alexie, President Clinton, 
Richard Rodriguez, Roger Rosenblatt, Clarence Page and Cynthia Tucker, Roberto Suro, Kay James, and 
Elaine Chao. The dialogues were in support of a national Presidential initiative dubbed “One America in 
the 21st Century.” The initiative, as its title suggests, aimed to spark national conversations among 
everyday Americans about the differences between them and ways, as Clinton put it in the dialogue, “to 
identify the common values that hold us together as a country.” As a part of the initiative, the President 
created a commission tasked with producing a report on race and race-related issues in the United States. 
The panel, chaired by John Hope Franklin, notably excluded Native American representation. For a critique 
of the panel’s composition and its relationship to whiteness and settler-colonialism, see Moreton-Robinson, 
“Writing Off Treaties.” Commentators of the period, as well as those writing more recently, were largely 
skeptical of Clinton’s aims and the political agenda underwriting his initiative on race. For a critique of the 
panel’s application of multiculturalist policies and its marked departure from earlier studies of racism in 
America, see Kim, “Clinton’s Race Initiative.” For a substantive introduction to critiques of 
multiculturalism in the 1990s, see Gordon and Newfield, Mapping. For a critique of the electoral and 
political agendas underwriting Clinton’s initiative more broadly, see Kim, “Managing.” 
 
2 All quotations from the dialogue reference the transcript available on PBS.org and listed on the 
Works Cited page as “A Dialogue on Race with President Clinton.” 
 
3 For an analysis of Clinton’s claims as they pertain to “shifting” into Cherokee identity, and how 
those claims map onto neoliberal discourse and its effacement of race, see Sturm (183-192). 
 
4 Here I am paraphrasing Raymond Williams’s development of “Structures of Feeling” in 
Marxism and Literature. See esp. 128-135 for his elaboration of the concept. 
 
5 Most readings of Alexie’s Indian Killer follow one of two related trajectories. Either readers 
contextualize the novel’s violence and focus on racism within Native American literature more broadly, or 
position the novel within arguments over the content and practice of teaching Native American studies. For 
readings of Indian Killer’s focus on violence and racism and its position and significance within Native 
American literature more broadly, see Bracewell; Carpenter, “Fancydancing”; Christie; L. Cooper; 
Coulombe; Dean; Grassain, “Indian Killer” and Understanding; Krupat; and Van Styvendale. For readings 
of Indian Killer as an argument over the practices of Native American studies, see Herman; Hollrah; 
McFarland; and Owens. For an overview of the critical reception of Alexie’s work more broadly, see 
Wahpeconiah, 
Walters’s Ghost Singer has received far less critical attention since its publication in 1989. The 
three published articles on the novel contextualize its central focus—Indigenous remains held within the 
Smithsonian Museum of Natural History—within the history and politics of the 1990 enactment of the 
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA). See Aigner-Alvarez; Graber; and 
Tillett. 
 
6 The notion of whiteness as unmarked or invisible is something of a critical commonplace within 
whiteness studies. For selected elaborations of the notion, see Chambers; Montag; Lipsitz; and Babb. 
 
7 On the relationship between cultural and legal forms of recognition within settler-colonial 
nations and Indigenous sovereignty, see Povinelli, Cunning; and Coulthard. 
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8 Describing ordinary sensation and perception, Merleau-Ponty argues “every sensation belongs to 
a certain field” and that as a result “simultaneously vision is always limited…there is always a horizon of 
unseen or even invisible things around my present vision. Vision is a thought subjugated to a certain field 
and this is what is called a sense” (224-25). The notion that sensation belongs to and constitutes a certain 
“field,” and as such creates boundaries around the sensible that can not include the “horizon of unseen or 
invisible things” around one’s active perception suggests that in every act of perception one is, by virtue of 
perceiving, editing out the “things around” one that become invisible. Developing the notion further, 
Merleau-Ponty argues that one’s act of perception can come to occupy one’s capacity to perceive: “my act 
of perception occupies me, and it occupies me sufficiently such that I cannot, when I am actually perceiving 
the table, perceive myself perceiving it” (247). In other words, in taking up a particular act of perception 
one loses track of the act, editing out elements of the stream of sensory data that do not match the 
occupation. As a result, the act of perceiving supervenes one’s ability to be consciously aware of the act. As 
a result, Merleau-Ponty argues, “The perceiving person is not spread out before himself in the manner that 
a consciousness must be: he has a historical thickness, he takes up a perceptual tradition, and he is 
confronted with a present. In perception, we do not thing the object and we do not think the thinking, we 
are directed toward the object and we merge with this body that knows more about the object than we do 
about the world, about motives, and about the means available for accomplishing synthesis” (247-48). 
Ahmed sketches the notion of “orientation” and what she calls “orientation devices” early in 
Queer Phenomenology as shaping “not only how we inhabit space, but how we apprehend this world of 
shared inhabitance, as well as ‘who’ or ‘what’ we direct our energy toward” (3). In addition to considering 
whiteness as a way of naming systemic sets of privileges afforded to persons identified as white, I also 
consider whiteness at it is lived to constitute an “orientation” toward the world of “shared inhabitance” as 
well as a way of describing how the “world,” or more specifically spaces within the U.S. that white persons 
inhabit alongside persons of color, as itself oriented around whiteness in ways that shape how “energy and 
attention” is directed toward them. For more on orientations and racialization in Queer Phenomenology, see 
especially chapter 3, “The Orient and Other Others.” For an earlier article covering a similar set of issues, 
see Ahmed, “A Phenomenology.” 
 
9 See Byrd, esp. “Indigenous Critical Theory and the Diminishing Returns of Civilization,” xv-
xxxix.  
 
10 On this point, see Byrd. 
 
11 I am referring to Butler’s notion of gender performance as a stylized repetition of acts. See 
Butler, Gender Trouble. For a consideration of whiteness as a “perspective,” in the sense of a way of seeing 
and knowing, and the ways that perspective is performed, see Nicoll. 
 
12 For considerations of Native American gaming industries on reservation economies, see 
Bruyneel; and Harmon. For a brief consideration of Native American gaming and its impact on Indigenous 
peoples in California, see Ramirez, (163-65).  
 
13 In this vein, Mather’s character suggests an allusion to the self-serving anthropologists Vine 
Deloria mocked in his famous essay “Anthropologists and Other Friends.” For the essay, see V. Deloria 
(78-100). 
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14 In Queer Phenomenology, Ahmed considers whiteness as an “orientation” that becomes habitual 
to the extent that it “does not have [one’s] attention” (131). Whiteness as a set of embodied powers and 
privileges also extends to the spaces that white bodies are able to easily and habitually inhabit. White 
bodies expand into space through the “objects, tools, instruments, and even ‘others’ [that] allow [the body] 
to inhabit space by” extending its reach, and in this way the “whiteness of space” takes form around “such 
‘points’ of extension” (132). 
Ahmed’s sense of whiteness as a background borne out of habitual inclinations toward spaces and 
others draws heavily upon the work of Merleau-Ponty and Linda Martín Alcoff. For Merleau-Ponty’s 
considerations of space, orientation, and background, see 254-65. Alcoff theorizes identities more broadly 
in ways similar to Ahmed’s framing of whiteness, as “horizon[s] of agency” constructed through “located 
lived experiences in which both individuals and groups work to construct meaning in relation to historical 
experiences and historical narratives” (42). 
 
15 On disciplinary discourses of knowledge-production, see Foucault, Discipline.  
 
16 For an extended analysis of The Education of Little Tree and the life of Forrest Asa Carter, see 
Huhndorf, esp. Chapter 3, “The Making of an Indian: ‘Forrest Carter’s Literary Inventions.” 
 
17 Circe Sturm notes that among the federally recognized tribes within the United States, racial 
shifters on the whole most often claim Cherokee identity, in part because “as they see it—real Cherokee 
look and act white…and are in many ways no different from the larger Euro-American population” (60). 
See Sturm, Becoming Indian. 
 
18 Marie’s argument echoes arguments for reforming the canon of Native American literature 
around tribally specific concerns and sets of experiences and grounding it solely in Native-authored texts. 
These arguments stand is stark opposition to Mather’s whitewashed syllabus, and position such approaches 
to Native American literature as participating in a broader project of assimilative erasure that overlooks and 
silences continual Native-authored literary production. For two important arguments within this frame, see 
Womack; and Weaver, Womack and Warrior. For readings of this argument as it emerges through Indian 
Killer, see Carpenter, “Fancydancing; Chen; Cox, “Muting”; and Hollrah. 
 
19 In February-May of 1973, Oglala Lakota members of the American Indian Movement (AIM) 
occupied Wounded Knee, on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation in South Dakota, the site of an 1890 
massacre of more than 200 Lakotas. For a history of the American Indian Movement and Red Power 
activism throughout the period, including the occupation of Wounded Knee, see Nagel. For a collection of 
essays reflecting on the earlier occupation of Alcatraz Island by AIM activists, see Johnson, Nagel, and 
Champagne, Eds. 
Indian Killer reflects ideas of Native nationalism and pan-Indigenous solidarity that formed 
cornerstones of AIM activism and the period of ethnic renewal Nagel charts, in particular with respect to 
Native peoples living in urban areas. For a consideration of the ways Indigenous peoples in urban areas live 
their connections to tribal homelands and form pan-tribal communities, see Ramirez. 
 
20 On the interconnections between new age spiritualism and the white co-optation of a menagerie 
of “Native” ways of life, see P. Deloria; and Huhndorf. 
 
21 See Grassian, Understanding (121-124). Grassian’s reading of the novel is largely centered on 
providing possible clues as the identity of titular murder, and as a result the similarities he reads between 
Jack Wilson and John Smith are aimed toward resolving this core question. 
 
22 On the mythos of John’s adoption, see Grassian, (106-109). 
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 23 The timeline of John’s adoption is vague, but the circumstances of the scene suggest Alexie’s 
allusion to the conditions that warranted the 1978 passage of the Indian Child Welfare Act. 
 
24 On urban Indigenous communities, pan-tribal affiliation, and action, see Ramirez. 
 
25 See Sullivan for considerations of whiteness as a kind of “ontological expansiveness” (10). 
 
26 For Merleau-Ponty, the body’s capacity for direct sensory perception grounds us in the world 
perception makes possible, and produces the world as fundamentally co-extensive with our bodies and 
other’s bodies. In this vein, the substance of identity is not but for the body’s connection to the world as its 
affective milieu. Persons experiencing hallucinations remain grounded in the world in this sense, because 
they remain embodied beings in the world. 
 
27 In The National Uncanny, Renée Bergland argues “the ghosting of Indians is a technique of 
removal,” and reads the “discursive technique of describing [Indians as]…spectral beings” as a part of the 
“interior logic of the modern nation [that requires] citizens be haunted” (3-4). The problem with Bergland’s 
reading is that, on the whole, it presumes the actual as well as discursive ghosting of Indigenous peoples at 
the expense of facing the reality of continual Indigenous presence; and the repression of participation in 
removal, conceived of as an event within American history, among American citizens rather than their 
enduring, active participation in the ongoing occupation of Indigenous lands. My thanks to Jason Cooke for 
a thoughtful conversation that helped me develop this critique. 
 
28 See Ahmed, Queer (132). 
 
29 On this point, see Cox, Muting. 
 
30 On the notion of contemporary appeals to white male victimhood, see Kimmel, Angry. For more 
complex readings of the phenomena of white male victimhood, particularly as it applies to rhetorically 
inhabiting a victimized body, see Savran. 
 
31 On the circulation of negative affects as means to engender national feeling or communal 
belonging, see Ahmed, Cultural Politics, esp. Chapter 3, “The Organisation of Hate,” and Chapter 4, “The 
Affective Politics of Fear.”  
 
32 See Williams (121-123) for his explanation of the “residual” as it applies to cultural and social 
formations. 
 
33 The Ghost Dance emerged as a movement following the 1890 massacre at Wounded Knee. Led 
by Wovoka, whose given name was Jack Wilson, the Ghost Dance centered on a prophecy that through 
collective action Indigenous peoples could bring about the annihilation of white settlers from Native lands. 
For an early though problematic history of the Ghost Dance religion, see James Mooney’s 1896 The Ghost 
Dance Religion and Wounded Knee.  
 
34 Two landmark Congressional acts—the National Museum of the American Indian Act and the 
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA)—followed within two years of the 
novel’s publication and, despite contested caveats, made affordances for the cataloging and repatriation of 
Indigenous dead held throughout the country. However, in 1988, the future status of these coming acts of 
legislation was far from a foregone conclusion. In broad strokes, these arguments typically voiced on the 
one hand the potential of breakthrough anthropological findings that might be dashed were indigenous 
remains to be repatriated, and on the other complex arguments from Indigenous groups pertaining to 
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sovereignty and the historical and present-day theft of remains from Indigenous lands. For further 
considerations of NAGPRA, see K. Cooper; Fine-Dare; Mihesuah, Ed.; Trope and Echo-Hawk; and 
Vizenor. 
 
35 Russel Tallman identifies as being part Kiowa, part Caddo, part Pawnee, part Comanche, and 
part Cheyenne (52). For the sake of clarity and to avoid a lengthy list, I’ve placed Tallman’s tribal 
affiliation here rather than in the body of the main text. 
 
36 For a consideration of the way this epistemological divide implicates theories of time, linearity, 
and archival research, see Aigner-Alvarez. For a consideration of the ways Walters’s framing of 
epistemological difference implicates a “specifically Euro-American worldview,” see Tillet. 
 
37 See Ahmed, Queer (131-135). 
 
38 See O’Brien (105-43). 
 
39 For a reading of Euro-American temporality and assimilation in Ghost Singer, see Aigner-
Alvarez. 
 
40 For the elaboration of Lipsitz’s notion of whiteness as a possessive investment, see 1-23. Also 
see Moreton-Robinson, “Writing Off,” for a consideration of whiteness as grounded in a logic of 
possessiveness.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
BODY DRAMAS: SEX, SINCERITY, AND WHITE SOLIPSISM 
IN DON DELILLO’S WHITE NOISE AND DAVID FOSTER WALLACE’S  
THE BROOM OF THE SYSTEM 
 
 
I don’t think I’m talking about conventionally political or social-action type solutions. That’s not 
what fiction’s about. Fiction’s about what it is to be a fucking human being. If you operate, which 
most of us do, from the premise that there are things about the contemporary U.S. that make it 
distinctively hard to be a real human being, then maybe half of fiction’s job is to dramatize what it 
is that makes it tough. The other half is to dramatize the fact that we still are human beings, now. 
Or can be. 
 
 — David Foster Wallace, interview with Larry McCaffery 
 
 
If you want to locate the hegemonic home of liberal logics and aspirations, look to love in the 
settler colonies. 
 
— Elizabeth Povinelli, The Empire of Love 
 
 
What makes the kind of detachment David Foster Wallace imagines above 
possible, and how might the ability to feel it implicate whiteness?1 What parts of being a 
“fucking human being” get dramatized in fictions that disavow the influence of politics 
and social life? And what, if anything, does “fucking” have to do with it? In the context 
of his interview with Larry McCaffery, Wallace is searching for solutions for his 
complaint over then-recent American fiction’s emphasis on surface rather than depth, 
irony without substance, and play without purpose.2 In the context of Wallace’s work, 
however, this complaint manifests as a sincere commitment to a particularly apolitical 
brand of humanism centered on longing to feel like a “fucking human being” and 
imagining love and sex as the way to get there.3 How is it, then, that sex and sexuality, 
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love and intimacy, the desire for care and the longing for someone else to do the caring, 
can feel like pathways to an apolitically plain personhood unencumbered by the messy 
details of race, gender, or sexuality? How might Alexie’s and Walters’s representations 
of whiteness, masculinity, and sincerity help to theorize the conditions that allow for sex 
and love to feel simply human and that make all the rest seem like stuff that makes it 
tough? At the close of the previous chapter, I argued that Alexie’s and Walters’s theories 
of white masculinity open out toward a theory of wounded whiteness: a performance of 
powerless alienation aimed toward enjoining others to serve as prostheses for the 
limitations white men’s self-perceived wounds generate. In this chapter, I focus on Don 
DeLillo’s White Noise (1985) and Wallace’s The Broom of the System (1987) and 
examine how the narratives produce this sense of wounded whiteness as a phenomenal 
field wherein performances of wounded detachment appear resolvable against the 
emotional backdrops of love, intimacy, sex, and violence.4  
White Noise and Broom both stage their protagonists’ subjective detachment as a 
response to their bodies’ vulnerability. The body dramas that result from that sense of 
detachment posit the body as an anchor point amid the otherwise disorienting anxieties 
the narratives imagine to characterize (white) solipsism. I have placed “white” in 
parentheses here because despite the fact that both novels’ central characters are 
presumptively white, neither White Noise nor especially Broom seems able to sustain 
more than an oblique focus on the racial dynamics of their otherwise palpably gendered 
body dramas. The narratives thus dramatize but also perform a kind of white solipsism 
that articulates whiteness through staging its perceptual unavailability against the more 
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“human” dimensions of love and sex. Paying attention to the emotional backdrops against 
which the body seems and feels most “human” repositions these novels as archives of the 
plugged-up sensorium Walters theorizes in Ghost Singer. Approaching them through the 
lens Walters develops highlights the ways that the perceptual blockages DeLillo and 
Wallace imagine as solipsism characterize a mode of perception reliant on relationships 
of dominance and possession and underscores how the violence as well as the whiteness 
of those relationships remain unavailable for the men who live through them and within 
the narratives that articulate them. 
The violence and whiteness of these possessive relationships gets filtered out 
through performances of sincerity that rely on the body as their conceptual and material 
anchor. Sincerity thus comes to seem like a moment of self-recognition stemming from 
the harmonious alignment of two previously disjunctive and perceptually distinct modes: 
solipsistic detachment and embodied sensation. Yet this paradoxical ability, to feel one’s 
body as one’s anchor while also feeling detached from the world, belies the disjunction 
Wallace and DeLillo imagine. The ways the body gets used in these narratives thus 
provides a way to track the deployment of sincerity as a modality of wounded whiteness 
in contexts where issues of race, possession, and dominance may otherwise appear 
wholly inconsequential, and provides as well a way to theorize the conditions within 
which it becomes possible not to notice them.  
Hegemonic white heteronormative masculinity already produces conditions that 
limn white straight men’s perceptual capacities.5 However, Walters’s notion of the 
plugged-up-ness of white masculinity opens another approach. If white men keep their 
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senses plugged, as Walters suggests in Ghost Singer, then solipsism seems less like a 
passively endured metaphysical condition and more like an actively stylized 
performance. As I demonstrate in this chapter, white men’s performances of solipsism 
rely on others for their extension.6 Broom screens out the ethical difficulties of such 
possessive instrumentality through positioning straight men’s inequitable 
interdependency on women’s receptivity and other men’s suggestively queer bodies as 
the normal result of sincere love and intimacy. White Noise similarly stages white men’s 
reliance on women and other men as straight, white solipsists’ affective prosthetics. 
Unlike Wallace’s narrative, however, White Noise offers an ambivalently ironic critique 
of protagonist Jack Gladney’s solipsistic travails that accents sincerity’s effacement of 
the conditions that make its expression possible. Whiteness is the background horizon 
that permits White Noise’s and Broom’s men’s disorientation to resolve into an 
experiential reorientation toward their bodies; yet, as a background condition, whiteness 
remains out of focus. 
The backdrops of love and violence Broom and White Noise stage permit white 
bodies and selves to expand while positioning whiteness as a given that once made to 
disappear from view need not return. Against these backdrops, sincerity offers the 
opportunity for white straight men to performatively strip away the conflicting or 
confounding parts of their identities and appeal instead to something missed (or missing) 
at the core of themselves. Insofar as sincere appeals to core personhood allow for white 
people to be anyone they want to be, as Marie puts it in Indian Killer, the efficacy of 
those appeals owes in part to the ways whiteness seems to afford unencumbered access to 
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the body’s performative plasticity.7 The space sincerity affords expands around a sense of 
self-possessiveness as a feeling of ontological security that is itself secured through the 
kinds of investments in others sincerity makes possible.  
I chart these investments and their implications first through a reading of White 
Noise in order to examine how DeLillo’s portrayal of white male anxiety frames 
whiteness as the condition of possibility within which violent performances of 
masculinity yield revelations of core humanity. Made to confront the reality of his 
embodiment, and with it his mortality, Gladney finds a figure for his anxiety in the aptly 
named “Mr. Gray,” whose identity, whether understood racially, ethnically, or 
geopolitically, is impossible to determine. As a generic “other” against which to judge his 
own fate, Mr. Gray’s presence allows Gladney to experience a moment of heightened 
perception that borders on epiphany, only to feel that moment collapse again into 
insularity.8 DeLillo offers this collapse as an ambivalently critical commentary on 
Gladney’s experience of his waning socio-cultural authority as a “wound” to his self-
assurance. Wallace, on the other hand, is neither critical nor ambivalent in his reworking 
of a similar set of anxieties in Broom. Wallace’s novel emphasizes sincerity, love, and 
sex as antidotes for his men’s otherwise problematically political personhood, thus 
muting the “noise” of DeLillo’s imagined white male world. Choosing to embody the 
“wounds” DeLillo’s Gladney perceives to be existentially threatening as physically 
incapacitating for Rick Vigorous, Wallace imagines Gladney’s kind of masculinity as 
terminal. In its place Andrew Lang, a man whose body is more than fit for the novel’s 
heterosexual drama, emerges as the only man up to the task of bringing solipsistic white 
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woman Lenore Beadsman into full personhood. Refocusing its solipsistic drama around 
female embodiment, Broom casts sincerity as essential to reproductivity. Although race 
remains occluded in the background, the novel’s reproductive anxieties articulate 
whiteness as their primary catalyst. 
The disappearing act that sincerity performs for whiteness, possessiveness, and 
dominance in these novels calls for another way to make sense of how they stage white 
men’s longing to feel like “fucking human beings.” Positing heteronormative love as 
merely human sustains the fantasy that a core apolitical personhood lies beneath the 
discursive fabric of problematically politicized identities. As I demonstrate, this fantasy 
finds a figure in men who mitigate their disorientations through enacting drives that seem 
natural to the body, whether violence or sex, in the service of love.  
 
Whiteness, Crisis, and Victimhood:  
White Noise and White Men’s Plugged-Up Sensorium 
Don DeLillo’s White Noise likens whiteness to white noise—ambient, uniform, 
but indistinct—and throughout protagonist Jack Gladney hears the sound but cannot 
place its origin. The gnawing uncertainty as to the meaning of the “dull roar” (36) he 
hears prompts his anxious search for a sense of clarity he ultimately fails to find. The 
irony of his failure suggests DeLillo’s critique that the noise Gladney hears might be the 
swell of his own anxious decline. Walters’s notion of white masculinity as a plugged-up 
sensorium offers a different perspective. White noise drowns out other frequencies; and 
Gladney’s failure to find clarity amid the white noise of his world points back to 
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whiteness as the governing set of assumptions and inclinations that obscures the violence 
his quest does to the others who becomes its instruments. Eschewing a redemptive 
ending, DeLillo suggests that through it all Gladney will remain as static as the noise that 
plagues him. To the extent that DeLillo’s take on white masculinity presents it as 
ultimately unchanging, White Noise implies that white male anxiety stems from the 
privilege of having nothing to be all that anxious about. However, that suggestion 
remains ambivalent for precisely the same reason. Gladney’s unaffected endurance is 
purchased through the others who pay the price of having to bear his burdens, others who 
in turn he seems unable to fully acknowledge.  
DeLillo’s portrait of white male anxiety hews close to the discourse of white 
masculinity in crisis through its staging of Gladney’s crises as body dramas, imagining 
what happens when a white man accustomed to living in his head has to instead live in 
his body. To the extent that these dramas entertain the fantasy of white men’s 
detachment, the novel intersects with the twin assumptions of masculinity in crisis 
discourse: whiteness’s invisibility and masculinity’s notional disembodiment.9 Walters’s 
theory of white masculinity calls these assumptions into question and moves the analysis 
toward examining how “crisis” and sincerity modulate the ways white men take up 
embodiment. Approaching solipsistic detachment as a performance helps to unmake 
White Noise’s framing fantasy, pointing out how through others white men like Gladney 
remain unable to sense the conditions that make their detachments possible. So, although 
White Noise’s initial framing makes it clear that Gladney’s anxieties stem from his sense 
of disorientation, what seems less clear within the narrative and for many of the novel’s 
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critical readers is the extent to which Gladney’s disorientation and anxiety signal 
DeLillo’s commentary on anxious white masculinity.  
Although some of White Noise’s readers have focused on DeLillo’s 
representations of masculinity or of gender dynamics, few have focused on whiteness, 
and in particular on the ways that whiteness forms the phenomenal field within which 
Gladney’s disorientations find purchase as his experience of embodied anxiety.10 Leonard 
Wilcox, for instance, reads the narrative against the backdrop of postmodernism as a 
cultural logic, and sees Gladney as a displaced modernist facing a new and perplexing 
horizon. For Wilcox the “composite” effects of others’ “undecideable ethnicit[ies]” make 
the novel’s world “postmodern” and as a result confound Gladney’s sense of existential 
security (197, 204). However, Wilcox stops short of pursuing his argument’s evocative 
implications. If Gladney experiences disorientation in part because he is unable to discern 
others’ ethnicities, then DeLillo’s portrayal seems also to point to the ways white men 
rely on others as orientation devices to find their way back to the center.11  
Gladney’s feeling as though he has lost his way through his world structures the 
narrative’s portrayal of white masculinity in crisis. Imagining the normative cultural and 
political centrality of white masculinity to be akin to solipsism, DeLillo suggests that in 
Gladney’s typical perceptual experience he rarely has to take account of his position with 
respect to others. In ways similar to Alexie’s characterization of Clarence Mather in 
Indian Killer, Gladney has become habituated to taking up the center of whatever spaces 
he enters in part because he is able to fix his location relative to the presumptive stasis of 
others’ identities. Where Alexie imagines the “portrait” as the metaphoric vehicle for the 
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spatial locatedness whiteness affords Mather, within White Noise’s phenomenal field this 
sense of locatedness appears as a given backdrop against which Gladney’s anxieties 
become visible. Alongside those rising anxieties, Gladney’s sense of his body’s 
situatedness rises in tandem. The extent to which Gladney feels his body, whether as a 
limit or at all, provides an index for how his everyday perceptual capacities stem from his 
durable experience of subjective centrality, and provide as well a way to track the 
conditions within which DeLillo imagines that sense of security to break into anxiety. 
Gladney’s affects thus situate his body dramas throughout White Noise as a series of 
encounters with stress points, in Ahmed’s terms, moments of resistance or push-back that 
mark out the limits of white bodies’ abilities to assume the givenness of their spatial 
orientations.12 The situations and others that constitute stress points within Gladney’s 
perceptual field trace the shape of DeLillo’s representation of white masculinity in crisis 
and, in the inverse, track the habitual arrangements and orientations that permit white 
men to feel at ease in the center of their worlds.  
Within the phenomenal field White Noise imagines the primary stress point 
Gladney encounters is his own body. Gladney’s swelling anxiety about his inevitable 
mortality confronts him with his fundamentally embodied vulnerability, a fact that seems 
out of joint with his typically analytical approach to life’s philosophical quandaries. This 
is especially evident throughout Part I of the novel, “Waves and Radiation.” His thoughts 
of death and his own demise come through in waves, and when these waves of data 
become disorienting, he finds solace in the comforting availability of his wife Babette. 
Whether the idea of her or her actual body, throughout the narrative Babette serves as 
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Gladney’s anchor point.13 Though these dynamics play out across nearly all of the first 
part of the novel, an early scene clearly illustrates Gladney’s reliance on Babette’s 
emotional surrogacy. Taking a family trip to the supermarket, Gladney runs into his 
colleague Murray J. Siskind, who is pondering the products and attempting to theorize 
the “energy waves” emanating from the “cultural material” lining the shelves (37-38). 
Murray’s notions confront Gladney with the possibility that “some form of swarming life 
just outside the range of human comprehension” lurks all around him (36). The 
disorientation Gladney feels in this moment owes to a perceptual experience he intuits 
but cannot process, suggesting that his body’s situatedness within this field of stray 
“psychic data” has become a stress point pushing his habitual posture off balance (37). 
Attempting to mitigate this feeling he turns to Babette for reassurance, placing his hands 
first on her breasts before trying to fit them into her skirt and finally grazing them over 
her belly (40). Fusing maternal symbolism with sexuality, Gladney’s desire to literally 
connect himself to Babette’s body illustrates his reliance on its materiality as a surrogate 
for his own feelings of solidity and emplacement. Her reciprocity thus reorients his 
anxieties about death toward his desires for sex.  
DeLillo thus suggest that insofar as Gladney’s death anxiety gnaws away at his 
otherwise detached analytical posture, his ability to take recourse to Babette’s body and 
its sexual significance provides him a sense of emotional as much as existential stability. 
As much as she functions in this way as his affective prosthetic, she also works as an 
anchor for the “security” of his identity. Earlier in the narrative, Gladney muses that his 
love for Babette helps him to “develop an identity secure enough to allow itself to placed 
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in another’s care and protection” (29). Their love becomes all the more meaningful 
against the backdrop of Gladney’s fear of death, particularly because, as Gladney 
imagines, death “cures us of our innocence of the future” (15). What Gladney cannot 
countenance, however, is how his possessive attachment to Babette hems in her agency 
and limits her ability to process her own swelling death anxiety. Gladney’s blockages 
with respect to the full dimensions of Babette’s affective experience point back toward 
Walters’s representations of white masculinity as plugged up and illustrates how, against 
whiteness’s given backdrop, limited female agency functions as one of those plugs.  
Despite the ironic distance that throughout Part I characterizes Gladney’s identity 
crisis as melodrama, Gladney’s prosthetic investments in his subjective centrality through 
Babette’s sexual availability amplify his crisis’s magnitude as the narrative unfolds, 
tilting the perspective from critique toward sincerity. In this respect, White Noise implies 
that Gladney’s anxieties about death reach the level of genuine crisis when those feelings 
merge with his fear that he might lose Babette to another man, and thus lose the primary 
prosthetic through which he experiences his identity as “secure” within a world that has 
taken shape around him. White Noise articulates the emergence of what it frames as a 
genuine crisis through two interrelated dramas: Gladney’s progressively more palpable 
connection to his body’s vulnerability and a developing homosocial competition that 
threatens the security of his attachment to Babette. Both trajectories implicate his 
possessive attachments, but importantly the situations that arise from them unfold around 
the vaguely racialized threat of Gladney’s physical penetration, whether embodied in the 
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“black billowing cloud” (113) that enters Gladney or Mr. Gray’s ambiguously raced 
body.  
White Noise’s final parts situate Gladney’s existential crisis as secondary to what 
seems the more genuine concern over ambiguously raced figures and their threatening 
penetration. Gladney himself, however, seems not quite able to face the source of his 
fears. For example, despite the more progressively threatening “blackness” of the toxic 
cloud, Gladney continues to enact his favored retreat to Babette’s sexuality (113-116). 
Observing that “this death would penetrate” (116), he seems otherwise wholly unaware 
of how his sense of Babette’s surrogacy in these instances emerges from a distinctively 
racialized anxiety that this “black death” might penetrate his and his wife’s white bodies. 
Following his exposure to the toxin, Gladney is forced to confront that death has in fact 
“entered” his body (142), but this realization again comes at a distance to the way the 
threat has been previously marked. Faced with the “big numbers” his data profile 
generates in the screening technician’s computer (140), Gladney reframes his penetration 
anxiety as an angst-ridden existential quandary: “You are said to be dying, yet you are 
separate form the dying,…[you can] literally see on the x-ray photograph or computer 
screen the horrible alien logic of at all…[You] sense an eerie separation between your 
condition and yourself. It makes you feel like a stranger in your own dying” (142). His 
sense of separation suggests the “condition” he experiences is not his fear that the 
blackness of the cloud might contaminate the insular purity of his whiteness, but instead 
his sense that technology has intervened into what ought to be, following the 
Heideggerian echoes of his existential musing, his “ownmost” finality.14  
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The gap between what Gladney can process and the otherwise suggestively 
racialized tenor of the events leading up to this dramatic encounter with existential 
estrangement point toward the plugged-up phenomenal field DeLillo imagines Gladney 
to inhabit. The threat of blackness’s penetration thus remains an atmospherically abstract 
possibility because what becomes perceptible as stimuli for his fears, anxieties, or 
rationalizations has already passed through a perceptual filter. The end product is an 
abstract, deracinated sense of existential dread that drones on in the background like 
“white noise.” DeLillo thus suggests that Gladney’s attachments enable the racial 
overtones of what readers can otherwise see as his white anxiety to escape his perception, 
in part because his whiteness, like the white noise he hears, seems to fall “just outside the 
range of human comprehension” (36). Whether through death or its associations with 
blackness, the fact that his being penetrated makes it through the filter suggests that 
sexuality, but not necessarily race, is by contrast perfectly intelligible. 
The scene detailing Gladney’s confrontation with the “condition” of his death 
generates an implicit analogy between heterosexual desire and humanity that becomes the 
backdrop against which Gladney’s body dramas seem like dramas of human hubris and 
frailty rather than like the enactment of a particularly cerebral white man’s mundane 
anxieties. In fact, only one of White Noise’s characters seems able to see Gladney for 
who he is, the ambiguously raced Mr. Gray/Willie Mink. Gladney first learns of Mr. Gray 
from Babette, who it turns out has been exchanging sex for Dylar, Mr. Gray’s 
experimental drug designed to alleviate death anxiety. When Babette finally confides her 
own death anxiety and the extent to which she had gone to find relief, all Gladney can 
 
 114 
concentrate on are the “genitals,” asking Babette “how many sets are we talking about?” 
while obsessing over Mr. Gray’s “entry” into her (194). Using language that mirrors his 
concerns over the billowing black mass having “entered” him, the love triangle Gladney 
now finds himself within suggests that, through Babette as the vehicle, Mr. Gray has also 
figuratively entered him. Gray thus effectively embodies the penetrative threat that 
Babette’s body had earlier kept in the background.15 The love triangle amplifies the 
gendered dynamics at work throughout the novel, but also interweaves Gladney’s sexual 
anxieties with his racial anxieties, expressed as his obsessive concern over “entry.”  
Up to this point, Gladney’s prosthetic relationships have largely been instrumental 
for navigating disorienting shifts in his affective milieu. Through Babette’s availability as 
a sexual orientation point, Gladney manages to route the racialized tenor of his anxieties 
into the background of his perceptual field. This mechanism fails, however, through 
Gladney’s double-exposure to the atmospheric toxin and to the penetrative reality of Mr. 
Gray’s body. Situated as a romantic betrayal made worse by Mr. Gray’s ambiguous body, 
White Noise thus suggests that Babette’s liaisons doubly wound Gladney’s whiteness 
insofar as they render immaterial his experience of possessiveness over Babette and 
likewise situate her betrayal as a point of physical contamination for the otherwise insular 
detachments he experiences through her prostheticization. Gladney’s “crisis” thus 
becomes genuine as his victimhood becomes tied to Babette’s romantic betrayal. What 
gets wounded is thus not Gladney’s pride but his sense of propriety. And what elevates 
his woundedness from existential dread and genuine crisis is the ambiguous body that has 
come to take something from him. Constructing a homology between atmospheric threats 
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and domestic-romantic betrayals, DeLillo positions Gladney as a victim of something so 
far beyond his control that he can barely perceive it and, eventually, as a victim of his 
own solipsistic interiority. In finding his ability to feel centered collapsing at every turn, 
Gladney’s solipsism suggests that for DeLillo, the last unencumbered space within which 
white men are able to feel centered is within the bounds of their own interior worlds.  
Solipsism in this sense becomes a performance of victimhood, a way of inhabiting 
a world that pushes back. DeLillo’s representation of solipsism as the last resort of white 
masculinity plays out in the novel’s penultimate scene. When Mr. Gray re-enters the 
narrative, this time in the flesh, Gladney finds a figure for his feeling of being off-
balance, but the figure turns out not to be quite what he had expected. Having gone 
pistol-in-hand to the hotel where Mr. Gray is holed up planning to restore the balance by 
enacting an elaborate revenge plot, when Gladney gets there he finds Willie Mink, an 
addled man in a “Hawaiian shirt and Budweiser shorts” slumping in front of a motel 
television set and speaking in lines from commercial breaks (305). Despite Mink’s 
wholly non-threatening presence, Gladney remains firmly fixed to his plan to kill, and as 
such begins pondering Mink’s confusingly “composite” ethnicity. His speculations as to 
the “geography” of Mink’s “spoon-shaped face” and “skin the color of a Planter’s 
peanut” (306-307) suggest that for Gladney Mink’s apparent non-whiteness means he 
must belong to an elsewhere. The racial geography he ponders is an instrument of 
possession, and the violence he intends to carry out against Mink’s racially ambiguous 
body depends on Gladney’s ability to feel already in possession of the terrain so that 
Mink can be made not to belong. The feeling of prior possession stems from a feeling of 
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propriety over spaces, including spaces that are most decidedly not already in Gladney’s 
possession. That those feelings are imagined as capacitous of vengeance carried out in the 
name of restoring a homosocial and racial hierarchy suggest that spatial expansiveness is 
a core element of settler-feeling, one that extends from proprietary relationships to 
persons like Babette through to proprietary relationships to the spaces. Here Gladney 
experiences settler-feeling as coterminous with white masculinity, and feels the need to 
protect these interrelated privileges as the experience of a wound to his hetero-patriarchal 
power. Mink, however, sees Gladney for who he is: “a heavyset white man about fifty. 
Does this describe your anguish?” (308). Mink’s instant ability to recognize Gladney’s 
whiteness highlights the gap between Mink’s nonthreatening posture and Gladney’s 
complicity in constructing him as a direct threat to his authority and to his whiteness. 
Gladney is driven by his need to complete a plot that exists entirely within his 
imagination. And despite the reality of Mink’s non-threatening state, within the plot 
Gladney has invented Mink is already attached to its deathward trajectory because Mink 
is in the wrong place.  
Gladney’s desire to avenge Mink’s sexual transgressions with Babette suggests 
that the majority of his “anguish” owes to the threat Mink poses to his possessive 
attachments to Babette and to the identity that through her he experiences as secure. 
Gladney’s elaborate plot in this respect appears an attempt to graft himself into a 
narrative he can control. Where Mink falls short of embodying the nemesis he had 
imagined, Gladney makes up for it by selectively amplifying Mink’s ambiguous identity 
so as to make him a better fit within the vengeance plot he has concocted. Secure now as 
 
 117 
the hero, Gladney begins to feel the space around him change. His senses tuned to 
elements of perception that earlier swirled beyond his comprehension, Gladney 
experiences a profound feeling of ontological expansiveness.16 Preparing to pull the 
trigger on Mr. Gray, he notes that “Things began to glow…The air was rich with 
extrasensory material…a secret life rising out of [things]…I understood the 
neurochemistry of my brain, the meaning of dreams…Great stuff, everywhere, racing 
through the room…I believed everything” (309-310). His experience of perceptual 
dilation permits him access even to Mink’s perspective: “I loomed in the doorway, 
conscious of looming, seeing myself from Mink’s viewpoint, magnified, threatening” 
(311-312). Having access to all of the sensory data, Gladney feels in tune with the white 
noise around him, “the intensity…the same at all frequencies,” and finally understood 
“who I was in the network of meanings” (312). Positioning Mink as his antagonist in this 
micro-drama of victimhood-turned-vengeance allows Gladney to sense himself expanded 
outward into the world in full possession of the “network of meanings” he is able to wield 
as the author of his self-styled fantasies.  
What falls completely out of Gladney’s “super perceptions” (313), however, is the 
underlying fact that this momentary feeling of ontological expansiveness comes at the 
cost of another person’s literally being made a victim of premeditated violence carried 
out to set aright a decidedly race-inflected anxiety over the sexual propriety of white 
womanhood. In the place of those more pressing elements of reality comes the experience 
of Gladney’s own victimhood when Mink unexpectedly shoots him in the wrist. “The 
world collapsed inward,” Gladney reports, and with it “all those vivid textures and 
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connections…the super perceptions, were reduced to visual clutter…meaningless” (313). 
Gladney’s now literally wounded body enables his narrative to detour into martyrdom. 
Gazing upon Mink’s bloody body with something like clarity, Gladney observes “with 
the restoration of the normal order of matter and sensation, I felt I was seeing him for the 
first time as a person. The old human muddles and quirks were set flowing again. 
Compassion, remorse, mercy” (313). Though here again, Gladney’s view to the “human” 
emotions and capacities that enable him to acknowledge Mink’s personhood apart from 
the caricature he had earlier invented are made possible by exactly the return to the 
“normal order of matter and sensation” that Gladney feels as the world collapsing inward. 
The normal order of things, in other words, feels like the solipsistic insularity of wounded 
white masculinity, a mode of perception that permits one to feel sincerely as victimizer 
and victim at one and the same time.  
To the extent that Gladney’s becoming wounded restores the “normal order” of 
things, White Noise’s final scenes offer up a literal figure for its more abstract 
dramatizations of white male victimhood. Given the dynamics of the final scene, it seems 
as well that DeLillo suggests white male fantasies of possession, dominance, and control, 
like the plots through which they are carried out, “tend to move deathward” (26). Who 
and what these fantasies mark for death, however, remains ambivalent at best. Tim 
Engles sees the novel as DeLillo’s argument over “the fundamental relationality of 
identity formation” (175). Citing the “severed connections” between Gladney’s self-
identity and the historicity of whiteness, Engles positions the narrative as a commentary 
on the “emptiness in whiteness itself…not unlike…the idea that death itself may be 
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nothing more than nothing” (183). However, Engles’s ultimately hopeful argument that 
White Noise amounts to DeLillo’s claim that recognizing one’s whiteness brings one “a 
step closer to relinquishing the fantasy of autonomous selfhood” (192) takes Gladney’s 
brief moment of recognition in the novel’s penultimate scene in terms of the sincerity it 
generates, and as a result overlooks the extent to which Gladney’s enactment of a 
decisively masculine fantasy makes his experience of shared humanity possible. Too 
quickly bracketing one or another set of the terms through which the narrative constructs 
identity threatens to obscure the effects of their interarticulation and thus to make 
invisible the ways that temporarily revelatory experiences like Gladney’s come at a cost. 
Moreover, Engles’s suggestion that recognizing one’s whiteness might hopefully lead to 
relinquishing one’s possessive claims to autonomy seems a leap given the ways that 
Gladney’s recognition of his whiteness leads to a temporary moment of “super 
perception” (313) that just as quickly fades back into the same old shtick. If anything, 
what Gladney seems most sincerely to recognize is his capacity for compassion and 
mercy, humanizing emotions that serve to clear the problematic dimensions of his white 
masculine fantasies out of the affective space Mink’s near-death experience opens up.  
If whiteness’s problematic associations with possessive autonomy, domination, 
and violence are marked for demise in White Noise, then in their place the narrative rolls 
in the prospect of deracinated humanism. Sincerity performs this disappearing act in part 
because Gladney’s sudden but “normal” recognition of his capacities for compassion and 
mercy, the “old human muddles and quirks,” situate those capacities as held in reserve 
beneath the otherwise apparently scripted performance of violent, vengeful white 
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masculinity. To the extent that Gladney’s performance of vengeful violence is only a 
performance, the narrative implies that empathy and recognition are deeply and genuinely 
human emotions. However, that Gladney’s super perceptions collapse back into this older 
order suggest the same sort of perceptual experiences that characterize his initial meeting 
with Mink, this time elevated to a different and more abstract register. Gladney is able to 
see Mink as another person only because the two share a wound in kind. In other words, 
Gladney has to feel himself literally and physically victimized by Mink’s out-of-place 
presence in order to recognize Mink as something other than an intruder in a space over 
which Gladney already feels in possession. And yet here again, within the perceptual 
experience of settler-feeling, Gladney’s whiteness seems like the victimizer and Gladney 
seems like its victim. As Sally Robinson observes in Marked Men, white men can 
“most…convincingly represent [themselves] as victims by inhabiting a wounded body” 
(20). The shape and color of the body white men inhabit in order to perform their 
victimhood, however, seems most at issue in White Noise. Through Mink’s wounded 
body, Gladney finds himself able to inhabit his own. But Mink’s racial ambiguity allows 
for Gladney’s whiteness to slip behind his more profoundly human feelings of 
woundedness and as well to slip past the narrative’s focalization of Gladney’s wounds as 
the pathway to sincerely recognizing another’s mutual humanity. What’s curious about 
this formation, however, is that though it appears to resonate with David Savran’s reading 
of white male masochism, Gladney does not need to “feminize and/or blacken himself” to 
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appear as a victim (33). He needs only to keep himself plugged up within the insularity 
whiteness affords in order to find the sincere person he is, or at least can be, beneath it 
all.  
The restoration of the “normal order of matter and sensation” that DeLillo 
imagines to follow from literal wounds enfolds the competing ideological registers 
structuring the novel’s portrayal of white male anxiety and identity crisis. Made available 
through a wound, “normal” here signifies embodied vulnerability as a baseline condition 
grounding the alignment of “matter,” the bald fact of the body’s existence, and 
“sensation,” Gladney’s recognition that the limits of his perceptions follow from the 
limits of his body. Against this alignment Gladney’s otherwise detached perspective 
seems abnormal. The contrast gives some force to DeLillo’s critique of whiteness as 
insulated from the conditions it generates for those who inhabit white bodies and for 
those who cannot. Irony creates the distance necessary for DeLillo’s commentary to 
emerge against the backdrop of Gladney’s otherwise absurdly vengeful plot and its 
absurd conclusion. DeLillo’s critical view to whiteness as an insular modality of 
existence remains ambivalent, however, because the ironic perspective it relies on seems 
unable to pull back quite far enough to examine the consequences of producing normal 
human being through a textual amplification of whiteness’s alignment with violence, 
possessiveness, and dominance. To the extent that DeLillo may ultimately be offering a 
view to whiteness’s emptiness, as Engles suggests, what fills the void is a “normal order” 
that articulates an extension of the racial, sexual, and gender hierarchies upon which 
whiteness and more specifically white masculinity depends. As Julian Carter points out, 
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claims that whiteness is either dangerous and so useless or simply empty of specific 
content “may work to renaturalize the category in ways that produce political stasis rather 
than transformation” by making the content whiteness names appear otherwise normal 
(29). Though White Noise may aim to diagnose whiteness as the instrument of white 
men’s solipsistic malaise, the novel’s turn back to normality re-routes its critique toward 
reification.  
Despite imagining an alternate set of perceptual capacities able to pick up on the 
interconnections and relations between bodies and things as a contrast to whiteness’s 
solipsistic insularity, White Noise seems not unable but unwilling to sustain its 
momentary departure from the normal order of things. The narrative seems unwilling to 
entertain the alternatives it imagines because doing so insinuates political and ethical 
questions that threaten to upset the structural conventions through which white men’s 
enactments of violent possessiveness seem like pathways to normal human being. White 
Noise sidesteps these questions through its staging of sincerity, even if only a brief 
moment at the conclusion of DeLillo’s otherwise ironically critical narrative. On the 
other hand, sincerity forms The Broom of the System’s ethical framework as well as its 
aspirational horizon. The result is a narrative that dramatizes heterosexual desire and 
heteronormative love as pathways to normal human being. Whiteness, however, falls 
almost entirely out of the frame. In the next section, I examine how Broom’s heterosexual 
dramas articulate whiteness in ways the novel seems unable to focalize because its 
sincere strategy assumes whiteness as something so stable that it need not be, as it is in 
White Noise, problematized into disappearance. 
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“Fiction’s about What It Means to Be a Fucking Human Being”:  
Sincerity, Sexuality, and Whiteness’s Disappearance in The Broom of the System 
 Bracketing the allusions to philosophers, the lengthy stories-within-the-story, and 
the comic vignettes, what’s left of David Foster Wallace’s The Broom of the System is a 
basic, heteronormative love triangle.17 Broom pits two differently-able white men—Rick 
Vigorous and Andrew Lang—against one another in competition for the love and sexual 
reciprocity of twenty-four year old white woman Lenore Beadsman, a wealthy 
businessman’s brilliantly smart daughter who by her family’s account is squandering her 
education, her romantic prospects, and her life by working as a telephone switchboard 
operator and dating Rick Vigorous. Throughout the novel Lenore’s family problems 
manifest as a profound sense of “disorientation and identity confusion” (61), a feeling 
that “all that really exists of [her] life is what can be said about it” (119). Feeling like a 
character in someone else’s story, Lenore’s solipsistic disorientation mirrors Jack 
Gladney’s feeling as though he is the “false character who follows the name around” 
(DeLillo 17). However, two things are notably different about Broom’s characterization 
of its centrally solipsistic protagonist: her gender and, as a result of the ways it is 
imagined, how Broom frames Lenore’s agency as already profoundly limited by her 
family, her job, her romantic prospects, and her presumptive orientation toward finding 
another who will allow her to find herself. 
If white male solipsism is a performance of victimhood marking a way of 
inhabiting a world that pushes back, as DeLillo imagines it in White Noise, then what 
happens when this performance is articulated through a female body? How does female 
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embodiment enable Broom to construct a phenomenal field wherein heterosexual 
couplehood becomes a self-evident means of extending one’s reach? And how might this 
shift in perspective enable the narrative’s heterosexual dramas to make whiteness as their 
racial corollary seem to disappear from view? In this section, I examine how Broom’s 
love triangle structures its staging of sincerity as a path to deracinated, normal 
personhood envisioned as finding and feeling hetero-love through fulfilling sex. Broom 
positions Lenore at the apex of its love triangle. As its point, Lenore’s body orients the 
novel’s men toward her fulfillment and establishes sincerity as the straightest, most direct 
approach. Broom thus imagines that sincerity works like a gendering and straightening 
machine, disciplining its men’s bodies toward fulfilling (or not) Lenore’s orientation 
toward hetero-love as much as disciplining her affects into line with her body’s 
inclinations.18 In contrast to Gladney’s appeals to love throughout White Noise, which 
seem aimed toward keeping his senses plugged, Broom’s dramatization of white 
solipsisms takes the opposite course. White women’s plugged up senses need 
unplugging, and plugged up white men aren’t the right men for the job. As I show, 
Broom suggests that men who live in the plugged-up sensorium structuring Gladney’s 
limited field are terminal cases who are neither quite straight nor quite white enough to 
measure up to the novel’s imagination of normal human personhood. Although race 
seems very much in the background of Broom’s body dramas, its distribution of 
capacities, orientations, and quite literally fitness for reproductive sex articulates 
whiteness as a hetero-familial investment that plugged-up white men cannot make and 
that plugged-up white women cannot reproduce. Sincerity and sexuality become the 
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means of casting aside solipsistic white men in hopes of reaching another, more sincere 
kind of white masculinity that can unplug solipsistic white women and secure a return on 
whiteness’s investments. 
Within the rather narrow field of Wallace criticism, focusing on how Broom’s 
heterosexual melodramas mime whiteness is highly unorthodox. The Broom of the System 
is Wallace’s first novel and by many accounts his weakest effort, though most readers 
agree that despite its shortcomings Broom begins to articulate themes that Wallace would 
go on to develop in his later novels and story collections.19 Among those themes, 
Wallace’s commitment to sincerity garners the majority of critical attention.20 Many of 
Wallace’s early works including Broom often articulate this commitment as an intra-
canonical parody of literary metafiction’s impossibly solipsistic gaze.21 Some of Broom’s 
readers have suggested its gendered dynamics make up its pointed satire of writers 
ranging from Vladimir Nabokov to John Updike.22 Despite calling attention to the ways 
gender features in Broom, these readings overlook two critical angles that yoke Wallace’s 
intra-canonical contention against irony to the narrative’s representation of white 
heterosexuality. First, these readings overlook how Broom situates Lenore’s solipsism as 
stemming from her virginity, representing it as the result of her refusal to properly take 
up her body’s putatively natural inclination toward sexual penetration. In this way Broom 
implies that white female solipsism is a performative mode of inhabiting a world that 
pushes back, but expresses that performance as a pathological response to the otherwise 
normative expectation of feminine receptivity and reproductivity. Second, though 
Marshall Boswell has argued that Rick Vigorous’s many micro-stories represent 
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Wallace’s satirical take on women’s often flat characterization throughout mid-century 
male-authored fiction, he stops short of examining the frame within which Rick’s stories 
as much as his body make sense as satire.23 Viewed from within Broom’s intra-canonical 
parody, irony’s reliance on a “queer ontology of appearance,” as Wallace put it in his 
essay “E Unibus Pluram” (63), becomes equivalent to a particularly queer kind of 
solipsism where queer signifies in its most pejorative sense, that is that solipsistic irony is 
at its base non-productive. Rick embodies irony’s fundamental non-productivity, and, as 
if to ensure that the argument comes through, Wallace elects to make Rick’s body 
literally incapable of engaging in reproductive sex by giving him a penis to small to enter 
Lenore’s body.  
Although sex and penis jokes make up the metaphors through which Wallace calls 
for sincerity against irony, continuing to frame this argument in literary-historical terms 
compounds rather than critiques how the narrative imagines sex and sincerity to be 
intertwined with white solipsism. I take Wallace’s claim that “fiction’s about what it is to 
be a fucking human being” at face value, and read Broom as producing a vision of 
deracinated human being wherein humanity becomes structurally dependent on straight 
sexuality. Paying closer attention to how the narrative relies on heterosexuality for its 
frame challenges the apparent political neutrality of Wallace’s call for sincerity as the 
lens through which human being ought to be focalized in literary fiction. Through its 
explicitly sexual metaphors, the narrative further ties its vision of sincerity articulates 
whiteness as an equally normative orientation. Yet against the backdrop of love the ways 
that whiteness colors the narrative’s understanding of sincerity and human being slip into 
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analytical invisibility. Working to undo these slippages and to call attention to what 
remains stable and visible around them draws out the whiteness of Broom’s sincerity and 
demonstrates how the frames within which (white) human being becomes recognizable 
depend on making some bodies incapable of participating in the economy of sincere 
emotion, exchange, and sex while compelling other bodies to fully participate. 
The Broom of the System’s sincere economy of heterosexual desire emerges out of 
Lenore’s body. In turn, her body becomes an icon of the titular system that works to 
sweep her toward her most fit companion. The problem is that as a result of her 
“disorientation and identity confusion” (61) she seems unable to “feel the way [her] life 
is” (122), as her therapist Dr. Curtis Jay puts it. Jay’s comment puts into perspective the 
narrative’s reliance on the kinds of detachment DeLillo imagines to plague Gladney in 
White Noise. The “way” of Lenore’s life marks an orientation toward heterosexual 
identification, an identification that emanates from what her body “is,” female and thus 
receptive and reproductive.24 Yet, because she cannot feel the way her life is, she appears 
detached from the sensations that ought otherwise to carry her along her life’s path. Re-
routing these feelings of detached disorientation through a female body thus works to 
situate feeling one’s life as an embodied imperative rather than as an available option. In 
contradistinction to the seemingly limitless agency Gladney can exercise through others 
as his attachments, Lenore’s only option is to align her subjective feelings with her 
body’s inclinations. Within the heterosexual field Broom imagines as a compulsory 
“system,” Lenore’s body inclines her only toward men who might help her to feel the 
way her life is, regardless of her subjective inclinations toward them.25 
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Sincerity becomes the privileged mechanism of this kind of perceptual 
realignment. In order to carry off its vision of sincerity as the felicitous alignment of 
subjective feelings and embodied inclinations, Broom needs to situate Lenore’s affects as 
out of joint with her body but needs also to position her as unwilling, blocked, from 
feeling her way toward the thing that promises to bring her back into line. The narrative 
positions Lenore’s sexual blockage as a pathology stemming from a missed connection 
with Andrew Lang, the man who will eventually return to bring Lenore into being as a 
full person because he is the only man whose penis seems up to the task. However, on 
their first meeting during a visit to her sister Clarice’s dorm room at Mount Holyoke 
college, then fifteen year-old Lenore confronts a very real reason to dodge the 
expectations that come to disorient her later in the narrative. Lang and his pledge brother 
Biff Diggerance, both from neighboring Amherst College, burst into Clarice’s room and 
refuse to leave until the women sign their asses as a part of their fraternity initiation 
(17).26 The sudden and menacing appearance of Lang and Diggerance, both drunk and 
already undoing their pants, suggests that their invasive penetration of the girls’ space 
marks an early and traumatic experience in Lenore’s developing sense of herself and of 
her body’s situatedness within a masculine economy of desire. 
Lenore’s sense of her body carries with it a sense of direction and directedness, an 
orientation the narrative suggests ought to incline her toward men like Lang and 
Diggerance despite their unexpected and violent intrusion. Moments before Lang’s 
sudden entrance, Clarice’s roommate Mindy Metalman’s suggestively bare body had 
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prompted Lenore to reflect on her felt alignment with her body as the capaciting object 
that makes such intrusive moments seem not only possible but welcome: 
 
Lenore can at this point divide all the girls she’s known neatly into girls who 
think deep down they’re pretty and girls who deep down think they’re really not. 
Girls who think they’re pretty don’t care much about their bathrobes being 
undone and are good at makeup and like to walk when people are watching, and 
they act different when there are boys around; and girls like Lenore, who don’t 
think they’re too pretty, tend not to wear makeup, and run track, and wear black 
Converse sneakers, and keep their bathrobes pretty well fastened at all times. (4) 
 
 
The directions of Lenore’s “deep down” feelings—outwardly oriented toward men’s 
gazes or inwardly oriented toward herself—suggest the disjuncture between the way her 
life “is” and her subjective feelings about her body’s position within the field of male 
desire. That field conditions the “way” that life might take her, a path she sees through 
Lang’s and Diggerance’s intrusively violent performances.  
Taken together, these scenes suggest that Wallace imagines men’s gazes to 
function as an instrument through which women learn to imagine and take up their bodies 
as surfaces of exchange. The text imagines that women’s responsiveness to men’s desire 
lends men the capacity to control and direct the way women become oriented toward 
their embodiment. In other words, women’s bodies are situated as projective—able to 
extend themselves—to the extent that men’s gazes lend them this capacity. Men’s 
capacity to extend themselves beyond the limits of their bodies likewise appears to 
depend on women’s bodies’ reciprocity. Enfolding this symbiotic system of exchange 
into a fraternity initiation ritual suggests that Lang and Diggerance literally need to wear 
the sign of women’s reciprocity on their bodies in order to join the “fraternity” of adult 
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male heterosexual performance. To the extent that these women become instruments of 
their sexual initiation, they also serve as markers of Lang’s and Diggerance’s “initiation” 
into the collegiate variety of the exclusively male and often exclusively white fraternal 
organizations that provide potential access to networks of professional, political, and 
personal privilege.27 In this sense the “initiation” cuts both ways insofar as the women 
must either sign on to this inequitably advantageous system, one that promises to 
inevitably limit their agency, or be cast aside or worse made victims of violence. Faced 
with these prospects, all of the women except Lenore eventually accede to Lang’s and 
Diggerance’s demands. Mindy Metalman, who by Lenore’s account seemed the most 
comfortable of all the women with her body’s signification, is the first to sign. Lenore, in 
contrast, chucks her high heel at Lang’s head and demands to be let out of the room (19-
21), an action the narrative suggests marks her exit from the “system” that will for the 
remainder of the plot begin to pull her back in.  
Lenore’s exit runs counter to what the narrative imagines as the “deep down” 
knowledge her body represents, collapsing what might otherwise be read as a moment of 
tacitly feminist resistance into the gender essentialism necessary to mark out Lenore’s 
resistance to Lang’s penetrative threat as a refusal to properly inhabit her body. The 
scene’s threateningly violent overtones further work to suggest that Lenore’s refusal 
stems from a traumatic encounter that eventually manifests as a pathological blockage 
preventing her from feeling the otherwise normative alignment of her subjectivity with 
her body’s inclinations.28 In this sense, whereas White Noise imagines solipsistic 
interiority to be the last resort of victimized white masculinity, Broom imagines white 
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female solipsism to be a willed performance of victimhood in response to a pathological 
misreading of one’s world as threateningly invasive. The scene’s language paints 
Lenore’s early encounter with Lang and Diggerance in precisely these terms. Lenore’s 
wandering gaze and wandering thoughts, particularly with respect to her sense of her 
body as a sexual commodity in the masculinist economy of desire that Lang’s gaze 
represents, suggests that she mis- or dis-identifies with heterofemininity. This failure to 
identify her self with her body, and her body with men’s capacities, propels her 
“disorientation and identity confusion.” Lenore thus misreads the signs as much as the act 
of signing as indications of her willed participation in the system of heterosexual 
exchange, a misreading that sets her on the wrong course. Had she seen the signs for what 
they were—in other words, had she taken them sincerely—she would have seen herself 
as already a part of that system.  
However the color of that system remains occluded through the scenes’ explicit 
focus on sex and sexuality. The narrative’s selective focus on Lenore’s emergent 
sexuality dramatizes the degree to which her later feelings of “disorientation and identity 
confusion” might owe to this traumatic kernel in her past, but remains unable to sustain a 
focus on the racial dynamics that are nonetheless already somewhat visible through 
Lang’s “initiation.” Instead, the signs Lenore ought to have seen point readers to the 
banality of the scene’s otherwise violent dynamics as a part of coming into adulthood at 
two among the nation’s most exclusive private universities. As Clarice had earlier tried to 
explain to Lenore regarding the prospect of rape on women’s college campuses, “you get 
used to it. It’s really just common sense” (9). In other words, one must learn to endure 
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and ignore a little violence as another part of the commonsensical backdrop that makes 
up what it means to be a well-bred (white) woman in a wealthy (white) man’s world. 
This kind of violence and the need to endure it appears as common sense in part 
because the “system” it serves to support appears too ordinary to name. Lenore’s exit 
from the room and apparent “refusal” to participate marks her misidentification with, or 
at least willful refusal to participate in, a filial system of hereditary privilege and lineal 
investment, the family dynamics of which again occlude whiteness as their racial 
corollary. Lenore comes from a long line of Mount Holyoke and Amherst College alumni 
stretching back to her great-great grandparents (63), and as Rick explains is daughter to 
one of “Cleveland’s first families,” noting that her father practically “owns the city” (58). 
The Cleveland neighborhood where Lenore lives, East Corinth, was founded and built by 
her grandfather Stonecipher Beadsman II (45). Lenore’s father, Stonecipher III, owns and 
operates the family business, an international baby food conglomerate named 
Stoneciphico. Lenore’s sister Clarice had gone on to marry Alvin Spaniard, who was in 
turn promoted to Vice President of Advertising at her father’s company (160). Lenore’s 
brothers both attended Amherst college, but unlike Clarice aren’t doing too well. Few 
family members hear from her older brother, and her younger brother Stonecipher IV 
appears destined to deal drugs and read philosophy at Amherst indefinitely (237-54). This 
leaves Lenore as the family’s last best hope for extending its legacy of wealth and 
privilege, and according to the family tradition Lenore ought to have gone to Mount 
Holyoke and settled in with a wealthy Amherst man. As Rick recounts, despite the 
incomparable privileges that ought to have set on her a path to wealth if not necessarily 
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happiness she “works answering telephones for something like four dollars an hour” (58), 
a fact that does not sit well with her father. Stonecipher III makes Lenore’s “failures” to 
continue the family legacy painfully obvious: “Planless, still? Distinguished graduate of 
Oberlin? Most highly educated receptionist and telephone operator in Cleveland 
history?...How long?...I won’t even say marriage because my glasses will break, but how 
long?” (147). Lenore’s father’s repeated question points to the expectations Lenore 
thwarted by initially refusing Lang’s advance, and although the implications come 
obliquely, it is quite clear that what Stonecipher III wants most is for Lenore to become a 
(re)productive member of the family. 
In the aggregate, these details initially suggest that Lenore comes from a wealthy, 
well-connected, and long-established family whose continuance depends on her 
performing her filial duties. The expectation to perform those duties by reproducing the 
investments her family has made through her suggests that whiteness may be among 
those investments. Cheryl Harris’s powerful reading of whiteness as property helps to 
draw out the occluded racial dynamics of Lenore’s familial history. Though Harris’s 
argument primarily focuses on the legal framework through which whiteness is 
established as a form of property, her conclusions bear on the ways that Lenore’s familial 
wealth construes whiteness as a form of what Harris calls “status property” (1734). Harris 
argues that ensconcing whiteness as a form of property accomplishes the “ideological 
move” of “[conceptualizing] white racial identity as an external thing in a constitutive 
sense—an ‘object or resource necessary to be a person’” (1734). To the extent that 
Lenore’s familial wealth is both an object and a resource, to which her access is 
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contingent on performing in accord with her family’s expectations to inhabit a certain 
“status,” the family pressures she feels as “identity confusion” articulate her identity in 
terms of the whiteness she is expected to perform and reproduce. The “system” that 
Lenore departs from, then, appears as a system of hereditary whiteness that, through the 
narrative’s articulation of it as familial wealth and privilege, appears normal and 
unremarkable.  
The sense that Lenore has failed to reproduce her family’s investments in 
whiteness, merged with the commonsensical aspects of (white) femininity Lenore’s sister 
Clarice expects her to have already known and that her father couches in terms of 
marriage, suggests that the novel’s heterosexual drama stages a drama of anxious white 
patriarchy. Lenore’s father expects her to put her “expensive degree to remunerative use” 
but feels her “refusal” as “embarrassment and sadness” (147). He situates her lack of 
“romantic involvement” in terms of “aimlessness,” and dismisses her relationship with 
Rick, telling her not to “deny involvement” but to “deny extent” (148). The “extent” of 
her involvement with Rick points back to Rick’s body’s failure to measure up to the task 
of capacitating Lenore’s ability successfully to carry on the family legacy. As her father 
explains to her, and as her grandmother who was a student of Wittgenstein had explained 
to them both, Lenore’s “meaning is nothing more or less” than her “function” within the 
system (149). So long as she remains aimless, underpaid, and involved with Rick to the 
extent that his body allows, she remains functionless. The layers of investment here mark 
out the ways the narrative implicitly portrays investments in female heterosexuality as 
investments in whiteness conceived as a form of property expected to be remunerated 
 
 135 
through women’s selective reproductivity. When white women fail to intuit the 
commonsensical dimensions of this systemic investment, white men like Lenore’s father 
become anxious about their future status.  
However, at this juncture it remains unclear specifically how Rick’s body renders 
Lenore “functionless” and, reciprocally, how Lenore’s body produces Rick as equally 
barred from functioning, within the white patriarchal system the novel imagines. If 
simple reproductivity were the only issue, then Rick’s body would appear to be just as 
able as Lang’s. As Rick explains during one of his many frantic attempts to secure 
Lenore’s love, his penis regardless of its size enables him to be “close enough for the risk 
of pregnancy” (286). Something other than sheer biological potential, in other words, has 
to get in the way of Rick’s ability to operate within the system Broom images. In the 
absence of physical impotence, then, Wallace relies on solipsism and anxiety as a way to 
call into question Rick’s sexual efficaciousness. In other words, though he might be 
physically capable of impregnating Lenore, Wallace imagines Rick as psychologically 
incapable of “fulfilling” her as a person because he is incapable of orienting himself 
toward her.  
Broom positions Rick Vigorous as an incorrigible solipsist through the ways it 
imagines his body to exclude him from the system of heterosexual exchange that will 
eventually bring Lenore back into being as a full person. That Rick’s exclusion from the 
system excludes him from redemption suggests that Wallace imagines his form of white 
solipsism as stemming not from disidentification with the body, as is the case for Lenore, 
but directly from the body’s specifically physical capacities. Yoking Rick’s insularity to 
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his inability to sexually “fulfill” Lenore (286), Wallace likewise casts Rick’s body as 
terminal and implies that its potential reproduction is inherently threatening. Yet, because 
Rick is clearly capable of reproducing, having fathered a child with his previous wife 
Veronica (58), and because his racial identity seems never in doubt throughout the 
narrative, what does it mean here to imagine his solipsism as something he embodies? 
How does the narrative’s ontology of gendered bodies’ “natural” inclinations toward their 
opposites produce Rick as on the one hand apparently white, physically male, and 
biologically capable, but on the other hand as threatening through all of those same 
capacities? Quite paradoxically given the ways the narrative imagines Lenore’s resistance 
to heterosexual identification as a pathological “refusal,” Rick’s terminal embodiment 
appears to stem from his suggestively queer sexuality. Whereas women are imagined as 
oriented along overlapping vectors toward straight couplehood and “remunerative” 
reproduction, within Broom’s phenomenal field men can perform straightness over and 
against their bodies’ queer inclinations. Rick’s performance of straight masculinity thus 
becomes the problem because he tries to appear to be something he is not.  
Broom begins to build Rick’s performances of straightness through illustrating his 
reliance on discourse as a means of inventing a system within which he can function. In 
this sense, Broom re-imagines the plotting Gladney relies on to maintain his subjective 
centrality throughout White Noise as instead necessary to maintain the illusion of 
functionality within an otherwise normatively heterosexual system. Among the elements 
of Gladney’s character that Wallace queers through Rick, the most significant appears to 
be Rick’s reliance on a manipulative, instrumental relationship with Lenore as his means 
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of maintaining a possessive stake in an outward performance of heterosexuality. As Rick 
explains, “My inability to be truly inside of and surrounded by Lenore Beadsman arouses 
in me the purely natural…desire to have her inside of and contained by me. I am 
possessive. I want to own her…” (72). This possessive claim manifests in metaphors of 
real property as Rick constructs Lenore’s body as a “Great House of Love” (58). Unable 
to physically enter it, Rick relies on Lenore’s emotional reciprocity to build its walls. 
Whether through the many stories in which he allegorizes their relationship or through 
his seemingly incessant demands that she narrate for him the extent of their love, so long 
as she continues to imagine her involvement with him in terms of the discourse he offers 
her she continues to function as a “house” within which Rick can imagine his “sense of it 
and me” enlarged and expanded (60). In further contrast to the ways White Noise seemed 
unable to imagine Babette’s reciprocity as ever in doubt, Rick seems terminally anxious 
about the efficacy of his ability to “possess” Lenore’s body as a sign of his proprietary 
control over his sexuality. He begins to “feel physical pain” when Lenore is apart from 
him (171), and explains to Lang that he “can be truly comfortable only in the context of 
an explicit recognition…of the fact that Lenore is mine” (270). Accustomed to generating 
his own context through stories and elaborately allegorical metaphors—“telling 
stories….is at this point what I do, after all” (74)—Rick’s anxiety swells in proportion to 
the faltering efficacy of his ability to maintain discursive control over the characters 
within his plots. Rick’s anxiety thus provides an index for the novel’s reliance on the 
body as the physical anchorage of its sense of love and sincerity. Illustrating the ways 
that Rick’s elaborate textual web serves to abstract from physicality, Broom implies 
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fantasies of bodily detachment as well as fantasies of inhabiting the body through others 
are only efficacious within a “queer ontology of appearance” that blurs the line between 
“meaning” and “function.”  
If manipulative possessiveness is among the characteristics of white male 
solipsism that Broom imagines as terminal because manipulative men like Rick are 
incapable of meaning what they say, that critique’s articulation depends on aligning 
solipsism with queerness, and queerness with an ontologically embodied sense of 
“intrinsic inadequacy” (286). Through Dr. Jay’s therapy sessions, Broom describes 
Rick’s manipulative possessiveness as the byproduct of his putatively repressed 
sexuality. Jay explains that Rick’s “insecurity” with respect to his identity makes him 
“erratic and dangerous” because it threatens to “[bleed] out into and [contaminate]” the 
cleanliness of Lenore’s “network” (137). Jay solidifies these implications through a 
reading of Rick’s dream, where a nude Lang draws a picture of Lenore that comes to life 
to sign Lang’s rear, grasp his “heroic front” and elicit a “rush of foam” (324-25). Asking 
why Rick and Lang are naked in the dream, and why the beer bottle “with all of the 
image’s attendant phallic and urological overtones” appears so prominently (345), Jay 
suggests that Rick’s anxiety owes to his misplaced identification of himself as the object 
of Lenore’s desire and his misplaced focus on Lang as the agent of the system’s 
disruption. Instead, Jay explains, “The Lang drawing” makes Lenore “two-dimensional, 
non-real, existing and defined wholly within the border of a page…a network very 
definitely of your own construction” (343). Watching Lenore rise from the page, Jay 
claims, is equivalent to watching “Lang and Lenore give birth to validity” (344), a 
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process Rick can only “watch” because his body renders him entirely inefficacious. 
Rick’s possessive voyeurism can only contaminate. Jay continues, “You soil, Rick…You 
enter the networks by dirtying” (347). Having rendered Rick’s inefficaciousness in terms 
of his inability to see himself for what he is except in the domain of dreams, Jay’s final 
act with Rick is to impart the moral lesson the narrative seems otherwise at pains to 
dramatize:  
 
Do we love truly? Do we love…enough to afford…validity, reality, three-
dimensionality…? Do we, recognizing our inability to enter and fertilize and 
permeate and validate…an Other, let that Other out...to a…place where she can 
find fullness, fulfillment, realness?…Have we the wherewithal to allow that Other 
to be Self? (347) 
 
 
Rick’s solipsism, in other words, places him beyond the borders of “validity” because he 
lacks the “wherewithal” to truly love Lenore. He has not been able to come to this 
realization because that same solipsistic outlook inverts his “Self-Other” orientation, so 
that others become instruments of his self-expansion. The terms of the scene recall early-
twentieth-century psychosexual discourse and link solipsism’s inward gaze to a sense of 
inversion in a way that suggests the only kind of love Rick might be able to effect 
through Lenore is an “enlarged” sense of self-love that makes up for a profound lack of 
“security” in his own identity.  
Insinuating that Rick’s love for Lenore is an ultimately self-serving performance 
of possessive straightness, the narrative aims to expose the hollow core of solipsistic 
possessiveness. Staging Rick’s performances as utterly inefficacious in this way becomes 
instrumental for situating “validly” straight masculinity as indubitably embodied in an 
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efficacious phallus that loves truly. The only blockage that remains, then, is Lenore’s 
misaligned subjectivity. Jay’s advice to Lenore runs parallel to his interpretations of 
Rick’s core problem, but moves in the opposite direction. Although Rick’s and Lenore’s 
“disorientation and identity confusion” seem to radiate out from their mutual inability to 
recognize themselves for what they are, within the narrative’s gendered ontology what 
they “are” carries them along different trajectories. Jay urges Lenore to locate her sense 
of being “pushed” toward Lang as “coming from inside you,” and during a therapeutic 
role-play he asks her to “be an ovum” and “suck in a sperm” (331). Lenore has to admit 
that “her inclinations and attractions come from inside” and direct her toward Lang, “this 
blond Adonis who can offer [her] realms of self-Other interaction [she’s] never dreamed 
of,” because “Rick is trapped” and “hasn’t the equipment to get out…He wants you in 
him…He’s a sick man” (331-32). Rick’s “sickness” is positioned as among the 
pathological blockages that keeps Lenore from recognizing her body’s inclinations. In 
other words, Rick’s textually queer influence has “contaminated” her self-concept, and as 
a result she needs to be coaxed back toward feeling the “way her life is” (122). Jay’s final 
moral lesson for Lenore is in this vein as instructive as his final dismissal of Rick: “We 
are all helpless and inefficacious as members of a system until we recognize the existence 
of the system…Your pupils don’t lie. Make it real. Bring it into the network…Take an 
Other inside” (333). In other words, Lenore needs to recognize the “common sense” 
lesson her sister Clarice had much earlier tried to impart, that her body does not lie and 
that, in short, her desires are sincere.  
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 Lenore’s body creates the system within which Broom’s identity dramas become 
dramas of disoriented embodiment. Within its gendered ontology the narrative positions 
the female body as the primary orientation point of its phenomenal field, and its men 
succeed or fail as a result of their ability to solicit Lenore’s genuine identification with 
her body’s sincere desires. Imagining those desires to be inextricably tied to the body, 
and further imagining the body to always be sincere in its expression of desire, engenders 
the framework within which Rick’s disorientingly queer solipsism can be made to seem 
like the result of a pathological need to possess and contain femininity, and Lenore’s 
identity confusion can become intelligible as her pathological refusal to properly take up 
her body. Further, yoking each of their “failures” to confusion and disorientation 
maintains heterosexual desire as the normative orientation from which these characters 
have lost their way. Rick’s eventual drop into oblivion at the conclusion of the narrative 
seals his fate as hopelessly inefficacious within Broom’s system, largely because he 
seems unable to acknowledge himself for what and who he is. Lenore, on the other hand, 
finds her way back to her body opened up through Lang’s performance of sincerity at the 
close of the narrative. When they finally come together, Lenore explains that his violent 
intrusion was the catalyst for her confusing disorientation, “You came in that time, and 
terrorized us, and were drunk…I’ve just felt so dirty, so out of control” (405). The 
revelations she experiences are coupled with a sense of her body’s inclinations. As they 
talk, she beings to feel “a lot of little lines…of heat” radiating out from her body (402). 
Within the space his body appears to condition, this time through a sincere approach, 
Lang confesses that the “good old boy stuff…became my thing, at school” (411), but that 
 
 142 
it is not indicative of who he really is. This different, more sincere version of Andrew 
Lang breaks Lenore’s memories into “pieces that didn’t fit” (403). Lang begins to delve 
deeper into his past, telling Lenore about his brother who was killed in Vietnam, and 
about his grandmother who he used to visit in a nursing home in Texas before she died 
(413-17), and as he and Lenore begin to cry together they also fall into each other’s arms. 
Lang’s touching moment of sincerity opens Lenore to her body’s inclinations, and once 
she begins to feel them his continued revelations of himself as a person and his care for 
her “as a person” (403, 442) enable her to feel finally “three-dimensional” in a way that 
Rick seemed never able to offer. Lang’s sincerity works to accomplish this alignment, the 
narrative suggests, because it permits him the space to be honest about the difference 
between his prior performances and his “deep down” ability to be caring and 
compassionate. 
 Against the emotional backdrop of love and the quest to find it, the narrative’s 
resolution of its love triangle seems rather unremarkable. It appears only to take a man 
sincere enough about his compassionate acknowledgment of a woman “as a person” and 
not as an instrument to help Lenore feel her way back to her body. However, the sense of 
personhood the narrative imagines to reorient Lenore comes at the expense of Rick’s 
being made to seem like something less than a person, a move that implicates his sexual 
“invalidity” as a sign of his not being quite white enough to reproduce. Julian Carter’s 
history of whiteness’s articulation as normal suggests that the discursive suturing of 
sexual reciprocity, heterosexuality, marriage, and love produced a vision of “normality” 
that enabled whiteness to “gradually become ‘invisible,’ its racial specificity obscured by 
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its claim to normality” (79). Part of whiteness’s gradual self-articulation as normal 
depended on aligning homosexuality with “fears about white reproductive weakness,” 
such that “queer forms of sexual desire and gender expression acquired the capacity to 
represent sexual disability” and which in turn provided a powerful point of contrast for 
the otherwise self-disciplined regime of normatively white heterosexual couplehood (13-
14).  
Broom’s alignment of Rick’s body with the threateningly queer contamination of 
sexual weakness and inefficacy points to the enduring effects of these historical 
phenomena on the ways writers like Wallace imagine what it means to be a normal 
human being. As Carter observes of whiteness’s relationship to normalcy, norms “appear 
to be inherently solipsistic,” a perceptual limit expressed through the collapse of 
whiteness into love that “could not have appeared possible outside the narrow bounds of 
a securely all-white context in which explicit discussions of contested race relations were 
already otiose” (21). That Broom seems unable to sustain a focus on whiteness suggests 
the relative insularity of its own presumptive context, as much as the whiteness of the 
phenomenal field wherein its imagination of the body’s sincerity can appear as simply the 
effect of normal and normative expectations. Lenore’s eventual couplehood with Lang, in 
this sense, demonstrates how Broom takes part in advancing the discursive suturing of 
white heterosexual couplehood to normality in ways that obscure the solipsistic whiteness 
of its imaginary.  
The abnormality of Rick’s embodiment or of Lenore’s “refusal” to recognize her 
body’s inclinations further suggest that the whiteness they all hold in common as 
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“common sense” becomes the way their disorientations signal their departures from the 
norm. By virtue of his unexamined and uncontested whiteness, Rick’s queerly abnormal 
body manifests the white patriarchal anxiety within which he is situated. Lenore’s 
father’s exasperation with her choice of romantic partners and the narrative machinations 
that bring her into line with a more able-bodied counterpart signal Rick’s abject 
commonality with them, the “ground zero” as Marlon Ross puts it, “for the observed split 
between heterosexual and homosexual Anglo Saxon men” (168). The threatening 
“perversion” homosexual men pose to the conjoined expression of whiteness and 
heterosexuality also carries with it “a latent racial perversion, implicitly fostering the 
threat of racial reversion by failing to…propagate the Anglo Saxon race” (168). To the 
extent that Rick’s body reflects these anxieties, the narrative’s imagination of Lang as 
iconic of (white) heterosexual reproduction mimes whiteness’s alignment with able-
bodied, healthy, and indeed loving masculinity, a way of taking up the body that finds its 
most felicitous expression through (white) women’s healthy alignment with their bodies’ 
inclinations to receive men’s sincere gestures and reproduce love as the gift that keeps on 
taking.29 
Broom’s sexual dramas unfold against a backdrop of the kinds of white 
patriarchal anxiety that White Noise foregrounds and focalizes through Gladney’s 
solipsistic travails. Made into a “system,” Broom thus offers a view to how such anxieties 
function both systemically and interpersonally. Woven together through Lenore’s mis- or 
dis-identification with the demands of white heterofemininity, what the novel presents as 
personal pathology points back to whiteness as a systemic investment that requires 
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women’s compliance as much as men’s sincerity about who and what they are for its 
future return. In this sense, one can distill the novel’s core problem down to the failure of 
communication, whether as language or body language, to covey the truth of what one 
really means as much as what one really needs. However, the novel’s core problem also, 
in this way, speaks to a dimension of settler-feeling with regard to securing one’s 
possession over space, place, and indeed over the meaning and “function” of being a 
person. The anxiety that for DeLillo drives Gladney to nearly murder the racially 
ambiguous other who he fears will take his wife, and thus his prosthetic anchor, away 
from him, for Wallace becomes a distorting influence, noise in the channel that threatens 
to obscure the body’s desires from reaching their most felicitous ends. Overcoming this 
anxiety becomes equivalent to really feeling the body, to feeling the lines of heat Wallace 
imagines to emanate from each of us toward the others who solicit our most deeply 
human desires. Though this may appear a humanist response to the distortions of 
language or the endlessly referential loops of deconstructive theories, what does it mean 
to imagine white heteroreproductivity as both an investment and an affect? Lang’s 
performance of white sincerity in this respect becomes emblematic of a cluster of 
presumptions about the body, about sex, and about love in the context of settlement. It is 
a micrological portrayal of the macrological structures of liberalism Elizabeth Povinelli 
describes when she speaks of love in the settler-colonies (Empire 17). It is, in short, a 
distillation of the possessiveness and prosthetiziation that characterize whiteness, and a 
distillation of love as the remedy for whiteness’s wounds. 
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“Just Human”: White Solipsism and the Fantasy of Plain Personhood 
In White, Richard Dyer argues that no position is more powerful than being “just 
human” because the capacity to speak on behalf of the “commonality of humanity” 
presumes that one can first identify as a member of that “just human” community (2). 
Dyer sees this as a possibility open to “non-raced” people unburdened by the 
presumption of speaking first for their race (2). Dyer’s non-raced points evocatively to 
whiteness, and captures the ways that persons who inhabit white bodies seem largely 
unable to see themselves as much more than “non-raced” persons. “As long as white 
people are not racially seen and named,” Dyer contends, “they/we function as a human 
norm” (1). The perceptual slippage Dyer articulates as a form of race-blindness speaks to 
Walters’s sense of whiteness as a sensory blockage that enfolds white persons into the 
limitations that whiteness has historically cast around itself. Defined by what it is not, 
codified as a form of exclusionary property, gradually associated with heterosexual love 
and couplehood, and envisioned as the normative baseline of a collective politics that 
sidesteps the political, whiteness generates an illusion of normal centrality against which 
everything but whiteness appears obviously visible, different enough from the norm to 
warrant examination. What gets unexamined, as Ross Chambers argues, is whiteness 
itself.30 What I take Chambers to mean is that the content of whiteness goes unexamined 
because it is assumed to be the “normal” content of everyday life, knowledge, history, 
sexuality, perception, modes of feeling, and ways of being. The sense that everything 
whiteness permeates is simply part of human normality contributes to the forms of white 
solipsism DeLillo and Wallace imagine, as well as the perceptual solipsism that limns 
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their narratives’ focus on the conditions of possibility that must be in place in order for 
whiteness to appear as either empty of content or as simply so normal as to pass below 
perception.  
 To the extent that White Noise and Broom constitute fictions about what it means 
to be a human being, in order to see them as such one has to inhabit the solipsistic 
perspective the narratives generate. This is not to say that sex, love, intimacy, or violence 
are not part of what it means to be a human being, nor that white persons are somehow 
not also humans. What I mean to suggest is that seeing the privileged articulations of 
what constitutes humanity within White Noise’s and Broom’s imaginaries—
heterosexuality, possessive masculinity, and the instrumental ethics under which others 
become white men’s prosthetic attachments—as simply and unqualifiedly human 
requires not conscious identification with those ways of being but simply the habitual 
inhabitance of a limited perspective. The relative dearth of critical attention paid to the 
ways race and sexuality inflect these narratives’ body dramas suggest that the typical, 
habitual approaches to them yield limited results.  
 This is especially true with respect to criticism of Wallace’s work, and of the 
sincere fictions his arguments against irony arguably helped to generate. Accustomed to 
mining works like DeLillo’s for nuance and depth, readers would be forgiven for finding 
themselves perplexed by a narrative that purports to mean just what it says. However, as I 
hope to have shown through my reading of Broom, paying attention to just what the 
narrative says helps to draw out its reliance on an inequitable framework wherein love 
and penetrative sex become the means through which a woman becomes a person, a 
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white man with a small penis becomes queer and less than white, and a white man with a 
large penis becomes a hero because he says what he means. These are only human 
dramas from a perspective that presumes humanity to inhere in heterosexual love, and 
female fulfillment to be derived only from full penetration and reproduction. Whether as 
a narrative mechanism or as a critical assumption, sincerity seems to have occluded these 
dynamics and as a result seems to have excluded Wallace’s work from the kinds of 
political critique he hoped to sidestep through dramatizing what it means to be a “fucking 
human being.”  
 Insofar as the perceptual limitations Wallace’s and DeLillo’s narratives dramatize 
and perform implicate whiteness as their phenomenal field, Walters’s sense of whiteness 
as a set of sensory blockages helps to name the dynamics within them as well as the 
fields within which those dynamics pass below notice. From this perspective, the 
narratives’ staging of sincerity seems to operate within a field that inherently limits what 
the narratives can be sincere about. Alexie’s representations of white sincerity in Indian 
Killer further demonstrate the confluence of white solipsism and sincerity, such that what 
one means to say is inevitably filtered through the means one has to say it. What appears 
as apolitical personhood, then, appears as such through a perceptual filter that screens 
what counts as political from what does not. Broom’s envisioning of what constitutes 
Lenore’s personhood illustrates the effects of this perceptual filter on what writers like 
Wallace find themselves able to sincerely express. For instance, although the narrative 
represents heterosexuality as a compulsory system radiating out from the expectation that 
women’s bodies constitute the full parameters of their identity, it seems entirely unable to 
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imagine how such a presumptive orientation implies a profoundly essentialist and 
inherently political production of gender. Despite its suggestion that Lenore’s orientation 
toward heterosexual couplehood becomes compulsory through imagining the whiteness 
invested in her as a gift she must give back, Broom seems unable to account for the 
sincerity of its investments in the discourse that articulates whiteness’s heterofamilial 
inheritance as the normal order of filial duty. And finally, despite its representation of 
Lang’s body as triumphantly valid only against Rick’s sexual invalidity, Broom’s sincere 
presentation of love sidesteps the political implications of casting queerness as a foil to 
whiteness so as to ensure whiteness’s uncontested reproduction as merely normal 
personhood.  
 That these representations nevertheless aim to articulate a vision of what it means 
to be a human being calls for a different way to approach sincere fictions that traffic in 
the fantasy of plain personhood, an approach that tries to move beyond the solipsistic 
borders such (white) fantasies throw up around themselves. What might result, for 
instance, from looking at sincerity in the ways that feminist scholars have read 
sentimentality? As Lauren Berlant argues in The Female Complaint, sentimentalists 
strive to “save the political from politics” by imagining their notional citizen “not as 
someone with potentially jeopardizing qualities or with a status in a hierarchy…but as 
someone with attachments and intentions and pain capacities…as a subject of 
feeling…who longs for…vague belonging, a sense of unanxious general social 
membership” (145). Wallace and the sincere fictionists who follow him imagine exactly 
the kinds of subjects of feeling Berlant describes, and the offer representations of human 
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beings who long for generality in the face of political jeopardy. Such an approach helps 
to situate sincere fictions as performing affective cultural work, and as I show in the next 
chapter, Jonathan Safran Foer’s Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close works to align pain 
with personhood in ways that render the whiteness of wounded whiteness, as much as the 
whiteness of the wounded nation Foer imagines, invisible.  
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Notes
 
1 For the first epigraph, see McCaffery (26). For the second, see Povinelli, Empire (17). 
 
2 Wallace’s interview with McCaffery was originally published in a 1993 issue of Review of 
Contemporary Fiction alongside his essay “E Unibus Pluram: Television and U.S. Fiction.” In the essay, he 
critiques contemporaneous American fiction for its lack of serious engagement with everyday life and 
suggests that this lack owes to two sources: televisual irony and contemporary author’s indebtedness to 
literary metafiction. For the essay, see A Supposedly Fun Thing (21-83). For additional essays critiquing 
contemporary American fiction, see Wallace, “Greatly Exaggerated” in A Supposedly Fun Thing; and 
“Certainly the End of Something or Other, One Would sort of Have to Think” in Consider. 
 
3 For especially salient examples of this theme in Wallace’s work, see Wallace, “Little 
Expressionless Animals,” in Girl; and “Brief Interview #20” also referred to as “The Granola Cruncher” in 
Brief Interviews. For a critical reading of the “Granola Cruncher,” see Holland, “Mediated Immediacy in 
Brief Interviews with Hideous Men.” Wallace also articulates this theme in his non-fiction. See especially 
Wallace, “Big Red Son” in Consider.  
 
4 By “emotional backdrop” I mean to signal two related structures. First, emotional backdrop 
names the range of emotional responses that become available within a narrative. The second structure (or 
set of structures) I mean to indicate by emotional backdrop is the condition within which a given range of 
emotional responses appears not only possible but also appropriate. The prevailing conditions that make up 
emotional backdrops encompass race, gender, sexuality, class, ability, location, and other elements of one’s 
affective milieu and identity schema. I use the term “phenomenal field” to refer to the dynamic 
interarticulation of these prevailing sets of conditions. 
 My use of these terms is informed by Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, contemporary work in 
phenomenology and affect, in particular Ahmed, Queer and Cultural Politics; and work within cultural 
studies on genre, especially Berlant, Queen of America and The Female Complaint. Berlant’s reading of 
genre as a disciplinary instrument is especially influential for my thinking about “emotional backdrops” in 
these narratives. Hamilton Carroll’s recent work on whiteness and masculinity in contemporary television 
has also been influential, in particular his reading of genres as “affective structures.” See Carroll, 
Affirmative Reaction. 
 
5 “Hegemonic Masculinity” refers to the dominant representation of idealized masculinity within a 
given cultural formation. These representations stylize privileged affects, performances, and ways of doing 
the male body that encompass both the ideal form of that body as well as the most ideal way of inhabiting it 
and taking it up. Hegemonic masculinities, like other forms of cultural hegemony, are dynamic and 
responsive but are usually described as unattainable forms of being masculine toward which men are 
nevertheless encouraged to aspire. 
Australian sociologist R.W. Connell is widely credited with having coined “hegemonic 
masculinity” in the 1980s to describe the prevailing images and attitudes ascribed to dominant 
understandings of masculinity in a given culture. See Carrigan, Connell, and Lee; Connell; and Connell and 
Messerschmidt. For considerations of American hegemonic masculinity and its historical development, see 
Kimmel, Manhood and Angry. For an example of shifting representations of hegemonic masculinity, see 
Jeffords. 
 
6 See Ahmed, Queer 132-136. Ahmed considers the ways that objects and others extend white 
bodies’ feelings of place and belonging. Although Ahmed focuses on primarily on space, her reading of 
bodily motility as it inflects race helps to describe the effects of white solipsism imagined as a limit for 
one’s perceptual capacity as well as one’s motility. 
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7 See Savran. David Savran’s notion of the “masochistic fantasmatic” offers up a sense of white 
men’s access to performances of victimhood through co-opting the signification of other subject positions, 
a point of access their whiteness makes possible. Masochistic performances of white male victimhood 
allow the “white male subject to…feminize and/or blacken himself fantasmatically…all the while 
reproducing his own unimpeachable virility” (33). Bracketing Savran’s psychoanalytic register, the ability 
to take up victimhood by fantasmatically inhabiting a feminized or blackened body suggests that those 
bodies already appear as spaces for white masculine extension. In this vein, one could read Savran’s 
argument in phenomenological terms as articulating a kind of performative plasticity that feels possible as a 
result of other bodies’ availability. 
 
8 For an extended consideration of “epiphanic moments” in DeLillo’s fiction, including White 
Noise, see Maltby. Maltby’s primary interest lies in critiquing conventional understandings of 
postmodernism. My interest in Gladney’s momentarily epiphanic experience in White Noise lies instead in 
the conditions that make Gladney’s feeling appear possible.  
 
9 Masculinity’s notional disembodiment refers to historical associations of masculinity with reason 
and rationality, and femininity with the body. For an overview of these historical associations’ outgrowth 
from Western philosophy, see Grosz. Whiteness’s presumptive invisibility within a U.S. framework refers 
to the historical constitution of race as difference from whiteness. “Race” is thus seen as blackness, for 
instance, from a perspective that does not take account of blackness’s production against whiteness. On 
whiteness’s reliance on negative identification for its coherent meaning, see Carroll; Chambers; DiPiero; 
Dyer; Hill; and Lipsitz. 
Arguments concerning white masculinity in crisis locate its impetus in the mid-1960s. As 
historically marginalized persons gained access to greater political and cultural representation, whiteness 
became more visible as a racial construction and masculinity’s disassociation with the body became more 
untenable. The “crisis” names the proliferation of political and cultural representations of visibly embodied 
masculinities, and white men’s difficulties maneuvering within the confines of their newfound visibility. 
For arguments that position white masculinity in crisis in response to feminism and identity 
politics, see Gardiner; Faludi; Jeffords; Kimmel, Manhood and Angry; and Malin, For an overview white 
masculinity in crisis discourse and critical readings of its representations in twentieth-century U.S. fiction, 
see Robinson. For critical analyses of white masculinity in crisis and white male performances of 
victimhood, see Berlant, Queen; Carroll; DiPiero; Savran; Silverman; and Walsh.  
 
10 For considerations of gender and White Noise, see Nel, “Amazons” and “Homicidal Men”; and 
Helyer, “DeLillo and Masculinity” and “Taking Possession.” For readings of whiteness and white noise, 
see Gordon; and Engles, “‘Who Are you Literally?’” and “Connecting White Noise.”  
 
11 See Ahmed, Queer (109-156). For Ahmed, orientation devices are involved in the “work of 
inhabitance,” as “ways of extending bodies into spaces that create new folds, or new contours of what we 
could call livable or inhabitable spaces” (11). Ahmed draws heavily on Merleau-Ponty’s reading of bodily 
motility and blindness in Phenomenology of Perception, where Merleau-Ponty considers a blind man’s 
cane to have become a part of his body schema and thus part of his ability to “orient” himself in space. 
Ahmed extends Merleau-Ponty’s considerations towards how objects, others, and expectations work to 
“orient” one’s perceptions of situatedness and belonging. I use the concept here to indicate the ways white 
men orient themselves toward a feeling of subjective centrality and secure belonging through locating 
others at the periphery of their milieu. 
 
12 On whiteness as a sense of ease, and stress points as challenges to the habitual ease with which 
white bodies ordinarily inhabit spaces, see Ahmed, Queer (130-33) and “A Phenomenology of Whiteness.” 
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13 See Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology (262-65). Merleau-Ponty suggests that one’s ability to 
sense one’s orientation depends one’s being already anchored in a prior perceptual level. 
 
14 In Being and Time, Heidegger describes death as the “possibility of the absolute impossibility of 
Da-sein” (the “there-being” at the center of Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology), continuing that 
“death reveals itself as the ownmost nonrelational possibility not to be bypassed” (232). For readings of 
Heidegger’s influence on White Noise, see Bonca. For considerations of Heideggerian philosophy, 
technology, and Gladney’s angst toward death, see Valdez-Moses. For further considerations of White 
Noise’s emphatic focus on death and anxiety, see Barrett; Olster; Osteen; Weekes; and Wilcox. 
 
15 In Between Men, Eve Sedgwick argues that a homosocial continuum of male-male desire (a 
term she uses to encompass erotic and non-erotic feelings between men) could be usefully read through the 
asymmetries that male-male-female love triangles form between men. For Sedgwick’s description of a 
male homosocial continuum distinct from female homosociality, see Between Men (1-5). For further 
elaboration of homosocial bonds, see Sedgwick, Epistemology (184-87). 
 
16 In Revealing Whiteness, Shannon Sullivan defines “ontological expansiveness” as “a particular 
co-constitutive relationship between self and environment in which the self assumes that it can and should 
have total mastery of its environment” (10). Sullivan’s study discusses the habitual patterns that structure 
the articulation of whiteness as a set of privileges and privileged access to persons, spaces, and resources. 
Her discussion of ontological expansiveness is especially salient in terms of white solipsism. As habitual, 
whiteness is ordinarily not available for conscious reflection among persons who benefit from being 
understood as white, and when it is it is often understood in terms that again arise out of habit, thus leading 
to a kind of reflective double-bind that retrenches rather than alleviates white solipsism (25). 
 
17 The Broom of the System envelops its love plot with allusions to philosophers ranging from 
Hegel to Wittgenstein, and authors encompassing Vladimir Nabokov, Thomas Pynchon, and John Updike, 
as Marshall Boswell usefully surveys Understanding (21-64). Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language bears 
especially on the shape of Broom’s dramas. For Wallace’s discussion of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, “The 
Empty Plenum.” For more on Wittgenstein’s influence on Broom, see Olsen; and Max. 
 
18 In The Female Complaint, Lauren Berlant reads sentimental women’s texts as “gendering 
machines, locating the ideality of femininity in fantasies of unconflicted subjectivity in an intimate world 
organized by a sense of emotional recognition, reciprocity, and self-mastery” (35). Broom positions 
sincerity to work in much the same, securing a sense gendered ideality in world imagined to cohere around 
intimate reciprocity and self-mastery. Wallace’s staging of sincerity as the means through which men and 
women become sexually oriented adds sexuality to Berlant’s notion of intimate fictions as “gendering 
machines.”  
 
19 See O’Donnell; and Boswell, Understanding. O’Donnel reads Broom as an “apprentice work” 
in the manner of Fitzgerald’s This Side of Paradise (though the comparison ought to strike anyone familiar 
with either novel as more than a bit of a stretch). Yet despite the novel consisting of a “series of intersecting 
plots that are almost plots,” O’Donnel offers an interesting insight into the narrative that I pursue in this 
chapter, writing that the novel explores “the nature…of personhood existentially and affectively” (8). 
Wallace also all but dismissed Broom in his interview with McCaffery, calling it “sensitive 
little…bildungsroman” (41). 
 
20 Wallace called for a turn to sincerity within American fiction in his often-cited essay “E Unibus 
Pluram: Television and U.S. Fiction.” For commentary on the essay and its importance for Wallace’s work, 
see Boswell, Understanding; McLaughlin; and Scott. For readings of sincerity and sentiment throughout 
Wallace’s fiction and non-fiction see Boswell, Understanding; den Dulk; Franzen, “Farther Away”; Giles; 
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Harris; Hoborek, “Introduction” and “The Novel after David Foster Wallace”; Holland, “The Art’s Heart’s 
Purpose”; Kirsch; and Scott. For discussions of Wallace’s influence on later writers, see Kirsh; Scott; and 
Smith. 
 
21 Literary metafiction is solipsistic to the extent that it dramatizes its own fictionality. Framing a 
story as being about itself, in other words, does little more than call attention to itself as its own conditions 
of production. Wallace’s critique in this vein is accurate insofar as literary metafiction does very little in the 
way of representing the lives of people who are not conscious of being characters in a story. In “E Unibus 
Pluram,” Wallace maps this critique onto the whiteness and masculinity of the authors of literary 
metafiction, a critique that seems to run out of steam in his fictional send-ups. See “E Unibus Pluram” (54-
69). For Wallace’s satire of literary metafiction and John Barth in particular, see Wallace, “Westward the 
Course of Empire Takes Its Way,” in Girl. 
 
22 See Boswell Understanding. See also Hayes-Brady. 
 
23 See Boswell, Understanding. Boswell offers a brief consideration of Broom’s love plot and goes 
as far as to consider its homosocial dynamics, but ultimately suggests that Wallace’s staging of them 
amounts to a joke on Nabokov and Updike (45). 
 
24 See Ahmed, Queer. Ahmed argues that part of the naturalization of heterosexuality involves the 
naturalization of gender as “in line” with sex: “The line of straight orientation takes the subject toward what 
it ‘is’…The naturalization of heterosexuality as a line that directs bodies depends on the construction of 
women’s bodies as being ‘made’ for men, such that women’s sexuality is seen as directed toward men” 
(70-71). Wallace arguably imagines exactly such a phenomenology of gender in which women’s bodies are 
in line with and oriented along a line toward men’s bodies, as if they are “made for” each other. 
 
25 The phrase “compulsory heterosexuality” and its usefulness for describing frameworks wherein 
heterosexuality is presumptively prior to other vectors of desire owes to Adrienne Rich’s work with the 
concept. See Rich, “Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence.” For a phenomenological 
consideration of compulsory heterosexuality as “congealed” in with the history of one’s body, see Ahmed, 
Cultural Politics (145). 
 
26 Wallace attended Amherst College during the mid-1980s, and was on campus when the 
university enacted a ban on college fraternities in 1984 in response to allegations of sexual assault and 
abuse. His attendance at Amherst also overlapped with Eve Sedgwick’s tenure there. The extent to which 
these occurrences amount to more than a coincidence is difficult to determine, but Broom bears the 
influence of feminist theory generally and Sedgwick’s considerations of male homosocial desire in Between 
Men, if only obliquely and at times negatively. For details of Wallace’s life at Amherst, including some 
description of the courses he took there and the influence of his experiences there on Broom, see Max. 
 
27 On fraternal organizations, whiteness, and privilege, see Nelson; and Kimmel, Manhood. 
 
28 The scene positions Lenore’s resistance as a series of refusals, thus situating her actions as the 
result of a willful disconnect between her feeling and her body’s inclinations in a way that suggests her 
traumatic encounter with this very real threat of rape produces a pathological blockage rather than a choice 
to evade sexual violence. I take up the connections between sincerity and trauma more fully in the next 
chapter, and so here rather than dwell on the ways the narrative uses the prospect of sexual trauma as a 
means of articulating female embodiment, I instead want to the focus how that implication functions to 
produce Lenore’s specifically female form of solipsism as the result of a pathological blockage that shapes 
her ability to perform normative, white femininity.  
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29 I am here paraphrasing Berlant’s opening lines in The Female Complaint (1). 
 
30 See Chambers, “The Unexamined.” 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
REGIONS OF SILENCE: TRAUMA, SENTIMENTALITY, AND EMOTIONAL 
SURROGACY IN KURT VONNEGUT’S SLAUGHTERHOUSE-FIVE AND 
JONATHAN SAFRAN FOER’S EXTREMELY LOUD AND INCREDIBLY CLOSE 
 
 
The traumatized, we might say, carry an impossible history within them, or they become 
themselves the symptom of a history that they cannot entirely possess. 
 
— Cathy Caruth, Trauma: Explorations in Memory 
 
 
In order to benefit from the therapeutic promises of sentimental discourse, you must imagine 
yourself with someone else’s stress, pain, or humiliated identity; the possibility that through the 
identification with alterity you will never be the same remains the radical threat and the great 
promise of this affective aesthetic. 
 
 — Lauren Berlant, The Female Complaint 
 
 
Jonathan Safran Foer’s Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close imagines a family 
fractured by two historical traumas, the 1945 allied firebombing of Dresden, Germany 
and the destruction of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. The 
intergenerational framework Foer imagines presents the Schell family as the focal point 
for historical violence’s continuity, arguably positioning them as representative of the 
kinds of “impossible histories” Cathy Caruth claims victims of trauma carry within them 
but cannot entirely possess.1 The inability of the Schells to possess and thus to fully 
process the historical traumas into which Foer enmeshes them invites readers to witness 
their suffering as representative of the past’s infiltration into the present. In this sense, 
Dresden survivor Thomas, Sr., who loses his ability to speak in the years following the 
Dresden raid, invites readers to imagine their own emotional responses in the space his 
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silence leaves open. His wife, who eventually loses her sight, invites us to bear witness to 
the pains she feels as the shape of her existence. And nine year-old Oskar, whose father 
died on 9/11, invites us to identify with his loss and aspire toward his restoration.  
To read the narrative this way, however, is to take the relationship Caruth and 
other humanities-based trauma theorists build between traumatic experience and 
physical-affective symptoms as a given.2 In other words, to see Thomas, Sr.’s silence as 
symptomatic of the ways Dresden’s trauma comes to literally possess his subjective 
experience is to hold to the notion of trauma’s repetition through altered physical 
capacities. If those alterations become an invitation for sympathetic identification and 
vicarious witnessing, then one must invest in the apparently self-evident ethics through 
which theories of trauma frame survivor’s symptoms as prostheses for witnesses’ access 
to the truth of “impossible histories.”3 Positioning Foer’s characters as bridges toward a 
different and more intimate relationship to the truth of historical pain and its present-day 
manifestations further takes their representativity for granted, assuming that they can 
stand in for the broader histories of loss and violence and the hopes for a better tomorrow 
that Foer imagines through them.  
This chapter explores the relationship between the presumed representativity and 
emotional surrogacy that traumatic frames make possible and the forms of 
prostheticization and attachments to national feeling that Walters envisions as a part of 
whiteness’s plugged-up sensorium. The sense that through others one can feel a way 
toward a better horizon where complex entanglements to historical and present-day 
violence will fall away against the uncomplicated feeling of affective redress drives what 
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Lauren Berlant calls an “intimate public.”4 Berlant argues that sentimental texts are the 
privileged cultural circulation devices for these publics’ intimacy, and she cites their 
“therapeutic promise” as reliant on one’s buying into a prosthetic relationship whereby 
one’s sense of self can transit through another’s more durable pain into a different and 
more emotionally complex identity (47). Trauma studies discourse positions victims of 
historical traumas, particularly of what Marianne Hirsch calls cultural collective traumas, 
as representatives of a history they bear through their bodies. Within trauma studies 
discourse, then, victims of trauma become affective transit points in ways similar to 
Berlant’s reading of the ways sentimental texts represent suffering bodies.5  
The ways sentimentality makes alterity available as a point of vicarious living has 
become the subject of critique. The similar structures within theories of trauma, however, 
have gone largely unexamined. As Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close’s representative 
family demonstrates, through the framework of trauma’s presumptively universal effects 
questions over representativity become attached to traumatic histories rather than to how 
those bodies inflect representations of the histories that shape them. From this vantage, 
Foer’s Dresden survivors’ affective silences become iconic of the silence around their 
historical suffering. For some readers, their silences point further to Foer’s revision of 
Holocaust trauma via his figurations of the Dresden firebombing.6 In order to make the 
leap between representations of Dresden and oblique echoes of Holocaust trauma, 
however, one has to again hold fast to the notion that traumatic frames offer bridges to 
“impossible histories” or even to histories that may not feature directly in a narrative’s 
representational milieu.  
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What would it mean to read traumatic representations not as attempts to overcome 
the impossible nor as bridges toward deferred experience but rather as attempts to stage 
trauma’s impossibility as a wellspring for the promises of tomorrow? How might 
representations of traumatic histories and dramatic historical violence participate in what 
Berlant calls the “unfinished business of sentimentality” by generating intimate 
attachments to sentimental-national feeling through a sincere directive toward suffering 
bodies’ representativity? And how might such a framework implicate whiteness as its 
given phenomenological surround? To the extent that whiteness plugs up engagement 
with the fullness of one’s historical entanglements, Walters’s notion offers a critical 
perspective from which to reimagine Foer’s novel as an archive of the unexamined 
relationship between theories of trauma and whiteness’s expansion through others’ 
emotional surrogacy. The kinds of invitations Foer’s novel extends toward its readers and 
literally performs, as I show in the final section of this chapter, speak to the sense of 
prosthetic attachment that Walters develops. In this sense, affective silences are indeed 
indicative of historical silences, but silence is also indicative of a particular way of 
relating to historical violence rather than a manifestation of its devastating impact.7  
I theorize representations of traumatic silences as marking out areas of feeling that 
remain perceptually active but practically unavailable, a notion I borrow from Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty’s sense of “regions of silence” in the Phenomenology of Perception.8 I 
adapt the concept from Merleau-Ponty’s original description of areas of the perceptual 
body schema that are no longer practically available, mapping it onto the affective 
schema in order to better capture the relationship between feeling, inclination, and 
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performance that Foer’s narrative imagines as sets of particularly gendered silences. I 
argue that the relationship between gendered inclinations toward historical traumatic 
violence and present-day hopes for a better tomorrow can be best understood through the 
frame of affective “regions of silence.” Doing so opens questions about how gender and 
whiteness become “silent” within representations of the “impossible histories” Foer’s 
novel takes up as a part of its sincere-sentimental aims to re-envision historical pain as 
the wellspring for national-familial intimacy. Throughout Extremely Loud and Incredibly 
Close, the presumptive accessibility of women’s pained lives and the space their pain 
opens for wounded men’s repair relies on an assumed relationship to heteronormative 
receptivity. As I argued in the previous chapter, this relationship produces the structural 
conditions necessary for white masculinity to perform woundedness while remaining 
grounded within a durable feeling of belonging. Within the national frames of Foer’s 
intimate public, however, women’s attachment to heterofamiliality works out a sense of 
national familiality as equally grounded within women’s bodies’ surrogation of 
sentimental intimacy.  
I contrast Foer’s representations of Dresden and its effects on the Schell family’s 
domestic arrangements with Kurt Vonnegut’s 1969 novel Slaughterhouse-Five. 
Published nearly forty years before, Vonnegut’s narrative is also centered on the 
firebombing of Dresden, but in the absence of an explicitly trauma-inflected framework, 
the text uses Dresden’s centrality to construct a critique of whiteness’s insular 
relationship to the continuation of historical violence.9 Vonnegut’s characteristically dark 
irony gives Slaughterhouse-Five the critical distance from its protagonist necessary to 
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work out a critique of his representative embodiment. Through that critique, Vonnegut 
demonstrates how Billy Pilgrim’s silence and “quietist” acceptance of historical violence, 
including the violence of the Dresden firebombing that dramatically impacts his life, 
perpetuates the individual affective conditions within which the continuum of historical 
violence—which Slaughterhouse-Five presents as encompassing American national 
history from colonial settlement to the war in Vietnam—can come to feel like an 
everyday backdrop for Billy’s general feelings of belonging.  
Foer’s straightforward sincerity, on the other hand, stages intergenerational 
familial trauma as a sentimental re-envisioning of national-familial ties. I read Extremely 
Loud’s reliance on notions of traumatic experience as propelling its positioning of the 
Schell family’s representative pains as well as their national-familial representativity. I 
argue that through trauma as a representational framework the narrative articulates the 
self-evidentness of its wounded characters’ attachments in a way that brings wounded 
whiteness’s reliance on others’ prostheticization into clear view.  
 I organize the chapter into four sections. In the first, I examine the contrast 
between Foer’s and Vonnegut’s representations of the Dresden bombing’s direct 
corporeal impact. I contextualize the differences between them through reference to the 
prevalent notions of traumatic experience that inform Foer’s imagination of the bombing 
as manifesting in silence. Those notions inform the shape of the symptoms Foer 
imagines, but borrowing from Merleau-Ponty’s reading of the relationship between 
sexuality and “regions of silence” I situate Foer’s presentation of symptoms as gendered 
performances that lay the groundwork for the novel’s re-imagining of heterofamilial 
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repair. In the second and third sections, I examine the ways Vonnegut and Foer 
respectively imagine the domestic impact of their characters’ Dresden experiences. 
Bringing their “traumas” home, Billy’s and Thomas, Sr.’s lives sharply depart from one 
another along the lines of their representative utility for the novels’ suggestive aims. In 
the second section, I work out Vonnegut’s critique of whiteness as insularity and show 
how it relates national-domestic feeling to the historical contiguity between Dresden’s 
erasure from U.S. cultural memory and the then-ongoing air war in Vietnam. In the third 
section, I position the absence of these frames within Foer’s narrative as generative of the 
novel’s vision for an intimate public organized around shared pain and anchored through 
women’s presumptively given attachments to domestic space. In the final section, I argue 
that the critical differences between the two narratives indicate the cultural work sincere 
sentimentality performs for representations of wounded whiteness. Through generating a 
felt alliance predicated on pain’s prostheticization, sincere fictions like Foer’s engender a 
region of silence around whiteness that propels readers to seek their attachments to 
national-intimate belonging in the more availably comforting durability of 
heterofemininity.  
 
Absorbing Violence, Performing Silence: Trauma and “Life’s Hiding Place” in 
Slaughterhouse-Five and Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close 
Much of the criticism on Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close and some more 
recent work on Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse-Five readers the novels as documenting the 
symptomatology of traumatic experience.10 Focusing on the presentation of symptoms 
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rather than on the representation of experiences, these arguments risk overlooking what 
may otherwise be at stake in the narratives’ productions. Trauma provides a powerful 
emotional backdrop against which the narratives can position wounded white men as 
synecdochic of the effects of historical violence, and for Foer, trauma theory provides a 
ready-made frame through which Extremely Loud brings men’s wounds and the 
relationship to history they serve to represent into focus. Throughout Extremely Loud, 
silence’s symptomatic relationship to trauma illustrates Foer’s distribution of 
survivorship and victimhood along gendered lines. Reading silence as pointing back to a 
singular, casual traumatic event does little to examine this distribution and further 
overlooks, as Rachel Greenwald Smith notes, how Foer’s sincere aesthetics attempt to 
palliate national feeling through a familial drama pitched as representative of a national-
familial crisis.11 
In this section, I compare Foer’s and Vonnegut’s representations of the Dresden 
firebombing and examine the effects they imagine it to produce for the men at the center 
of their narratives. The silences each author portrays in the aftermath puts into relief the 
productive relationship between affective and experiential blockages and alternate ways 
of feeling attached to the “impossible” histories traumatic experiences represent. The 
presumptive “impossibility” of histories of traumatic experience thus takes on a different 
shape in each narrative, producing alternately configured “regions of silence.” In 
Vonnegut’s narrative, Pilgrim’s “regions of silence” become avowedly national-
historical. Extremely Loud’s “regions of silence,” on the other hand, become descriptive 
of familial traumas and embodied failures that cannot be passed on if the national family 
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for whom the Schells are representative are to move forward and “work through” the 
traumas they’ve endured.12  
A possible explanation for Foer’s gendered distribution may lie in how 
humanities-based trauma theorists imagine traumatic experience. Theories of trauma 
posit a relationship between embodiment, affect, and cognition that separates the content 
of one’s experience from one’s ability to process it fully in order to bracket questions as 
to the veracity of traumatic experience while simultaneously rendering unethical attempts 
to interrogate the logic underpinning the theory.13 As the pivot point of this relationship, 
the body’s affective capacities are imagined to lie beyond the reach of the distortive 
threat narrative memory might otherwise pose.14 The veridical relationship between 
traumatic affects and historical events thus works out a metonymic relationship between 
victim and history that makes it possible to witness historical traumas at a remove 
through paradoxically witnessing the body’s presentation of symptoms. Cathy Caruth 
offers this perspective as an ethical solution to what she argues amounts to a “crisis of 
truth” (TEM 5). Witnessing the body resolves this ethical dilemma because through it 
witnesses can gain access to a fuller dimension of historical experience.  
However, what Caruth calls a “crisis of truth” Ruth Leys calls a “crisis of 
representation” (252). Leys contends, “We might put it that the entire theory of trauma 
proposed by…Caruth is designed to preserve the truth of the trauma as the failure of 
representation—thereby permitting it to be passed on to others who can not only 
imaginatively identify with it but literally share in the communion of suffering” (253). 
Leys’s pointed critique questions one of humanities-based trauma theory’s core 
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assumptions: that traumatic experience manifests in the present through bodily symptoms 
whose literality allows for witness’s sympathy to become empathy. In this regard the 
failure of representation ensures the “truth” of bodily affects, as Leys puts it “the 
subject’s not-knowing of the trauma—his inability to speak or represent his experience—
is what guarantees the return of the truth in the patient’s traumatic repetitions” (252). To 
the extent that this configuration of embodiment and experience becomes instrumental 
for securing trauma’s truth and literality, the body likewise becomes an instrument 
through which witnesses and victims alike share in the “communion of suffering” (253).  
Leys’s phrase is evocative of the economy of pain theories of traumatic 
experience engender around the act of witnessing and suggests that pain becomes 
something witnesses consume in order to join in the body of feeling victims of trauma 
present. Following Leys’ critique, theories of trauma proceed from a prosthetic 
relationship that enables witnesses to feel the ethical dimensions of their selfhood as well 
as their attachments to historical experiences extended and expanded through victims’ 
bodies. The modes of emotional, ethical, and historical-affective surrogacy that theories 
of traumatic witnessing produce are anchored in bodies that in turn become representative 
of whole histories of violence. The logic of representativity embedded in such prosthetic 
relationships propels identifications with forms of feeling that build from small-scale 
interpersonal interactions out toward large-scale national-affective formations.  
From this perspective, silence becomes symptomatic of traumatic affect, which in 
turn becomes a representational strategy through which to generate durable affective 
attachments. Out of those attachments, representations of trauma stage relationships to 
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national-historical feeling that operate through the bodies of survivors as witnesses’ 
prostheses and direct attention toward specific pains as representative of general 
orientations toward national histories. In articulating traumatic experience as first a 
blockage and finally a working through, theories of traumatic witnessing produce 
gendered orientations that presume a masculine, heteronormative frame. To the extent 
that these presumptions structure Foer’s fictional representations of traumatic experience, 
the narrative’s production of gendered affects flags a relationship to heteronormative 
masculinity and whiteness as given orientations that produce women’s bodies as 
receptacles for traumatic violence and spaces of wounded men’s repair.  
Foer articulates this presumed relationship through infusing his descriptions of the 
Dresden firebombing with a narrative of Thomas Sr.’s sexual awakening and hopes for 
familial reproduction, the destruction of which comes to serve as an explanatory frame 
for his resultant silence. A few weeks before the Dresden raid, concealed behind a 
bookshelf that “protected” them, Thomas and his first love Anna, who will later be 
consumed in the Dresden firestorm, negotiate their first sexual encounter (126-27). 
Thomas reports that he “felt on the verge of bursting into flames,” foreshadowing the 
impending destruction of Dresden he would soon witness and yoking his nascent 
sexuality to the violence he would soon endure. Framing the buildup to the Dresden 
firebombing as Thomas’s sexual awakening, Foer ties Dresden’s destruction to the 
erasure of Thomas’s object of desire and thus produces Anna as one among the “regions 
of silence” he will carry within him.  
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Expressed through representations of lost love as a metaphor for trauma’s 
“impossible history,” Thomas, Sr.’s silence further corresponds to conventional 
understandings of traumatic affects. Anna’s body’s erasure, literally and figuratively, 
becomes the mechanism through which Thomas’s silence guarantees the truth of his 
experiences. In this vein, his silence emerges as a gendered affect that through the same 
lens couches his survivorship as dependent on his embodiment of masculinity. Foer’s 
representation of the firebombing suggests as much, beginning with a silence that 
“pressed down…like a hand”: 
 
One hundred planes flew overhead…I knew that something unimaginable was 
about to happen, I was thinking of Anna, I was overjoyed. I ran downstairs four 
steps at a time, they saw the look on my face, before I had time to say anything—
what would I have said?—we hear a horrible noise, rapid, approaching 
explosions, like an applauding audience running toward us, then they were atop 
us, we were thrown into the corners, our cellar filled with fire and smoke, more 
powerful explosions, the walls lifted from the floor and separated just long 
enough to let light flood in before banging back to the ground…I later read that 
the first bombing lasted half an hour, but it felt like days and weeks, like the 
world was going to end… (210-11) 
 
 
Throughout the description, Foer positions the silencing effects of the firebombing as a 
forcible imposition on Thomas’s body. As something imposed and endured, the 
experience suggests his body’s inviolability against the otherwise penetrative and erasing 
effects of the blast for the rest of family and, in particular, for Anna with whom he would 
have soon had a family of his own. In other words, the literal reproduction Anna’s body 
promises to deliver has to be erased in order for Thomas’s “silent” performance of 
survivorship to seem like result of an external imposition. The violence of the air raid 
 
 168 
thus shatters his familial fantasy while at the same time producing it as an “impossible 
history” he nevertheless continues to carry as a “region of silence” within his experience.  
If we read this scene as documenting a traumatic experience then we must also 
confront how love and sexuality articulate a vision of traumatic experience as an 
“impossible” and “silent” history. We must also confront how that history finds an 
alternate outlet through the vehicle of textual reproduction. As a gendered affect, silence 
in this sense emerges as less a direct symptom of traumatic experience than a strategy 
through which Extremely Loud represents Thomas’s relationship to historical events and 
to the absence that makes his personal history impossible. To the extent that his silence 
arises from what amounts to forestalled reproduction, Foer arguably mobilizes the 
discourse of trauma’s inevitable return through configuring familial reproduction as the 
narrative’s ultimate aspirational horizon. In doing so, Extremely Loud drives a wedge 
between the threateningly intergenerational reproduction of traumatic loss—from 
Thomas, Sr. through to Oskar—and heterofamilial reproduction as the horizon against 
which his Schell family becomes representative. 
Extremely Loud couches Thomas’s trauma in terms of lost love and thwarted 
sexuality in order to situate narrative as the vehicle through which the reality of 
“unspeakable” historical traumas might find form. This choice raises questions over the 
ways gender and sexuality influence representations of traumatic symptomatology. 
Though the narrative presents this connection as a given and assumes its readers will 
intuit the logic that structures it, we ought to ask why lost love and silence seem to fit 
together so easily and why, in this regard, men’s love for women endures as a “region of 
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silence” within their corporeal capacities while women’s bodies are, as if by necessity, 
erased.  
The sense that lost love manifests in physical but not necessarily cognitive silence 
suggests a structural relationship between sexuality, desire, and embodied affects that 
takes heterosexuality as a given orientation. Imagined as the result of Anna’s erasure, 
Thomas’s silence is also imagined to eventually strip him of his ability to express the 
most basic form of identity, the pronoun “I” (17), a loss directly tied to the perceptually 
active but practically absent capacity to reproduce through Anna’s now lost body. 
Merleau-Ponty’s elaboration of “regions of silence” in the Phenomenology of Perception, 
which sketches a similar relationship between the erasure of desire and physical silence, 
helps to draw out how Foer’s presentation takes heterosexuality to be, in Merleau-Ponty’s 
terms, an “intentional arc…that for the normal subject gives experience its degree of 
vitality and fecundity” (160). Reading the case of a young girl who had fallen silent after 
her mother forbid her to see her lover, Merleau-Ponty argues that the impossibility of 
seeing her love manifests as silence because “speech is, among all bodily functions, the 
most tightly linked to communal existence….Aphonia…represents a refusal of 
coexistence…The patient breaks with her the relational life of the familial milieu” (163). 
The “sexual signification” of these symptoms thus signifies for Merleau-Ponty a relation 
“to past and future, self and others…to the fundamental dimensions of existence” (164). 
The young girl regains her voice when she is “let free by her family to again see the 
young man she loves,” an affective restoration that suggests “that sensory messages or 
memories are only explicitly grasped or known by us given a general adhesion to the 
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zone of our body and of our life that they concern” (164-65). To the extent that one’s 
desire for “communal existence” remains foreclosed, “the power to learn, to mature, and 
to enter into communication with others are all somehow blocked by a bodily symptom; 
existence has become entangled and the body has become ‘life’s hiding place’” (167).  
The movement between the personal and the general throughout Merleau-Ponty’s 
descriptions of silence and sexuality is quite evocative of the ways that sexual capacity is 
taken to underpin “coexistence” as the basic strata of perceptual life. As Merleau-Ponty’s 
reading of the young girl’s case illustrates, the body’s capacity for affective response is 
imagined as enfolded with one’s intentional directedness toward the body’s sexual 
complement. One’s capacity to remember is further linked to the areas of the body one’s 
memories actualize. When those capacities cannot find their outlet, they become 
blockages that entangle the “vitality and fecundity” of existence into what in this context 
appears to signal the non-reproductivity of the body as “life’s hiding place.”  
Tying “existence” in its barest form to a notion of “fecundity” that articulates 
itself via sexuality as an “intentional arc,” silence emerges as a fundamentality non-
productive orientation toward the world that stems from a set of “blocked up” 
experiences. Foer’s representations of silence and foreclosed reproductivity generate a 
similar structural relationship that posits Thomas, Sr.’s inability speak about Anna’s 
erasure as a “block” that produces his silent body as “life’s hiding place.” Foer’s 
suggestion that textual reproduction can serve as a prosthetic through which one can 
mitigate these blocks points to narrative as a mode of prosthetic engagement with 
otherwise “impossible histories” while simultaneously presenting Thomas’s body as 
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representative of a blockage that cannot be overcome. As Thomas explains, “the distance 
that wedged itself between me and my happiness wasn’t the world, it wasn’t the bombs or 
the burning buildings, it was me, my thinking, the cancer of never letting go” (17). 
Against the backdrop of his Dresden experiences and the metaphor of reproductive 
release as “bursting into flames,” Thomas’s inability to reproduce appears as a necessary 
element of the narrative’s progression toward a reparative, reproductive future wherein 
traumatic experiences might only manifest in narratives of never letting go.  
Extremely Loud thus represents the firebombing of Dresden as traumatic catalyst 
for Thomas Sr.’s nonproductivity, situates his memories of Anna as an incapacitating 
region of silence within his affective and sexual schema, and positions his wounded and 
traumatized body as the vehicle for an impossible history he must carry within him. 
Framed through sexual and reproductive metaphors, Thomas’s silence becomes a 
necessarily gendered affect through which his body’s durability serves as a testament to 
the locatedness of his experiences as much as his affective anchorage in Anna’s absent 
body. Through taking up the discourse of trauma, Extremely Loud presents Thomas Sr.’s 
affects as a particularly emotionally powerful representational strategy through which to 
frame the Dresden firebombing as generative of belated national-familial consequences. 
But those consequences become confined to Thomas’s body through the same gesture 
inasmuch as his silence marks the foreclosure of their reproductivity.  
Vonnegut represents the Dresden firebombing as producing similarly silencing 
effects, but offers those effects in the service of a different and more critical end. The 
contrast between the narratives’ representations of Dresden highlights Extremely Loud’s 
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reliance on the discourse of trauma as the vehicle for its sentimental strategy. As 
Vonnegut’s rendering of the firebombing makes clear, notions of silence and impossible 
histories are not universal symptoms of traumatic experience but rather selected elements 
of a strategic representation. Where Foer uses silence as a surrogate for forestalled 
reproductivity and “blocked up” desire, in Slaughterhouse-Five “reproduction was not 
the main business of the evening” but rather total destruction (Vonnegut 107).  
The setting for Billy Pilgrim’s survival amplifies this immediate difference. 
Quartered in an underground meat locker of the titular slaughterhouse-turned-barracks for 
American prisoners, Pilgrim survives the bombardment locked in a “cement block cube” 
designed initially to house the carcasses of animals slaughtered on the killing floors 
above. In further contrast to the unspeakable core of Thomas’s Dresden memory, Billy 
remembers the scene “shimmeringly—as follows”: 
 
There were sounds like giant footsteps above. Those were sticks of high explosive 
bombs. The giants walked and walked… 
 
A guard would go to the head of the stairs every so often to see what it was like 
outside… Dresden was one big flame. The one flame ate everything organic, 
everything that would burn.  
It wasn’t safe to come out of the shelter until noon the next day. When the 
Americans and their guards did come out, the sky was black with smoke…. 
Dresden was like the moon now, nothing but minerals. The stones were hot. 
Everybody else in the neighborhood was dead.  
 
So it goes.  
 
The guards drew together instinctively…They experimented with one expression 
after another, said nothing, though their mouths were often open. They looked 
like a silent film of a barbershop quartet. (226-227) 
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Compared to Foer’s rendering, Vonnegut characterizes the firebombing as consuming 
“everything organic” and leaving behind a moonscape the profundity of which renders 
further explanation superfluous. The guard’s silence at first surveying the scene is thus 
not “imposed” nor imagined as stemming from a traumatic loss, but is rather the only 
available response to a scene that otherwise has no context. Furthermore, the pathos of 
Foer’s pregnant maternal body is absent against the flatness of Pilgrim’s memory and the 
deflective dismissal of his “so it goes” catchphrase. Taken together, the guards’ stunned 
silence and Pilgrim’s relatively flat memory point to the instrumentality of Foer’s overtly 
emotional representation for reframing Dresden’s destruction as one family’s 
representative devastation. Rather than isolate its effects through a representative figure 
and his thwarted familial desires, Vonnegut’s spare descriptions frame the bombing as 
the result of a voracious nationalism for which the novel’s titular slaughterhouse becomes 
synecdochic.  
In further contrast to Foer, Vonnegut translates this desire for violence through 
figuratively pregnant men who serve as a critique, rather than a retrenchment, of national-
familial feeling. Former high school teacher and elected leader of the American prisoners 
of war Edgar Derby is “mournfully pregnant with patriotism and middle age and 
imaginary wisdom” in the weeks before the Dresden bombing. Defending the mythos of 
American unity and democratic equality before defector-turned-Nazi propagandist 
Howard W. Campbell, Jr., Derby wearily becomes the spokesman for a kind of masculine 
national belonging that Vonnegut frames as generationally specific and temporally 
vanishing. Linking his defense of American mythos to his being “mournfully pregnant,” 
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Vonnegut suggests that Derby’s patriotism makes him into a surrogate for a sense of 
national unity that proves ultimately fruitless against the absurdity of Dresden’s 
devastation. The irony of Derby’s “mournful pregnancy” suggests Vonnegut’s critique of 
the narrative machinations through which war is made to seem like a virtuously filial duty 
and it further illustrates the ways that national feeling manifests as “imaginary wisdom” 
in the face of uncontextualizable violence. 
In this vein, Derby’s fate carries a different sort of pathos than Foer’s pregnant 
Dresden victim. Anna’s death becomes what Thomas seems incapable of moving beyond, 
and his “unborn child” illustrates the overtly familial and yet impossibly deferred 
disruption and devastation of the Dresden raid. Her body places Thomas’s object of 
forestalled reproductive desire in conventional and unthreatening terms that reify the 
effects of dramatically rupturing and penetrative trauma. Derby’s “mournful” pregnancy, 
on the other hand, telegraphs its terminus from the outset. As both receptacle and vehicle, 
Derby embodies the ideological as much as biological reproductivity through which 
nationalism takes personal form. As Foucault argues, “a real subjection is born 
mechanically from a fictitious relation” (Discipline and Punish 202), and for Vonnegut, 
Derby’s pregnant body signals the continued reproduction of a mechanically enacted 
patriotism born from the fictitious relation that binds bodies to the conscriptive logics of 
the state. 
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“Frames Are Where the Money Is”:  
Whiteness, Insularity, and National Feeling in Slaughterhouse-Five 
The differences between Slaughterhouse-Five’s and Extremely Loud’s 
representations of Dresden’s effects flag a critical difference between the ways Vonnegut 
and Foer frame the narratives’ historical and cultural context. Vonnegut, like Foer, 
frames Slaughterhouse-Five through allusions to literary and mythic narratives: evoking 
several popular histories of Dresden, citing and quoting from Céline and Horace, and 
explaining that writing Slaughterhouse-Five has turned him like Lot’s wife into a pillar of 
salt. However, these allusions aim to contextualize Slaughterhouse-Five within a history 
of national violence that appears unavailable or at least unnecessary within Foer’s 
imaginary. Vonnegut’s reference to the biblical destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, for 
example, alludes to the British firebombing of Hamburg, Germany, codenamed 
“Operation Gomorrah.”15 The strategy of total war that underpinned this operation would 
be reprised in the 1960s as the U.S. began its lengthy bombing campaign over North 
Vietnam, what the Pentagon Papers described as a shift from an event-reprisal strategy to 
a generalized response to North Vietnamese aggression.16 In the final chapter, 
Slaughterhouse-Five’s narrator points to the 1968 assassinations of Robert F. Kennedy 
and Martin Luther King, Jr. and notes that “every day my government gives me a count 
of corpses created by military science in Vietnam. So it goes” (268). Vonnegut generates 
a relationship between the extraordinary and the everyday by linking national public 
tragedies to the banality of climbing body counts on nightly news reports. Appending 
Billy’s catchphrase to the end of line is not a dismissal of this relationship but rather a 
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demonstration of the ways his “quietist” rationalization of violence’s repetition performs 
the affective inclination through which it becomes a banal part of daily life.  
In this respect, Billy’s silence is more performative than symptomatic.17 Insofar as 
Billy’s Dresden experiences may have propelled his “so it goes” acceptance of violence 
on an incomprehensible scale, the incomprehensibility and absurdity of the level of 
destruction for which Dresden is representative but not exhaustive critiques forms of 
representativity that seek otherwise to contain the scale of its devastation within the 
boundaries of particular bodies or particularlized experiences. The totality of Dresden’s 
destruction is too vast to be captured within one person’s, or one family’s, experiences. 
Vonnegut’s framing allusions to historical and contemporaneous acts of violence thus 
situate Billy’s so-it-goes response as an equally absurd rationalization that, for him, 
silences the relation between Vonnegut’s narrative framing, but, for readers, amplifies 
how his being borne along by a current of violence does little to address the conditions 
within which such a floating feeling becomes possible.  
Vonnegut’s historical framing thus aims to produce a different orientation toward 
the generalizable affective belonging Billy expresses as a “so it goes” relationship. His 
characteristic irony and dark humor clears space for Slaughterhouse-Five’s critique of 
Derby’s war-time nationalism to extend into a critique of Billy Pilgrim’s floating feelings 
as indicative of white insularity. Through detailing Pilgrim’s home-life, Slaughterhouse-
Five focuses its staging of national and personal “regions of silence” as areas of public 
and personal feeling that remain perceptually active but practically unavailable. Those 
unavailable feelings become alternate ways to engage with historical violence for which 
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“official histories” cannot account (235). Tying the firebombing of Dresden to the 
ongoing war in Vietnam and the struggle for rights and equal protection for all persons to 
a “so it goes” feeling that glides past them, Vonnegut’s ironic caricature is not 
representative of an affinitive aspiration. Rather, through Billy, Vonnegut encourages 
readers’ disidentification with the plugged-up insularity that generates Billy’s feelings as 
a normative, everyday orientation, and asks them to see how it maintains a region of 
silence around national and personal violence. 
Slaughterhouse-Five’s opening scenes call attention to the “regions of silence” in 
the narrator’s memories of Dresden and presents Billy Pilgrim as a caricature invented to 
fill the void. The narrator explains that he had set out to visit his old war buddy Bernard 
O’Hare to gather material for his book about Dresden. When he arrives he meets 
O’Hare’s wife Mary, a nurse, who has prepared an “operating room” around the kitchen 
table (16). Revealing that neither of the old soldiers could remember “anything good” 
(17), the scene transitions into an autopsy of dead memories. Having been “talking to 
herself,” Mary finally interjects: 
 
‘You were just babies then!’ she said…‘But I know you’re not going to write it 
that way, are you? […] You’ll pretend you were men instead of babies, and you’ll 
be played by in the movies by Frank Sinatra and John Wayne or some of those 
other glamorous, war-loving, dirty old men. And war will look just wonderful, so 
we’ll have a lot more of them. And they’ll be fought by babies like the babies 
upstairs.’ (18)  
 
 
Mary’s protest links the contemporary backdrop of the war in Vietnam to the cultural 
production of stylized narratives of war-time heroism and clear-cut causes and implicates 
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iconic masculinities as among the circulation devices for young men’s identification with 
romanticized patriotic violence. Taking her counter-feeling seriously, the narrator gives 
us the hapless, drifting, and decidedly counter-iconic figure of Billy Pilgrim as 
Slaughterhouse-Five’s focal point. 
Presenting Mary’s argument as the impetus for the narrative’s ironic 
characterization, Vonnegut suggests that Pilgrim’s counter-iconic embodiment is on the 
one hand offered as a critique of hardened and conventionally masculine heroism and on 
the other as a critique of the sentimentality through which conventional war narratives 
convert violence into an affective inclination toward national identification. However, 
expressing Mary’s argument through the conventionally sentimental figure of children 
and in terms of protective motherhood raises questions about why the narrative’s critique 
takes shape through a specifically feminine counter-narrative. Why, in other words, 
choose to frame the novel as emerging from a kitchen table operation nursed along by a 
figural Mother Mary? To the extent that the narrator’s memories remain perceptually 
active but practically unavailable, the scene suggests that Mary’s presence serves as a 
prosthetic through which the narrator finds a means of expressing them. In this sense, the 
narrative appears to need a maternal figure to serve as the emotional surrogate for its 
critique of nationalist masculine sentimentality. However, insofar as Mary becomes the 
prosthetic through whom the narrator overcomes the blockages that might otherwise plug 
up his critical focus, her prostheticization suggests that conventionally sentimental 
domesticity is a region of silence within the form of wounded white masculinity the 
narrator’s voided memories represent. Unable to give them a place or a shape without her 
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intervention, the narrator becomes able to construct an elaborate and imaginative 
framework through her “operative” presence.  
In this vein, Slaughterhouse-Five suggests the forms of prosthetic relationships 
that wounded whiteness as insularity relies on for its extension, and the novel positions 
the forms of counter-feeling Mary voices as unavailable within traditional masculinity’s 
orientations. As Elizabeth Barnes observes of sentimental narratives, women’s bodies 
serve as “synecdoche for…emotional susceptibility” (8). In drawing upon sentimental 
conventions Vonnegut implies that his “old soldiers” silences about their memories of 
Dresden are performative attempts to keep their own emotional susceptibility quiet. Yet 
through Mary as a vehicle for this more explicitly sentimental kind of emotional 
identification, the narrative can unfold its story of Billy Pilgrim as a cautionary critique 
of how more traditionally masculine sentimentality around war, heroism, duty, and 
patriotic belonging manifests a more pernicious region of silence around their 
relationship to the continual reproduction of historical violence in the name of securing 
domestic space. Vonnegut’s caricature thus speaks to the sense that homemaking, as a 
feeling that manifests a particular relationship to space, is an ongoing process that 
generates women as surrogates for men’s otherwise threateningly sentimental feelings of 
emplacement.18  
As the narrative unfolds around the story of Billy Pilgrim, Vonnegut’s critique of 
masculinist sentimentality’s prostheticization of women’s attachments to domesticity 
takes shape around the notion of woundedness as rootless and aimless memories, or being 
“unstuck in time” (29). Named “Pilgrim,” Vonnegut plainly signals Billy’s placelessness, 
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and through the story of his domestic resettlement following the war, Vonnegut presents 
Billy’s “unstuckness” as reliant on the felt solidity of his attachments to home and place. 
Billy becomes an optometrist and marries a wealthy ophthalmologist’s daughter named 
Valencia. The scenes detailing their honeymoon position Billy’s post-war settlement as a 
metaphor for broader forms of emplacement through which “pilgrims” make their homes 
in new worlds. Set during an “Indian Summer” in “New England,” Valencia fantasizes 
their consummation as the conjoining of Queen Elizabeth I and Christopher Columbus 
(151). Merging narratives of “discovery” and British settlement against the backdrop of 
an “Indian Summer,” Vonnegut presents Valencia’s fantasy as representative of the 
affective continuance of settler-feeling and its rootedness in metaphors of sexual 
conquest and reproductivity. Their consummation produces their son Robert, who would 
go on to become a Green Beret, suggesting that Vonnegut’s allusions to American 
colonial settlement work out an implicit critique of its fantasy-enactment as continually 
reproductive of the forms of American nationalist expansiveness then underway in 
Vietnam. Through Valencia, Billy thus becomes attached to the fantasy of colonial 
expansiveness within which she frames their consummation. Through her reproductivity 
he finds himself emplaced within that fantasy’s manifestation. As a “reward” for 
“marrying a girl nobody in his right mind would have married,” Billy’s father-in-law 
gives him “a new Buick Roadmaster, an all-electric home” and makes him “manager of 
his most prosperous office…where Billy could expect thirty thousand dollars a year” 
(152).19 Reflecting on this newfound prosperity, Billy’s mother reports that the “Pilgrims 
are moving up in the world” (152). Configured as essentially a dowry, Billy’s 
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inheritances mark out the relationship between heterofamilial reproductivity and capital 
investment that the narrative positions as secured through his connubial joining with 
Valencia’s body.  
Calling attention to this relationship as taking the form of a fantasy, Vonnegut 
suggests that Billy’s emplacement within the hetero-reproductive economy of capitalized 
whiteness generates insularity as a zone of feeling around conjugal ties and settler-
colonial domesticity. His insularity becomes more profound as his father-in-law’s capital 
investments push Billy toward a set of political investments that situate him as among the 
members of what George Lipsitz called the “countersubversive conservative 
mobilization” sparked by the American political right following the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act (35). For example, by 1967 Billy had adorned his Cadillac with a bumper sticker 
calling for the impeachment of U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren, a gift 
from his father-in-law who was a member of the John Birch Society (Vonnegut 73). An 
unwittingly dutiful son-in-law, Billy seems not to notice how his bumper-sticker 
affiliations mark his membership in a tacitly racist political organization that aimed to 
undo some of the Warren court’s most lasting decisions with respect to equal protection 
under the law.20 Billy’s passive association with these organizations and ideologies in 
effect delimit the ethical frame of reference through which he becomes able to view the 
world. “Saving the republic,” as Klaus Fischer notes Birch Society billboards implored 
passers-by during the 1960s (159), through dismantling juridical protections for 
historically and contemporaneously disenfranchised persons depends on seeing those 
persons as less than deserving of equal protection under the law. This logic likewise 
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depends on seeing oneself as always already more deserving of those protections as a 
result of the durability of one’s feelings of attachment to the “republic.” Through 
situating Billy’s affiliation with these organizations and their arguments as the result of 
an unwittingly dutiful sense of familial belonging, Vonnegut suggests that Billy’s passive 
acceptance of the logics behind the exclusivity of white belonging slips into his normal, 
everyday perceptual surround and feeds into the continuing violence of exclusion. 
Vonnegut compounds the irony of Billy’s insularity and unwitting identifications 
through using his occupation as a metaphor for whiteness manifest through a particularly 
myopic way of seeing. As an optometrist, Billy’s business is “prescribing corrective 
lenses,” but as he notes “frames…are where the money is” (31). Alluding to the 
narrative’s subversive framing of Billy’s insularity, Vonnegut points out how his capacity 
to see himself as implicated within a particular ethical and perceptual milieu depends on 
the frames through which his situation comes into focus. Vonnegut demonstrates the 
effects of these frames’ myopic insularity during a scene ironically set at a meeting of the 
local Lions Club. The evening’s speaker is a Marine Corps major who explains that he is 
“in favor of…bombing North Vietnam back into the Stone Age, if it refused to see 
reason” (76).21 The major’s logic depends on framing North Vietnam’s survival and 
future existence as dependent on the exceptionality of Euro-American rationality and the 
limits of U.S. benevolence. That sense of “rationality” is thus configured as generating 
the conditions of its imposition as well as the conditions within which wholesale 
annihilation becomes a reasonable response to another nation’s willful resistance.  
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Staging his critique of the Major’s logic as an address offered to a group of 
philanthropic businessmen whose mission is to distribute frames and lenses, Vonnegut 
positions the Lion’s Club as ironically synecdochic of the kinds of forums wherein 
individual perceptions and limited ethical horizons—well-intentioned or otherwise—
generate the collective conditions for these logical contortions. Vonnegut continues this 
ironic play with optometric metaphors when Billy, reading from his trade journal the 
Review of Optometry, comes across an auspicious political forecast: 
 
What happens in 1968 will rule the fate of European optometrists for at least 50 
years! Billy read. With this warning, Jean Thiriat, Secretary of the National 
Union of Belgium Opticians, is pressing for formation of a ‘European Optometry 
Society.’ The alternatives, he says, will be the obtaining of professional status, or, 
by 1971, reduction to the role of spectacle-sellers. (73) 
 
 
Given the prior allusions to European colonialism and the political affiliations into which 
Billy rather haplessly finds himself grafted, the notion of a “European Optometry 
Society” becomes a clear indicator of Vonnegut’s ironic critique of the ways whiteness 
becomes a collective investment that manifests as a shared way of seeing. Situating 
Billy’s insularity as sustained through calls to invest in one’s racial exceptionality as a 
guard against being reduced to “spectacle sellers,” Vonnegut configures whiteness as a 
frame that delimits one’s perceptual surround while generating the felt urgency of 
retrenching those limitations. Vonnegut’s portrayal of Billy’s domestic life thus takes 
shape around the ways whiteness manifests in a particularly myopic relation to history, 
nationalism, and past and present violence. Further Vonnegut demonstrates the ways that 
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whiteness consolidates its investments through generating collective affects that incline 
persons like Billy toward sustaining the status quo.  
To the extent that myopic whiteness bounds Billy’s everyday perceptions of his 
home-life in Illium, his visits to Tralfamadore offer a “corrective lens” through which to 
see his insularity in context. While on one of his travels to the planet, the 
Tralfamadorians teach him that his gaze is irrevocably shortsighted using an elaborate 
and evocative metaphor:  
 
…this poor earthling…his head was encased in a steel sphere which he could 
never take off. There was only one eyehole through which he could look, and 
welded to that eyehole were six feet of pipe. […] All Billy could see was the little 
dot at the end of the pipe. He […] didn’t even know there was anything peculiar 
about his situation. (147)  
 
 
This lesson in perspective serves to highlight the otherwise insulating limitations Billy 
lives within at home. However, given that this lesson comes from another planet, it 
broadens the scope of Vonnegut’s critique of wounded whiteness’s insularity to 
encompass Billy’s representatively national-domestic perspective. At home, he can only 
see a “little dot” of an otherwise impossibly broad field. The Tralfamadorian metaphor 
thus becomes a way to focus on what lies beyond Billy’s limiting frames. The apparatus 
between his capacity to sense the fullness of his situation and his limited horizon serves 
as a metaphor for the “frames” he sells at home. Through that metaphor, we can see those 
frames as representative of the plugs Walters imagines to manifest as whiteness’s 
perceptual insularity. Billy’s daily life articulates a relationship to broader histories that 
Vonnegut situates as a continuum stretching from Euro-colonial settlement to present-day 
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imperial nationalism. Seeing those broader histories and sensing their violent 
implications depends on the “frames” one wears. 
The juxtaposition in perspective Vonnegut builds throughout these scenes speaks 
to the novel’s characterization of the continuity of U.S. history as a region of silence 
within national feeling, a recognition of situatedness along a historical continuum that 
remains perceptually active but practically unavailable. That Billy eventually comes to 
understand the limits of his own perspective through fantastical visits to a distant planet 
further demonstrates how such recognition remains unavailable within U.S.-framed 
history’s limiting perspectives. Billy’s “so it goes” dismissal and quiet acceptance in this 
way suggests an individual mode of relation to these broader historical entanglements. As 
Walters’s notion of sensory plugs suggests, Vonnegut’s layered critique of whiteness 
through his representations of Billy’s myopic insularity points out how whiteness plugs 
his engagement with his situation’s broader conditions. Those blockages also serve to 
simultaneously plug him into a collective feeling of attachment to domestic space, an 
experience of wounded whiteness as the experience of prosthetic belonging.  
Vonnegut demonstrates the relationship between perceptual plugs and the 
prosthetic attachments they generate through staging Billy’s confrontation with “official 
Air Force Historian” Bertram Copeland Rumfoord (234). Setting their fated encounter in 
a shared hospital recovery room, Vonnegut further suggests that their mutual 
woundedness becomes the medium through which they are able to come to a new 
understanding with respect to the contiguity between historical and present violence. 
Tasked with writing “the official Air Force standpoint” on the Dresden bombing in a 
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“one-volume history of the United States Army Air Corps in World War II” (235), 
Rumfoord feels the burden of reframing Dresden “[for] fear that a lot of bleeding hearts 
might not think it was such a wonderful thing to do” (244-45). While Rumfoord 
contemplates this “new history” Billy continues to say that he “was there” on the ground 
in Dresden (245), a fact Rumfoord dismisses as a historical impossibility given that 
anything left alive would represent “a flaw in the design” of the air raid (230). Rumfoord 
initially speculates that Billy has “echolalia,” insisting “for his own comfort,…that [a] 
person…whose death he wished for very much, for practical reasons, was suffering from 
a repulsive disease” (246). Yet in imagining Billy as an “echo” Vonnegut suggests that 
Rumfoord feels repulsed by the history he is responsible for documenting, a feeling that 
seems to have no place within his sense of the air war as something that “had to be done” 
(235). However, as Billy begins to reveal details of his experience, Rumfoord backs away 
from his initial diagnosis and begins to “reluctantly [become] interested in Billy as a 
human being” (253). His recognition of their mutual humanity comes through the slow 
recognition of their mutual woundedness—Billy’s literal wounds from Dresden and 
Rumfoord’s more apparently emotional wounds at having come face to face with a 
“human” “flaw in the design”—suggesting that through Billy as his emotional surrogate, 
Rumfoord can find an outlet for his outpouring of sympathy: ““It must have been hell on 
the ground” he begins (253), “Pity the men who had to do it. […] You must have had 
mixed feelings, there on the ground” (254).  
As in the novel’s opening kitchen table operation, an allusion to political 
sentimentality comes between this recognition and Rumfoord’s expressions of sympathy. 
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Billy closes his story of Dresden with a memory of having been shipped home on a 
freighter named the Lucretia A. Mott. Configured as a literal vessel ferrying these men’s 
affects, Vonnegut’s reference to Mott points back to the narrative’s opening suggestion 
that women serve as the emotional surrogates through which men actualize alternate 
feeling toward national histories. Here that suggestion is situated as a conflict between an 
“official historian” and an actual though “impossible” survivor of history’s effects. The 
novel’s critique of the “official” erasure of sympathy from everyday masculine feeling 
thus comes full circle. As Billy’s domestic scenes illustrate, the pattern of gendered 
reliance Slaughterhouse-Five produces is a necessary part of its strategic re-envisioning 
of nationalist masculinity and myopic and insular whiteness. Where the regions of silence 
within the narrator’s memories are indicative of blockages around a sympathetic 
narration of war trauma, the narrative he writes envisions regions of silence as national-
affective zones of unspeakably “mixed feelings” over the effects of historical violence 
over there “on the ground.”  
Slaughterhouse-Five in this way suggests that within a masculinist economy of 
feeling national history, Billy’s insularity and “so it goes” acceptance become the 
mechanism of historical erasure. Confronting the violence of national history would 
require a perceptual shift that would unplug whiteness’s blockages. That this potential 
repair goes no further than two wounded men’s acknowledgement of each other’s pain, 
however, highlights how such pain alliances prop up the insularity necessary to articulate 
interpersonal resolution as national-historical recognition. Thus, Rumfoord’s 
acknowledgement of Billy’s historical suffering becomes a performance of affective 
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recognition that generates rather than alleviates how suffering is kept silent within 
national histories. Vonnegut suggests that this sort of “official” recognition becomes 
representative of a performance of national sympathy that through recognizing the 
personal maintains a silence around its imbrication with the historical.  
Actively silencing the historical contiguity that suffering bodies represent 
converts those bodies into prosthetics. Through them, the historical continuum of U.S. 
violence Vonnegut imagines across Slaughterhouse-Five is broken up into a series of 
representative events. As events for which bodies like Billy’s become representative, 
national-historical acts of violence can be framed as extraordinary exceptions to the 
otherwise smooth flow of everyday life. Ironizing this process through positioning Billy’s 
relationship to his own history of violence, silence, and erasure as whiteness’s insularity, 
Vonnegut pushes his readers to see emotional surrogacy and prosthetic engagements as 
the background conditions against which a “so it goes” feeling becomes a marker of 
ahistorical belonging, a feeling buoyed by the representative exceptionality of traumas 
and their “impossible histories.” 
 
“It’s Unspeakable, Write It!”:  
Sentimentality and National Familiality in Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close 
Vonnegut’s representations of “regions of silence” contrast with Foer’s domestic 
scenes, wherein the effects of the firebombing and Thomas Sr.’s silence are imagined to 
manifest in the Schell family’s fractured familial life. Extremely Loud’s straightforward 
sincerity configures the Schells as representatively embodying intergenerational 
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traumatic affects. The novel ties their domestic processes of working through to national 
repair and restoration, and organizes that repair around a vision of what Berlant calls an 
“intimate public.” The intimacy of pain draws persons together into an affective 
collective expressed through a sense of “vague belonging as an alleviation of what is hard 
to manage in the lived real” (5). The difficult stuff of life—pain, loss, detachment, 
separation—forms a sense of alliance that becomes a surrogate for engagement with the 
conditions that continually generate mixed feelings. Foer imagines women’s bodies as 
surrogates for these feelings and as prosthetics through whom wounded men migrate their 
traumatic experiences into durable attachments to what the novel presents as the 
collective aspirational horizon of national-familial fantasy. 
The allusions to histories of settler-colonial violence, racism, nationalist 
sentimentality, and masculine representativity through which Slaughterhouse-Five staged 
its critique of whiteness’s insularity fall away. The explicitly familial drama that comes in 
their place suggests that such concerns form the given backdrop against which the Schells 
can be positioned as representative. Extremely Loud’s sincerity suggests that the given 
normality of whiteness and heterofamiliality inform the shape of the narrative’s 
imaginary and take form through affects of pain, loss, and traumatic experience. In not 
calling attention to these affects as indicative of the social formations that take form 
through them, Extremely Loud effective frames their givenness as a region of silence 
within the sincerity that traumatic exceptionality makes possible.  
The wounded men at the center of Extremely Loud’s representative drama, 
Thomas, Sr. and Oskar, each experience the kind of floating relationship to time and 
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place that Billy feels throughout Slaughterhouse-Five. In Extremely Loud, however, these 
floating feelings are situated as signs of trauma’s insulating effects. Their emplacement 
within women’s relatively durable bodies points to another of Extremely Loud’s sincere 
revisions, this time aimed toward literalizing the forms of emotional surrogacy that 
Slaughterhouse-Five highlighted as ironic critiques of white insularity. Foer’s sincere 
reliance on women’s literal emotional surrogacy situates his female characters’ overt 
objectification and limited agency as given elements of wounded men’s phenomenal 
surround. Thomas’s or Oskar’s floating feelings thus express a felt independence from 
place made possible through women’s emplacement within a gendered hierarchy that 
positions women’s bodies as spaces within which wounded men can anchor their pains. 
The sense of placeless feelings and surrogate anchorages that Foer’s gendered 
dichotomies imply are inflections settler-affect. Not needing to take account of the ways 
others provide domestic security, the men Foer imagines are thus able to live through 
their woundedness because they are able to live their day-to-day lives vicariously. In this 
sense, despite the narrative’s focalization through wounded men it is ultimately women’s 
bodies that become the pivot points of Extremely Loud’s vision of an intimate public 
because the durability of their attachments to heterofamiliality form the surface upon 
which men can project wounded sincerity as an aspirational orientation toward future 
repair.  
The relationships between women’s durable attachments to heterofamiliality and 
the novel’s sincere aspirations open up around the shattering domestic effects of Thomas, 
Sr.’s Dresden traumas. Following his immigration to the United States, he serendipitously 
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meets and marries Anna’s sister, but their marriage never took form as the blissful union 
for which he had hoped. Instead, Thomas describes it as a “marking off of distance,” “a 
marriage of millimeters and rules,” that ensure his and his unnamed wife’s isolation from 
their pasts (109). Experienced as a form of distanced isolation, their marriage provides 
him with an affective anchorage from which to remember and reorient his past 
experiences. Thinking of Anna’s absence, for instance, he explains, “the center of me 
followed her, but I was left with the shell of me” (113). From within the relative rigidity 
of the measured and “ruled” domestic space he creates with Anna’s sister, he is able to 
feel his sense of “self” as having “followed” Anna. In this vein his feeling of being out of 
place owes to the relative durability of his attachments to a home he is thus able to regard 
as a “nothing space” because he experiences it as a “no place” (110).  
Foer positions Thomas, Sr.’s ability to experience his home and his marriage as 
“nothing spaces” into which he can pour his memories of Dresden as owing to his wife’s 
ability to become the surrogate for his feelings of attachment. As a sculptor by trade, his 
wife’s body quite literally becomes the palette upon which he sculpts the shape of the life 
he would rather have lived with Anna. As if to compound the sense that Thomas’s actual 
life becomes hidden away within the fantasy space of his memorial attachments, Foer 
describes the sculpting scenes from his wife’s nameless perspective:  
 
I took off my clothes…He came over and moved my body like I was a doll…all 
that mattered was him looking at me…[After] a few sessions it becomes clear that 
he was sculpting Anna. He was trying to remake the girl he knew seven years 
before. He looked at me as he sculpted, but he saw her…he was trying to make 
me so he could fall in love with me…We were looking for an acceptable 
compromise…It was the first time I had ever made love…I wondered if he knew 
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that. It felt like crying…I looked at the unfinished sculpture of my sister, and the 
unfinished girl looked back at me. (83-84) 
 
 
Presented as needing Thomas’s attention in order to bring herself into being, she becomes 
pliant under the pressure of his desire to remake her. In identifying herself with Thomas’s 
“unfinished girl,” she characterizes herself as becoming the vehicle for Thomas’s 
memorial fantasy as well as the surrogate through which his “impossible history” 
manifests its traumatic reproductivity in a way that permits his detachment from its 
present domestic effects.  
That this self-limitation seems not only appropriate but also necessary to “fill the 
hole in the middle” of Anna’s sister calls attention to the sincerity of Foer’s 
characterization (83). This nameless woman appears to serve only as the conduit for 
Thomas’s active rearrangement of his life and later for Oskar’s negotiations of his mixed 
feelings about his father’s death. Caught between each of their conflicting demands while 
attempting to deal with the death of her son, her identification as the stuff of someone 
else’s affective sculpting makes her inability to navigate her own traumas the condition 
within which Extremely Loud’s men find it possible to work through theirs. In this sense, 
her body’s durable emplacement as a domestic-affective anchor provides the space from 
within which Thomas Sr. can fantasize about the life he could not live and Oskar can 
keep the extent of his pain secret from his mother. That her instrumentality is yoked to a 
sense of positive objectification, as needing men’s attention to complete her, frames the 
narrative’s production of shattered domesticity around a distinctively gendered economy 
wherein men’s pains are positioned as the stuff of women’s emotional fulfillment.  
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Yet in imagining women as needing to absorb the painful surplus of men’s 
wounded emotions and lives not lived, Foer’s reciprocally imagines men’s lives to be 
exceedingly productive. Men’s experiences, as Extremely Loud represents them, spill 
over into others’ emotional lives. The excesses of feeling that thus become “unspeakable” 
nevertheless continue to take up women’s affective space. Conjoined as they are to 
physical, domestic space within the novel’s sincere imaginary, women’s bodies as well as 
their affective lives are imagined as another plane of men’s spatial expansiveness. This 
kind of limitless expansiveness, the experience of feeling more than one can describe and 
yet finding others through whom one can channel and manage the excess, points toward 
another dimension of settler-affect within whiteness.  
Extremely Loud’s aspiration toward future repair depends on generating and 
maintaining this gendered economy. The sympathy the novel aims to garner from its 
readers relies on situating women’s emotional emptiness as a bridge toward the kind of 
better tomorrow Berlant argues is characteristic of sentimental narrative’s work in 
engendering intimate publics around representatively personal pains. The “hole in the 
middle of me” that Thomas’s wife fills with his attention manifests in the “two-thousand 
white pages” of the blank autobiography she writes at Thomas’s behest (124). Urging her 
to find the exhilaration he had felt at “building the world anew” (120), Thomas set her up 
with a typewriter and reams of paper. He had thought “if she could express herself rather 
than suffer herself, if she had a way to relieve the burden” she might have found a way 
through her own pain (119). Realizing that he had pulled the ribbon from the typewriter 
in order to “[unwind] the negative it held—the future homes I had created for Anna, the 
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letters I wrote without response—as if it would protect me from my actual life,” he comes 
to a far more unsettling realization: “it’s unspeakable, write it!—I realized that your 
mother couldn’t see the emptiness, she couldn’t see anything” (124). However, what he 
perceives as an “emptiness” she could not see, Foer positions as an accurate record of her 
life. In answer to Thomas’s prodding suggestions about what she might write, she 
explains “My life story is the story of everyone I’ve ever met,” and asks in response to 
his suggestion that she write about her feelings “Aren’t my life and my feelings the same 
thing?” (130). Through the blank record of her life’s feelings, Foer couches her emotional 
dependency on Thomas’s fulfillment as a tragically impossible goal out of which Thomas 
becomes able to recognize the profundity of his wounded fantasy’s shattering effects. She 
remains unable to extricate herself from these effects because she has become the 
surrogate for the parts of Thomas’s life that he seems otherwise unable to manage.  
Extremely Loud thus divides its sense of Dresden’s shattering domestic effects 
along the gendered differences its two survivors embody. For Thomas’s wife, the only 
measure of her life is her capacity to feel for others, a capacity that she is compelled to 
articulate as a blank space. Within it, Thomas can reimagine and revise an alternate for 
the life with Anna, Dresden made into an impossible history. As he explains, “it’s a 
shame that we have to live, but it’s a tragedy that we get to live only one life, because if 
I’d had two lives, I would have spent one of them with her” (133). The tragedy of their 
mutual impossibility acts as a sympathy machine that works to resolve the inequitable 
division of gendered pain Foer imagines into a point of affective identification for the 
narrative’s readers. In this sense, rather than inviting readers to contextualize the 
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narrative’s focal traumas within a continuum of historical and present-day violence 
through ironic distance from its focal characters, Extremely Loud brings its readers 
incredibly close to the pains it asks them to feel in kind. The characters’ differently 
configured victimhood—whether of Dresden, of lost love, or of love as a form of 
emotional instrumentality—produces them as vehicles for an affective identification 
predicated on the universality of pain rather than on the historically violent conditions 
that cause it.  
Using these survivors and their pain as the backdrop for the novel’s reimagining 
of 9/11’s national traumas, Foer positions Oskar’s troubled relationship to his father’s 
absence as an allegory for national familial crisis. Through representing his childhood 
frustrations with emotions he cannot fully process, Foer offers Oskar as a synecdoche for 
his two Dresden survivors embodiment of the gendered difference between feeling too 
much and “the cancer of never letting go” (17). Throughout the novel, he embarks on a 
quest to find the lock that fits a key he discovers in the bottom of a vase his father had 
hidden in the closet. Foer uses Oskar’s journeys throughout New York to construct the 
sense that shared pain binds an otherwise motley cast of strangers together into an 
intimate public. On his journeys, Oskar meets a paralyzed man who cannot leave his 
apartment, a saddened woman negotiating the end of her marriage, and an old man named 
“Mr. Black” who keeps an encyclopedic catalog of world events in his apartment. The 
latter of these characters becomes Oskar’s companion on his journeys through the city, 
and as a result of Oskar’s influence decides to turn on his hearing aid for the first time in 
a “long, long time,” breaking into tears at the sounds of the world he’d been missing 
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including most of all his own voice (168). Wondering how such a “lonely person could 
have been living so close to me my whole life,” Oskar shares his numerous “inventions” 
with Mr. Black, including the especially touching notion of water treated with a chemical 
that would allow one’s skin to change color with one’s mood, so that “everyone could 
know what everyone else felt, and we could be more careful with each other” (163). With 
Mr. Black’s help, Oskar eventually comes to discover the strange man living in his 
Grandmother’s apartment who, it turns out, is in fact his Grandfather, Thomas, Sr. Mr. 
Black having said his goodbyes and thanking Oskar for getting him “back into the world” 
(254), Oskar and his Grandfather work together to take up what’s left of Oskar’s great 
quest. When it finally comes to an end, Oskar learns that his father had initially 
purchased the vase as an anniversary present for his mother that he had planned to give 
her three days after 9/11. 
Oskar’s happy-go-lucky journey through New York follows in the track of his 
grandfather’s far more woeful journey from Dresden to the U.S. Having lost his central 
anchor, Oskar is left to both figure out his identity and to configure it with the help of 
those he meets along the way. Whereas his Grandfather lost his voice, and eventually the 
word “I,” Oskar has lost his father and thus his sense of how to best manage his pains and 
confusions. Though not told as a romantic tragedy, Oskar’s process for working his way 
through his father’s untimely absence involves the emotional surrogacy of a city’s worth 
of people whom he did not know before. Knocking on strangers’ doors as he moves 
through the New York City phone book, he fully expects to be greeted, understood, and 
aided by those whom he calls upon. However, as in the previous chapter’s discussion of 
 
 197 
love, here we might ask how telling this particular story through a child’s perspective 
renders the relation between Oskar’s expectations, Foer’s characterization, and 
whiteness’s relation to space and to gender difficult to see. If not for Oskar’s age or his 
implacable and quirky demeanor, we might more easily see that the expectation that 
anyone and everyone can intuit one’s personal pains stems from the relative privilege of 
presuming one’s pain to be universally accessible. Reciprocally, Oskar’s seemingly 
limitless capacity to insinuate himself into other people’s lives, often without their 
solicitation, and to improve them all the more by virtue of his youthful energy and 
innocent hopefulness is suggestive of the experiences of affective expansiveness involved 
in treating others as emotional prosthetics. In other words, Oskar seamlessly experiences 
himself as belonging to a community of strangers because he experiences those strangers 
as extensions of himself. In this regard, much like his grandfather before him, the 
overwhelming surplus of emotions with which he is often personally at odds generates 
additional space within which he can move, adapt, and expand. 
In Extremely Loud’s sentimental vision of New York’s representative pains, one 
can never feel too much. The excess of feeling that marks the tragedy of Thomas’s wife’s 
blank life, when channeled through Oskar’s youthfully fresh optimism, becomes the 
wellspring of a city’s-worth of repair and reemergence. Oskar likewise reproduces his 
Grandfather’s “cancer of never letting go,” but this time as the benign tenacity of never 
giving up hope. In this sense, Oskar becomes representative of intergenerational pains 
and traumatic histories re-imagined as the propellant for aspiring toward the less painful 
future he figuratively embodies. Deploying Oskar as the vehicle for the narrative’s 
 
 198 
imagined resolution of New York City’s saddened and lonely residents, Foer draws upon 
the conventionally sentimental associations between childhood, innocence, and hope, and 
merges them into a trauma-framed bildungsroman. That the narrative tracks Oskar’s 
restorative journey against the threat of erasure his Dresden-survivor grandparents 
embody points to Extremely Loud’s reliance on the notion of future productivity 
embedded within its sentimental figurations. The forward thrust of this notion pushes the 
novel to turn the loss and impossibility of historically exceptional traumas into the 
backdrop for its everyday lessons in feeling that Oskar sums up in his sense that we ought 
to be “more careful with each other” (163). 
However, inasmuch as Oskar’s journey pushes readers to dig deep and find a 
sense of emotional tenacity in the face of seemingly “impossible histories,” it carries off 
this affective lesson through a sincerely represented sense of feminine emotional 
surrogacy. Foer uses Oskar’s pained frustrations in the face of forced fatherlessness as a 
well of universal sympathy from which to draw yet another affective lesson in loss. 
Though Oskar is without his father and may believe his mother simply cannot understand 
his pain, when he finally begins to assemble the parts of his journey that might otherwise 
seem improbable he realizes that she has been behind him all the way through. Initially 
suspecting that he had carried out an elaborate ruse, Oskar discovers that his search had 
been “a play that Mom had written, and she knew the ending when I was at the 
beginning” (292). Her direction takes him back to the saddened divorcé Abby Black who 
he had encountered eight months earlier at the start of his search and whose husband he 
learns has the lock for which he had been searching. When he arrives to meet this Mr. 
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Black, he learns that he too had had a troubled relationship with his father. The 
similarities in their stories open up space for Oskar to tell Mr. Black about his father’s 
five answering machine messages that Oskar had been keeping from his mother 
throughout the narrative (302). Unburdened of his quest as much as the secret that 
propelled it, Oskar returns home only to embark on a quest with his grandfather to dig up 
his father’s empty coffin and bury his grandfather’s passel of letters in the place of his 
father’s body (321-22).  
The sheer improbability of such a scheme vanishes against its sentimentality, 
particularly as it, like the longer quest before it, becomes another allegorical lesson in 
Oskar’s mother’s script of his working through. His Grandfather reminds him “just 
because you bury something, you don’t really bury it” (322), teaching Oskar that 
attempting to bury the mix of feelings that had kept him from processing his father’s loss 
will only compound his suffering into the “cancer of never letting go” (17). Thus through 
this final of his mother’s engineered lessons, he learns that loss is an inevitably tragic part 
of living that every one must learn to endure so that tomorrow can become a better day. 
Finding his mother patiently awaiting his return to their apartment, he expresses the fruits 
of this profound life lesson as his permission for her to fall in love again and then retreats 
to his bedroom to reverse the order of his lengthy journey, imagining finally that his 
father’s bedtime story would have moved backward from “‘I love you’ to ‘Once upon a 
time’” (326). Within the fantasy space of that fairytale opening, Foer voices the novel’s 
final sincere hope that “We would have been safe” (326).  
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Mixed Feelings: What We Talk about When We Talk about Sincerity 
Foer’s final “we” refers to both the Schell family and the national family it 
gathers into its embrace. Embedding the “falling man” photos as the narrative’s final 
pages and arranging them as a flipbook so that readers can find themselves inhabiting 
Oskar’s perspective, Extremely Loud literally performs its aesthetic imaginary of 
reversing the effects of trauma’s inevitable return into the gentle comfort of a bedtime 
story that begins with “I love you” and ends with “Once upon a time.” It is through the 
impossibility of this kind of temporal reversal that Extremely Loud partakes of the 
sentimental economy of shared pain and intimate publicity it aims to engender as an 
affective inclination toward the nation’s traumatic past. Although readers know they 
cannot reverse the direction of pain’s progress, if for the moment they align themselves 
with Oskar and feel themselves feeling his pained desire for a time when “we” would 
have been safe, then they too can feel the safe embrace of a mother’s watchful guidance 
that unlike undoing trauma never really goes away. The novel’s presentations of feminine 
emotional surrogacy throughout thus merge with its generic performance of sentimental 
surrogacy. Inasmuch as Extremely Loud asks its readers to identify with Oskar’s pain, or 
with his mother’s painfully loving relationship to him, or with his Grandmother’s 
painfully tragic nameless blankness, or with his Grandfather’s self-imposed silence under 
the tremendous burden of love’s impossible history, it invites readers into the kind of 
“dis-interpellation” that Lauren Berlant argues is characteristic of sentimentality’s 
imaginative transportation of everyday pain into transcendent repair (47). The critical 
difference between Extremely Loud’s sentimental vision and Berlant’s otherwise 
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comprehensive notion of the prosthetic relationships such a vision implores readers to 
take up and feel through is that Foer’s novel performs these dynamics through its 
characterizations as much as through its materiality. 
Published in 2005, and admittedly an attempt to “create art out of tragedy,” 
Extremely Loud sparked an intense display of acrimony in the popular press.22 Michael 
Faber sums up most reviewers’ conflicting sentiments: “I can’t deny how frequently and 
furiously I've scribbled ‘Aaaarrghh!’” in the margins of the novel, he writes, yet adds 
“[inauthentic] though Foer's creations may seem, they are suffused with a profound 
sadness for things lost, a yearning to reconstitute a shattered past, to retrieve the 
irretrievable, repair the irreparable, express the inexpressible. In this he is as sincere and 
committed as he needs to be” (1, 7). Faber zeroes in on the novel’s crystallization the 
immense cultural work sentimentality’s invitation for prosthetic identification performs. 
“The turn to sentimental rhetoric at moments of social anxiety,” Berlant argues, 
“constitutes a generic wish for an unconflicted world, one wherein structural inequities, 
not emotions or intimacies, are epiphenomenal” (21). Sentimental fictions cohere readers 
into an intimate public through generating a shared sense that “the world is out of joint” 
that subverts discussion or consideration of the various, conflicting, and ethically 
unbalanced reasons for its being off-kilter. The sense that feeling wrong and then feeling 
better amounts to a fix for the problems that push one’s world off-center, in the context of 
Extremely Loud’s vision of trauma’s undoing, stems from the experiences of insularity 
that Vonnegut’s ironic caricature of a “so it goes” philosophy of life tied to whiteness. 
Projecting a utopic fantasy where emotional, but not structural, inequities are resolved 
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through frames of “affective justice,” as Berlant puts it, sentimental narratives depend 
upon readers’ prosthetic identification with other persons’ actual pain. Thus in feeling 
bad about another person’s bad feelings, readers are invited to imagine their capacities for 
recognition as surrogates for materially engaging with the structural problems that 
manifest through experiences of emotional pain. Faber’s review, though it balks at Foer’s 
schmaltz, points at least to the ways Extremely Loud appears to hit the mark on building 
an alliance around the decidedly intimate emotions of sadness, loss, yearning for a distant 
and “irretrievable” past, and above all the desire to speak within silences that seem 
irrevocable. Within this conceptual framework Faber argues, and his phrasing bears 
repeating, Foer is as sincere as he needs to be.  
When we talk about sincerity, then, we are talking about a fantasy. Like many, 
Faber reads Foer’s flipbook as an “attempt to fuse the aesthetics of fairyland with the 
unresolved trauma of Bush’s America” (10).23 The “aesthetics of fairyland” must, in 
other words, mark the emotional and affective aesthetics of sentimentality, merged with a 
different (although not that different) sense of sincere desire for what is otherwise 
normatively impossible. Acknowledging that historical traumas are impossible to undo, 
Foer’s sincere desires emerge through wounded characters whose very woundedness 
becomes the paradoxical guarantor of their ongoing and irreparable suffering and the 
means through which readers are able to identify themselves as belonging to the pain 
alliance he constructs as trauma’s “communion of suffering.” However, the wounded 
bodies of Foer’s sincere fiction ultimately strive not to undo the past but to solidify in the 
present the heterofamilial alliances his sentimental staging presents as unquestionably 
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representative of national familiality. The hinge point between sentimental fictions and 
sincere fictions thus appears not to be only, or simply, fantasy, but a decidedly gendered 
fantasy inflected through white women’s relatively durable emotional availability and 
white men’s relatively enduring ability to feel themselves expanded through them. 
Sincere fictions enact the desire to feel something for another and to open 
channels between reader, text, and author that encourage a direct, mimetic identification 
with the story world and the real world those fictions putatively attempt to bring into 
order. Foer is “sincere” in his emotional investments because those emotions are invested 
in wounded men capable of “working through” traumas by working through the bodies of 
women who seem always and improbably to continue to care for them. The mixed 
feelings Foer’s wounded men enact and embody are resolvable because the women in 
their lives appear as wholly constituted surfaces upon which they can project, organize, 
and assimilate the mix. Foer paints the maternal embrace as the most sincere of all 
sincere fictions, but in doing so, he limits the possibility of traumatic repair to wounded 
masculinity. The falling man returning to the embrace of the tower, Thomas, Jr. returning 
to embrace Oskar, Oskar returning to the embrace of his mother, Foer’s imaginative 
undoing—though impossible—forges an intimate public around the sincere fiction of the 
family while figuring the “we” to whom his sincere address is directed as wounded men 
he represents throughout the narrative. In this sense, the narrative’s refusal to 
acknowledge nor engage with its women’s pains, although politically and culturally 
troubling in its own right, is simultaneously productive of the intimacy Extremely Loud 
offers in the form of their emotional closeness. Anchored in their unshakeable emotional 
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availability, the narrative relies on women’s keeping home so that wounded men can find 
a place to return from their protracted quests to reimagine themselves anew. 
As a prism through which fictions depicting men in traumatic scenarios focus 
readers’ attention on pain, wounded men emerge as a way of sidestepping the 
problematic cultural politics of racialized and gendered representativity. Throughout 
Foer’s novel, the critical and clinical discourse of trauma becomes the backdrop against 
which these potent political deflections are possible because traumatic scenarios establish 
a teleological narrative arc that projects the subject toward his eventual return to normal 
functioning. On the way toward healing, the victim of traumatic experience needs a 
community of sympathetic witnesses who can vicariously identify with his pain, align 
themselves with his feelings, and provide him with the comfort, stability, and felt safety 
necessary to rebuild his shattered sense of subjectivity. The core presumption within this 
narrative, however, is a normatively whole body that is never actually threatened nor 
dismembered by trauma’s rupturing effects. The wholeness of the subject trauma 
discourse imagines becomes, within Foer’s imaginary, the wounded white male body 
whose wounds are never quite deep enough to incapacitate their ability to find space to 
heal. In a broader cultural frame, trauma discourse and its clinical and communal 
imperatives work through fictions like Foer’s to build pain alliances as a “politico-
sentimental” tactic, in Berlant’s phrase, aimed toward harnessing emotional energy and 
directing it toward a phantasmal projection of an “unconflicted world” where pain trumps 
politics and structural inequities are sublimated into personal turmoil (21).  
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 Contrasted to Slaughterhouse-Five’s ironic acknowledgement of its own framing 
conditions, Extremely Loud’s sincere buy-in to forms of feminine emotional surrogacy 
and traumatic prostheticization thus also articulates a broader fantasy of national 
collectivity that can be represented through the unacknowledged whiteness of 
heterofamiliality as a sentimental figuration of hope for a better tomorrow. If the 
narrative’s solicitation of readers’ identification with its characters is indicative of one 
manifestation of this fantasy, it suggests at least that within Foer’s imaginary whiteness 
continues to represent the nation’s pains as well as its hopes. Thus in the years between 
Slaughterhouse-Five and Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close, it appears that 
whiteness’s insularity has grown more rather than less profound, and that the silences 
bordering its representations have grown more troublingly loud. We might ask in this 
vein, following Vonnegut’s implicit critique of settler-feeling in Slaughterhouse-Five, 
why a feeling of historical entanglement in the continual manifestation of whiteness’s 
belonging appears unavailable within Extremely Loud. An unexamined whiteness within 
the discourse through which trauma is theorized and understood may account for a part of 
this absence, but arguably also the sense of pain and woundedness as attaching the body 
to a history and history to a nation that trauma discourse produces is another side of the 
same coin. Insofar as wounds signify a body’s history, they serve as the connective tissue 
between the personal and national-historical. Wounded whiteness thus manifests its 
attachments to national-historical belonging even and especially when whiteness appears 
to be sublimated to woundedness in the service of representativity. This is perhaps the 
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most sincere of the sincere fictions Foer’s narrative brings into focus, the sense that 
whiteness can transit through something else and yet remain the same.  
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Notes 
 
1 For the first epigraph, see Caruth, Trauma (5). For the second, see Berlant, The Female 
Complaint (47). 
 
2 Much of the critical literature on trauma suggests that silence, or the inability to communicate the 
traumatic event to another, is a foundational characteristic of traumatic experience. See Bal, Crewe, and 
Spitzer, eds.; Caruth, Trama and Unclaimed; Felman and Laub; Haaken; Herman; and Vickroy. 
 
3 See Caruth, Trauma (5). 
 
4 For the development of Berlant’s sense of “intimate publics” see The Female Complaint (1-31). 
 
5 For other considerations of the ways sentimentality is expressed in relation to suffering bodies, 
albeit from very different contexts, see Hartman; and Hinton. Hirsch develops the notion of “Postmemory” 
as a way to account for the lingering, intergenerational effects of historical traumas, particularly of the 
Holocaust on second- and third-generation descendants of Holocaust survivors. See Hirsch, Family, 
“Surviving,” and “The Generation of Postmemory.” 
 
6 See Codde, “Philomela,” and “Keeping.” Codde argues that Thomas, Sr.’s silence, Thomas Jr.’s 
death on 9/11, and Oskar’s attempts to work through his father’s absence constitute a metaphor through 
which to understand third-generation Jewish American fiction’s relationship to Holocaust trauma. Owing to 
his three-step “ontological” remove from the traumas of first-generation survivors, Codde argues that Foer 
and writers of his generation “can only witness documents” of the historical traumas that second-generation 
writers could read on the bodies of survivors (“Keeping History” 676). Indirectly experiencing the traumas 
of previous generations, as a result Foer and other third-generation writers become what Norma Rosen 
called “witness through the imagination” (676). See Rosen, esp. “The Second Life of Holocaust Imagery” 
(47-54). On the intergenerational transfer of traumatic experience, see Hirsch, Family Frames, “Surviving,” 
and “The Generation of Postmemory.” 
As a theory of contemporary Jewish American fiction’s relationship to intergenerational cultural 
trauma, Codde’s claims offer some insight into Foer’s earlier Everything is Illuminated, wherein the 
protagonist embarks on a search for his family history in the Ukraine. For Extremely Loud, however, 
Codde’s argument and others like it run into the problematic fact that it is not about Holocaust trauma but 
rather about Dresden and 9/11. 
Foer does indirectly mention the Holocaust through allusions to hiding Jewish refugees in 
Dresden. See Extremely (125-26). However, this vague and fleeting passage does not, to my reading, 
position the narrative as intervening in the literary-historical tradition of Jewish American fictional 
representations of Holocaust traumas. To read it as such would be to assume that all Jewish-American 
writing in which traumas of any kind feature must be using those traumas to metaphorize the cultural 
experience of the Holocaust, which seems at best dubious and at worst essentializing. Though making a 
different argument, Amy Hungerford and Richard Crownshaw each contend that “Postmemory” work like 
Codde’s often involves mistaking persons with textual personae, obscuring the degree to which fiction is 
meant to be fictional. See Hungerford; and Crownshaw. 
 
7 On silence and trauma, see Bal, Crewe, and Spitzer, eds.; Caruth, Trama and Unclaimed; Felman 
and Laub; Haaken; Herman; and Vickroy. 
 
8 My thanks to Gayle Salamon, whose work with Merleau-Ponty helped me develop the 
connections between “regions of silence” and national affective capacities. See Salamon, Assuming and 
“The Place Where Life Hides Away.” 
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As Merleau-Ponty conceives of them in Phenomenology of Perception, regions of silence describe 
the remaining sensory impressions of areas of the body one no longer possesses the capacity to actualize. 
He develops the concept from observations of patients who experience phantom limb pain. Regions of 
silence “are delimited” when an object—a cup, a pencil—that one would grasp out of habit with one’s right 
hand, for example, calls for the use of the hand one no longer has. The object actualizes the sense of the 
missing hand, but the body’s ability to carry out the action remains silent; one then experiences that area of 
the body—that lost capacity—as a region of silence. Compelled through the course of everyday experience 
to re-actualize lost corporeal capacities, regions of silence become sites of one’s impossible intentions.  
 
9 Slaughterhouse-Five was published in 1969, and recounts events that occurred in 1945. Pilgrim’s 
coming “unstuck in time” signals the kinds of “flashback” symptoms conventionally associated with Post-
traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). However, PTSD was not codified into diagnosable criteria until its 1980 
inclusion in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Third Edition (DSM-III). In this 
sense, a “framework of trauma” was historically unavailable when Vonnegut was writing Slaughterhouse-
Five. For a history of post-trauma and the development of the criteria for PTSD, as well as a critique of 
“flashbacks” as symptoms of traumatic experience, see Leys, Trauma. For a discussion of the 
implementation of these criteria for victims of trauma, see Caruth, Trauma: Explorations. 
 
10 The majority of articles published on Extremely Loud & Incredibly Close argue that Foer’s 
“crackpot” characters are each affected by one or another symptom of trauma, and that Extremely Loud and 
Incredibly Close reflects the etiology of traumatic experience. See Atchison; Codde, “Philomela”; Saal; and 
Versluys. 
Several recently published articles on Slaughterhouse-Five have attempted to diagnose Billy 
Pilgrim, and Vonnegut by extension, with PTSD, and as a result have read the novel as a testament to the 
traumatic effects of his surviving the bombing of Dresden. See Broer; Brown; Cacicedo; Rigney; and Vees-
Gulani, Trauma and Guilt and “Diagnosing Billy Pilgrim.” 
Rigney and Vees-Gulani contextualize the narrative’s representations of the Dresden firebombing 
within its actual historical circumstances, and read Vonnegut’s framing against German cutural memory of 
the firebombing. For histories of the Dresden firebombing and the air war over Germany, see Friedrich; 
Irving; and Kennet. 
Much of the remaining criticism on Slaughterhouse-Five can be divided into three camps. For 
those who read the novel as documenting Vonnegut’s actual avowal of fatalist philosophy and a “so it 
goes” theory of time, agency, and determinism, see Coleman; Edelstein; Harris, “Illusion and Absurdity”; 
Tanner; and Merrill and Scholl. For arguments regarding the place of Slaughterhouse-Five amid narrative 
and stylistic innovations of the nascent postmodern period, see Klinkowitz, Literary Disruptions, Kurt 
Vonnegut, Slaughterhouse-Five, Structuring the Void, and The Vonnegut Effect. For arguments regarding 
Vonnegut’s embrace of a folksy humanism, see Abele; Davis, “Apocalyptic Grumbling” and “Kurt 
Vonnegut’s Crusade; Glover; Lingel; Lundquist; McCoppin; Spatt; Thomas; and Vonnegut, A Man without 
a Country. The argument over Vonnegut’s relationship to technology and science fiction reaches back to 
his earliest incorporation into academic critical conversation. See K. and C. Wood; Glen Meeter, 
“Vonnegut’s Formal and Moral Otherworldliness: Cat’s Cradle and Slaughterhouse-Five”; and Willis 
McNeely, “Kurt Vonnegut as Science-Fiction Writer,” in The Vonnegut Statement. 
 
11 See R. Smith. 
 
12 On the notion of “working through” traumatic experiences, see LaCapra. 
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13 In Trauma: A Genealogy, Leys argues that Caruth and psychologist Bessel van der Kolk, from 
whose work Caruth draws her theories of trauma,  
 
 
are committed to the widespread post-Holocaust assumption according to which any 
attempt to represent trauma…is distortive….From this perspective, the concept of trauma 
as literal provides an essentially ethical solution to the crisis of representation posed by 
trauma in our time. As such a solution, trauma in its literality, muteness, and 
unavailability for representation becomes a sacred object or ‘icon’ that would be a 
‘sacrilege’ to misappropriate or tamper with in any way. (252-53) 
 
 
Leys critique puts into perspective the extent to which theories of trauma create the conditions of their own 
veracity through insinuating an ethical dilemma between the presumptive truth of embodied symptoms and 
unassailability of the historical experiences to which those symptoms are argued to testify. For further 
critiques of the relationship between trauma and affect, see Goldman and Leys, “Navigating.” 
 
14 On the relationship between the body and traumatic symptomatology, see van der Kolk and van 
der Hart; Crawford; and Cuddy-Keane. 
 
15 For a history of the bombing of Hamburg, see Lowe. As he explains the title of the British 
operation, “the symbolic implication…was clear: God’s power to rain down fire and destruction upon the 
earth now lay in man’s hands, and was being wielded in what the British Establishment saw as just 
retribution for the damage that the Luftwaffe had caused during the Blitz” (64).  
 
16 For the “Pentagon Papers” descriptions of Rolling Thunder, see United States. For histories of 
the operation, see Weist, ed.; and Preston. 
 
17 Many arguments throughout Vonnegut’s reception history have oscillated between reading the 
frequency of “so it goes” as indicating either Vonnegut’s “quietism,” “fatalism,” or his humanist hope for 
redemption. Yet as Donald Morse has suggested, we can more productively read Billy’s character as a 
caricature whose quietism is a caution. See Morse, Imagining. 
 
18 On homemaking and “at-homeness” as continual processes, see Kaplan. For a reading of 
masculinity and domestic fiction, see Jacobson. Jacobson argues that “neodomestic fiction,” her term for 
fiction since the 1980s engaged with scripts of nineteenth century domestic novels, breaks into two 
distinctive modes according to the gender of the author. Male-authored neodomestic fiction is usually 
bound up with property disputes, and the home is usually couched as a space of confinement. Conversely, 
she readers female-authored domestic fiction as inclusive and fostering, and the domestic space as open, 
ranging, and transitory. Though she attempts throughout her project to “trouble” these divisive frames, she 
inevitably reinscribes the traditional division of spheres that many critics working on nineteenth-century 
domestic and sentimental fiction, from Nina Baym’s 1978 Woman’s Fiction through to the present, have 
sought to deconstruct. See Cathy N. Davidson’s special issue of American Literature entitled No More 
Separate Spheres! for landmark arguments in the debate over the traditionally gendered divisions of 
domestic fiction. 
 
 19 Adjusted for inflation, Billy’s projected income is roughly equivalent to between two-hundred 
fifty and three-hundred thousand dollars per year in 2015.  
 
20 Noting that the John Birch Society’s outlook on the Warren courts supposed threat to the unity 
of the Republic struck many as “paranoid,” historical Klaus Fischer argues that “what made the Warren 
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Court so menacing to conservative Americans was its unabashed liberal activism” (159). The Warren Court 
issued decisions in several monumental cases during the 1960s and early 1970s, most of which revolved 
around securing constitutional rights for persons of color, women, and the accused. These decisions range 
from the groundbreaking though ultimately difficult to implement decision in Brown v. Board of Education 
(1954) to Miranda v. Arizona (1966) to Roe v. Wade (1973). The Warren court’s decision in Brown v. 
Board provoked heightened racial tensions throughout the United States. Fischer reports that President 
Eisenhower, who appointed Warren to the court, “had second thoughts…” later claiming, “it was ‘the 
biggest damnfool decision I ever made’” (52). 
 
21 For a reading of Slaughterhouse-Five and the air war in Vietnam, see Donald Morse, Imagining. 
On LeMay’s and Mitchell’s role in developing the strategy of total war through advancements in U.S. air 
power, see Kennet. 
Voiced through optometric metaphors, the Major’s argument suggests Vonnegut’s allusion to a 
strange turn of 1968 presidential politics. During his campaign for president, Alabama Governor and 
avowed white supremacist George Wallace selected retired Air Force General Curtis LeMay as his running 
mate. As Klaus Fischer reports LeMay, who along with Billy Mitchell was instrumental in developing 
strategic bombing as a means of waging a total war of attrition, made Wallace “look even more menacing 
than he really was, talking freely about his fondness for nuclear weapons. One way to win the Vietnam 
War, the general had already advised, ‘was to bomb North Vietnam back into the Stone Age’” (237). 
Through setting these national-political arguments in a meeting of a suburban Lion’s Club, Vonnegut 
suggests that arguments for unchecked violence on a nation-to-nation scale gain affective traction through 
generating and sustaining a myopic focus on the local and the individual.  
 
22 See Siegel for an acerbic but representative example of many popular-press reviews. See also 
Beck; Gates; and Meyers. 
 
23 For a reading of the intertwining of temporality, Bush-era politics, the response to 9/11, and 
Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close, see Huehls, “Foer” and Qualified. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
To argue that white men represent themselves as wounded in contemporary U.S. 
culture is in a sense to state the obvious. From Kaja Silverman’s Male Subjectivity at the 
Margins through to Amanda Lotz’s recent study of contemporary U.S. television dramas, 
Cable Guys, since at least the early 1990s scholars interested in fictional representations 
of white masculinity have pointed out the ways white men are imagined to inhabit 
wounded bodies as metonyms for their wounded subject positions. Announcements of the 
“crisis of masculinity” in the 1990s were echoed in the early 2010s, as Lotz notes, 
through magazine articles announcing the “end of men.”1 Nearly all of these 
announcements center on the core notion that previously hegemonic modes of white 
masculinity have run out of steam against waning cultural patience with their uncritical 
recycling. One might argue that contemporary gender dynamics are simply different now, 
that heteronorms have come under intense deconstructive scrutiny, that race is a more 
visible and more palpable element of U.S. cultural conversation that at any time since the 
1960s, and so representations of the traditional center of power in U.S. gender and racial 
hierarchies have to shift in accordance with the reality that grounds the logic of their 
representativity. However this line of argument carries on the one hand the presumption 
that shifts in cultural attitudes toward gender, sexuality, and race are what wounds white 
masculinity, and on the other the presumption that wounded white men are performing 
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their woundedness in response to these shifts. Wounded men cannot possibly be sincere 
about their wounds, in other words, because despite the changes to which some critics 
may point as evidence of shifting power dynamics in U.S. culture, white masculinity 
retains its centrality through mobilizing its mutability as a form of its power.2 
If whiteness can be everywhere and nowhere, continuously in focus and yet very 
hard to see,3 and if through these assumptions white masculinity can be mutable and 
central, wounded and strong, anxious and stable, why can it not be sincere? In writing 
this project, I set out to challenge the assumptions that underpin wounded white 
masculinity’s apparently fundamental insincerity, but through the process I came to a 
different understanding of the relationship between insincerity, dissimulation, irony, and 
performances of sincerity that stretch beyond the frameworks offered within previous 
studies. Rather than holding to a more orthodox notion of performances of wounded 
white masculinity as dissimulation, I have read the sincerity through which those 
performances are articulated as expressive of the content they supposedly mask.  
Following Alexie’s and Walters’s phenomenologies of white masculinity, and 
contextualizing my work with nonnative self-representation within the critical orbit of 
Indigenous studies scholarship, gender studies, and queer studies, I have argued 
throughout this project that performances of sincerity, through their performativity, 
manifest the relationships between bodies and the resultant experiences and perceptual 
contours that otherwise appear as fixed formations filtering their way down from the 
plane of ideology into the realm of social interactivity. In this sense, performances of 
sincerity manifest the ideological content about which wounded white men imagine 
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themselves to be sincere, whether it is presented as durable attachments to spatial 
occupation as in Alexie’s and Walters’s novels, as attachments to plain human 
personhood as in DeLillo’s and Wallace’s, or as figurations of national familial 
domesticity and maternal care in Vonnegut’s and Foer’s work.  
 In this sense, we can read fictional representations of wounded whiteness not as 
strategic misrepresentations of whiteness’s enduring centrality but as sincere fictions that 
represent whiteness as the experience of prosthetic belonging. As Alexie and Walters 
suggest, the experience of prosthetic belonging inheres in the structure of settler-
coloniality and is expressed through whiteness as a structure of feeling within which the 
experience of settlement fades into the background. Experiencing whiteness as a wound 
thus flags a relationship to belonging and emplacement rather than a reaction to changes 
in one’s position within a shifting cultural milieu.4 It is the experience of woundedness as 
propelling the capacity to position others as emotional and affective prostheses, to seek 
out alternate ways to work one’s attachments to space and place, that wounded whiteness 
names, and it is the shape of those experiences that I have attempted to trace through the 
examples of contemporary, male-authored, male-centered, nonnative self-representation 
featured in this project.  
To the extent that Wallace or Foer can imagine themselves as speaking on behalf 
of human emotionality rather than as producing a particularized notion of humanity 
through representatively affected white men, fictional representations take on a degree of 
representativity that lends them the self-authorized gravity in which their authors can feel 
vested. In other words, sincere fictions imagine the world as already having taken shape 
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around what they can be sincere about. To the extent that the worlds that come into view 
in their novels take shape around the experience of whiteness, the centrality of that 
experience speaks to whiteness’s relationship to the settler-colonial structures that 
produce it as a privileged subject position. When that central experience is rendered as a 
wound, we see the privileged centrality of settler-feeling as settler-belonging become 
even more deeply entrenched into the discourse of plain humanity. Wounded whiteness 
thus becomes a surrogate for one’s presumptively plain belonging because within a U.S.-
frame whiteness is presumed as a given formation stable enough to withstand being 
wounded. 
 
Everyday Forms of Wounded Whiteness 
Taking Alexie’s and Walters’s theories of wounded whiteness seriously, however, 
involves widening the angle of our critical lens beyond a focus on fictional 
representations of wounded white men toward the terrain of everyday life sincere fictions 
attempt to capture. To illustrate the ways these representations emerge in everyday life, I 
want to introduce a local, small-scale example of how wounded whiteness takes shape 
and of how quickly whiteness can toggle between a description of systemic concerns and 
a marker of individual victimization.  
While serving on the county Housing Authority board, Rowan County, North 
Carolina Elections Board Chairman Malcom Butner took to Facebook to add his 
perspective to a series of what were called “Moral Monday” protests held in Raleigh.5 
Josh Bergeron of the Salisbury Post reports that Butner’s Facebook post argued whites 
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were not participating in the Moral Monday actions because “they were too busy 
working, being productive, good citizens.” A year later, Butner’s seat on the Elections 
Board came under scrutiny after North Carolina GOP Press Secretary Kara Carter 
reported to the Associated Press that his Facebook comments were “offensive,” and that, 
as if to add to the embarrassment, his nomination had been the result of a clerical error 
and as a result the party had asked him to step down.6 As Elections Board Chairman, 
Butner would oversee and certify final vote counts, and as Bergeron reports, would have 
a hand in “deciding early voting sites and approving provisional ballots.” Worry that 
Butner’s racist commentary might filter into the execution of his duties as Elections 
Board Chairman, calls for his resignation began to grow louder. Butner, however, called 
the fear “poppycock,” explained that he would follow the “letter and spirit” of the law, 
and further that he had been made the victim of political correctness and would not resign 
under any circumstances.  
What stands out about this incident and the reporting around it is not so much the 
racism embedded in Butner’s commentary, nor the sense that his attitudes might manifest 
in his job performance, but instead his own sense of victimhood in the face of public calls 
for his acknowledgement of the interrelationship between systemic racism and everyday 
life. Consigning concern about a public official’s attitudes to little more than 
“poppycock” and “political correctness,” Butner’s tactics suggest the evasiveness one 
might expect. However, his characterization of whiteness as a surrogate for good, 
upstanding citizenship and productive labor point to the ways whiteness is experienced as 
prosthetic belonging to the state configured as shaped around white bodies whose labor 
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secures the impossibility of their incongruity with the state’s aims. Butner’s comment 
suggests that white persons simply do not have the time to engage in political protest 
because they have chosen to invest it in ensuring the state’s future. Butner thus implies 
that persons of color experience their relationship to the state as a surplus of time 
stemming from their bodies’ nonproductive relationship to the furtherance of its goals.  
These implications mark the contortions performed by a phrase like “political 
correctness,” especially when that phrase is used to describe an improper relationship to 
political reality. Butner’s attachment of white bodies to citizenship points to the “correct” 
orientation toward politics and the state and generates a disciplinary structure wherein 
whiteness is assumed to produce an orientation toward state-supporting labor and good 
citizenship. By making political correctness the subject of irony, Butner’s comments 
enable his victimhood to seem genuine on the one hand and, on the other, to seem like the 
result of his attachment to the correct orientation his comments envision whiteness to 
produce. Within this logic, one can appeal to one’s physical whiteness as a marker of 
one’s victimhood while likewise appealing to its systemic configuration as a marker of 
one’s durable attachment to a virtuous and productive relationship with the state. 
Butner’s refusal to resign suggests that the sincerity of his attachments elaborate a felt 
part of his everyday experience of whiteness, and it points to the ways that whiteness as a 
systemic set of concerns, public anxieties, and political implications fall away against the 
horizon of individuated opinion and expression. It is through this logic that whiteness 
toggles between a visible marker descriptive of one’s body and a framework wherein 
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marking oneself becomes a way to sincerely express one’s attachments to durable forms 
of belonging and productivity.  
The conjunction of race, gender, and affect this example puts on display speaks to 
the enduring applicability of Walters’s notion of whiteness as a plugged-up sensorium. 
From within it, the work one performs to attach oneself to the state feels like an absence 
borne by the bodies of others; when that work is called into question victimhood becomes 
an available position through which one can situate oneself as more closely and durably 
attached. The simplicity of Walters’s theory of whiteness is thus arguably its greatest 
strength for examining wounded whiteness as a representational structure as much as a 
manifestation within everyday life. Rather than search for some other catalyst for 
changing representations of white masculinity, Walters’s sense of experiences, attitudes, 
and inclinations accumulating into habitual orientations calls for turning toward the 
experiences and attitudes that get taken up as representative and for beginning to read 
them as exactly the stuff that pushes white masculinity toward other bodies as anchor 
points through which to express a sincere, deeply felt sense of belonging and attachment.  
 
Re-Reading Contemporary Fiction as Nonnative Self-Representation 
Walters’s and Alexie’s phenomenologies of whiteness confront readers of 
contemporary nonnative fiction with the process of settlement’s enduring continuance 
and with the enduring effects of settlement as a lived, affective structure on the shape of 
contemporary nonnative self-representation and experience. As Aileen Moreton-
Robinson argues with respect to whiteness studies, so long as manifestations of settler-
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feeling and settler-belonging remain out of focus in contemporary U.S. fiction the blur at 
the center of our critical lens will continue to occlude the stakes of their imperceptibility.7 
This may be another, broader function of the “plugged-up” sensorium Walters represents 
throughout Ghost Singer. But as Walters’s novel indicates, the kinds of blockages that 
plug up one’s ability to perceive the contours of settlement as a part of one’s everyday, 
lived surround are no more permanent than they are obstructive. As I have shown 
throughout my work with DeLillo, Wallace, Vonnegut, and Foer, perceptual blockages 
are generative of other modes of feeling and ways of engaging. Though ethically 
complicated and certainly conceptually difficult, as Walters suggests throughout Ghost 
Singer, it remains possible to reorient one’s inclinations and attitudes toward different 
ways of understanding and perceiving one’s relationship to the historical and present-day 
violence that produces settler-belonging as the given experience of whiteness.  
I have attempted to demonstrate what this different orientation might look like as 
a way of reading contemporary nonnative representations of wounds, whiteness, and 
masculinity and how those representations become focused through the lens of sincerity. 
This is not, nor do I hope for it to be, the only way to examine the contours of settler-
belonging in nonnative fiction. In examining wounded whiteness as an affective 
formation through which settler-feeling is articulated, I have sought to extend the scope 
of scholarship on representations of white masculinity and to push critics of 
contemporary nonnative fiction toward alternate ways of reading that are as attuned to 
affect and relationality as they are politically mindful of the resultant imbrication of 
settler-structures and modes of feeling that such representations produce. The broader 
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goal running alongside this more direct focus is to encourage fellow scholars of 
contemporary U.S. narrative to consider the extent to which such a frame applies to the 
bulk of contemporary U.S. writing.  
If wounded whiteness is the experience of prosthetic belonging within settlement, 
then other forms of prosthetic relations to a felt sense of being in place through 
occupying space are equally as palpable across the corpus of U.S. nonnative writing. 
What would it mean in this vein to look again at something as seemingly remote from 
Indigenous concerns as Hemingway’s The Sun Also Rises (1926) for the ways it 
represents the transitory character of affective belonging to U.S. space? What would 
come into focus in a much more contemporary novel like Jonathan Franzen’s Freedom 
(2010) if we were to re-read the characters’ protracted relationships to existential freedom 
as stemming from a secure sense of locatedness that permits their wandering affects to 
feel rootless? How could we reinterpret the Vietnam trauma and subsequent personality 
play of Tim O’Brien’s protagonist from In the Lake of the Woods (1994) against the 
narrative’s titular backdrop of Ojibwe lands? Or Chang-Rae Lee’s embattled 
protagonist’s relationship to the American promise of wealth, happiness, and home in 
Aloft (2004)? That such a list of narratives and questions could go on for some time 
suggests the potential of re-reading contemporary U.S. writing as nonnative self-
representation, and of theorizing it alongside Native-authored creative and intellectual 
work as an affective archive of settler-feeling through which one can trace the ways 
settlement comes to feel like a given.  
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To the extent that settlement feels like a given it follows that settlement remains 
something one can feel. The narratives this project has examined demonstrate that the 
relationship between what can be felt and how it feels is a function of one’s broader 
phenomenological situatedness and the degree of access to persons, spaces, and objects 
one’s situatedness produces. Where wounded whiteness becomes a strategy, as in sincere 
fictions or everyday examples, it can be critically deconstructed and recontextualized in 
hopes of defamiliarizing the given content through which it takes form. As a structure of 
feeling, wounded whiteness articulates the lived manifestation and interarticulation of the 
large- and small-scale frames through which settler-belonging becomes familiar. 
Defamiliarizing this relationship requires a different way to focus its representations, one 
informed by the critical, political, and ethical perspective of Indigenous writers and 
thinkers and oriented toward continuing the manifestation of Indigenous sovereignty, 
survival, and self-determination through disarticulating the givenness of settler-belonging 
across the variety of its everyday representations. 
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Notes
 
1 See Lotz (179-85). 
 
2 On the “lability” of white masculinity as a reactive formation, see Carroll (9-10).  
 
3 I am paraphrasing from Richard Dyer, White and George Lipsitz, The Possessive Investment in 
Whiteness, respectively.  
 
4 On reactive formations, see Carroll (1-23). 
 
5 The information regarding Butner’s comments and response is drawn from Bergeron’s reporting 
for the Salisbury Post. See Bergeron, “Update.”  
 
6 As of August 2015, Butner had not yet resigned his post as County Elections Board Chairman. 
All references to his current office are thus dated. 
 
7 See Moreton-Robinson, “Writing off Treaties.” 
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